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ABSTRACT  
 
Although Common Pool Resources (CPRs) make up a significant share of total income for 
rural households in Ethiopia and elsewhere in developing world, limited access to these 
resources and environmental degradation threaten local livelihoods. As a result, the issues 
of management, governance of CPRs and how to prevent their over-exploitation are of 
great importance for development policy. This study examines the current state and 
dynamics of CPRs and overall resource governance system of the Lake Tana sub-basin. 
This research employed the modified Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework. The framework integrates the concept of Socio-ecological Systems and 
Interactive Governance perspectives where social actors, institutions, the politico-economic 
context, discourses and ecological features across governance and government levels were 
considered. It has been observed that overexploitation, degradation and encroachment of 
CPRs have increased dramatically and this threatens the sustainability of Lake Tana 
ecosystem. The stakeholder analysis result reveals that there are multiple stakeholders with 
diverse interest in and power over CPRs that often lead to competition and conflict. Local 
community, private investors, governmental, non-governmental, national and international 
stakeholders are engaged in the process of resource use, management and governance. The 
analysis of institutional arrangements reveals that the existing formal rules and regulations 
governing access to and control over CPRs could not be implemented and were not 
effective to legally bind and govern CPR user’s behavior at the operational level. The study 
also shows that a top-down and non-participatory policy formulation, law and decision 
making process that overlooks the local contexts (local knowledge and informal 
institutions) fails to understand the diverse, dynamic, complex and sensitive nature of the 
natural and human sub-systems. The outcomes of examining the participation of local 
resource users, as an alternative to a centralized, command-and-control, and hierarchical 
approach to resource management and governance, have called for a fundamental shift in 
CPR use, management and governance to facilitate the participation of stakeholders in 
decision-making. Therefore, establishing a multi-level stakeholder governance system as an 
institutional structure and process is necessary to sustain stakeholder participation in 
decision-making regarding CPR use, management and governance. 
Keywords: Common pool resource, governance, institutional arrangement, stakeholder, Lake Tana, 
Ethiopia. 
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GLOSSARY: DEFINITIONS OF LOCAL TERMS  
 
Expression  
in English 
Language Explanation  
Birr ብር Amharic Ethiopian Currency, Approx. 24.45 Birr is 
equivalent to 1 Euro (as of July 11, 2013) 
 
 
  
Dek ደቅ Amharic An island in Lake Tana on which about 10,000 
people are residing. 
 
 
  
Derg ደርግ Amharic The short name of a committee of military junta 
which ruled Ethiopia from 1974 until 1991 and 
overthrown by EPRDF. 
 
 
  
Equb ̂እቁብ̃/ ̂ቁብ̃ Amharic A rotating credit association in which each of its 
members contributes money periodically and the 
amount collected at each period is provided to 
one of the members often on a lottery system 
 
 
  
Edir እድር Amharic Edir is a traditional community organization in 
different parts of Ethiopia whose members assist 
each other during the mourning process. 
 
 
  
Gubbo ጉቦ Amharic is a local Amharic term to mean ‘a gift for 
someone, in exchange for doing something 
special’ equivalent to English word corruption’ or 
‘bribery’ 
 
 
  
kebele ቀበሌ Amharic The lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia 
 
 
  
Negede 
woyto  
ነገደ-ወይጦ Amharic  This tribe is among the poorest section of the 
society in Amhara National Regional State and 
they are believed to be indigenous people in the 
Southern tip of Lake Tana who were fisher and 
hunter men.  
 
 
  
‘Tana biderk 
eske dek’ 
̂ጣና’ቢደርቅ’
እስከ’ደቅ̃ 
Amharic It is a motto mostly said by local farmers who 
live and owned farmland around the shore of 
Lake Tana. It is to mean ‘if Tana dry, we will 
plough up to Dek Island’. 
 
 
  
Wereda ወረዳ Amharic Administrative unit that comprises several 
kebeles equivalent to English word ‘ district’ 
 
 
  
Ye giligil 
Shimagile 
የግልግል’
ሽማግሌ 
Amharic The village elders who are old enough and 
respected to settle disputes in their village 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study  
 
A large proportion of the poorest rural households in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
depend critically on common-pool resources (CPRs hereafter)-such as forests, wetlands, 
fisheries, and rangelands-for their food, livelihood and make up a significant share of total 
income (Ratner, 2011, Kemekes, 2012). As a result, the issues of management, governance 
of CPRs and how to prevent their over-exploitation as population grows are of great 
importance for development policy (Wade, 1987). Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, all 
types of land based livelihoods are constrained by a combination of population pressures, 
land shortages and resource constraints (Andrew et al. 2003) that ultimately can lead to 
conflict over resources.  
 
The problem is even worse in Ethiopia, where it is quite a common phenomenon to 
experience a recurrent drought, resource depletion and degradation accompanied by a 
dramatic population increase. According to the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) the 
Ethiopian population is estimated to be 84,320, 987 (CSA, July 1, 2012 est.), whereas the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States population projection estimates the 
population of Ethiopia to be 93,815,992 (July, 2012 est.), which would make Ethiopia the 
second most populous country in Africa and the 13th in the world. With a population annual 
growth rate of 3.179 % Ethiopia also ranked 5th in the world in terms of growth rate (July, 
2012 est).  
 
The country exhibits one of the lowest rates of urbanization where only 15% of the 
population dwells in urban centers. The remaining 85% of the population resides in rural 
areas engaged in subsistence agriculture. As a result, arable land per household and access to 
CPRs is decreasing making the land based resource issue critical. Average land size holding 
in the country remains at about 1 hectare per household. This is equivalent to a mere 0.2 
hectare per head with an average rural household size of 5, which is mostly used for staple 
crop production (CSA, 2005).   
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Population pressure combined with other socio-economic factors cause environmental 
scarcity that denotes the social effects of the combined impacts of i) environmental 
degradation shrinking the total size of an imagined environmental ‘resource pie’, e.g. arable 
land, wetland, aquifer; ii) population increase shrinking the size of the equitably allotted 
‘slices’ of the resource pie; and iii) unequal resource access allowing powerful segments of 
the population to access inequitably large amounts of resource slices in a process of 
‘resource capture’. This results in ecological marginalization and loss of livelihoods for large 
but weaker groups of the population which inherently causes conflict over resources 
(Ohlsson, 2000).  
 
The consequences of these environmental scarcities, degradation, depletion in the north and 
central parts of Ethiopia, which includes major parts of the Amhara region, have caused 
stagnation in agriculture, an ever decreasing amount of land per capita for cultivation and 
livestock production, degrading CPRs, and less income for the rural and urban community. 
On the other hand almost all the rural population-and many urban people too- are CPR users 
in one way or another (IFAD, 1995; Sapkota and Oden, 2008). Particularly rural households 
are highly dependent on CPRs for their livelihood. Common-pool resources are usually 
characterized by (a) multiple use values, such as consumptive, recreational, environmental 
and spiritual (Baland and Platteau, 1999) and (b) multiple users with different powers and 
interests. When resource units are highly valued and many stakeholders benefit from 
harvesting them for consumption, exchange, or as a factor in a production process, the 
harvests made by one individual or actor are likely to create negative externalities for others 
(Ostrom, 2008).  
 
Therefore, this dependence and diverse use pattern of CPRs have become an important 
topical issue in developing economies like Ethiopia (IFAD, 1995, Sapkota and Oden, 2008). 
Any degradation of CPRs will have an adverse impact on rural livelihoods, particularly of 
the poor. Environmental degradation through reduction of common property resources 
decreases earnings of the rural mass. This deterioration of resources increases the incidence 
of poverty, as these poor are exclusively dependent on the stock of natural resources 
(Mahanta and Das, 2012). 
3 
 
This thesis therefore explores the CPR governance and institutional arrangements in Lake 
Tana sub-basin of Amhara Region, Northern Ethiopia. Common-pool resource governance is 
a challenge to the resource users as well as for those who have a stake in the CPR 
governance system, particularly under conditions of change and resource pressure. These 
resources may be governed and managed by a wide variety of institutional arrangements that 
can be roughly grouped as governmental ownership, private ownership or community 
ownership. In recent times, a considerable number of CPRs are co-managed by communities 
working with governments (Ostrom, 2008).  
 
In this regard, to design an improved natural resource governance and management system 
for a local context, a detailed analysis of the existing, emerging and proposed socio-
economic, socio-political and institutional factors is a prerequisite. However, previous 
analysis of institutions related to natural resource management in the study area normally 
focused only on national or regional mechanisms and programmes in place. Even though it is 
accepted that these programmes contribute significantly to natural resource management, the 
role of institutional arrangements and governance regimes at local/user level cannot be 
ignored. Several recent and ongoing research initiatives have dealt in one way or another 
with the biological, hydrological and environmental aspects of Lake Tana sub-basin, but 
they were inadequate to illustrate the human-nature interaction and the trends in resource 
degradation, and to anticipate possible solutions especially in reference to institutional 
arrangements and natural resource governance at local/user level. Therefore, this research is 
designed to critically analyze and understand the institutions that govern the CPRs, local 
community1 and the roles, responsibilities and interaction of stakeholders in conflicting or 
cooperative situations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Local community- is understood in this thesis as a local unit of actors using or making decisions over 
Common pool resources (CPRs). It is not necessary a homogeneous group with similar interests and 
objectives (Clement, 2010). 
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1.2 Problem Statement   
 
Lake Tana, located in north-west Ethiopia, is the second largest freshwater lake in Africa. It 
accounts for 50 per cent of the total inland water area of Ethiopia and feeds the Blue Nile 
River, which contributes about 85 per cent to the total flow of water in the Nile. However, 
recent developments in the region around the lake, and particularly around Bahar Dar, a 
rapidly growing town on the southern shores of the lake, have cast doubt on the 
sustainability of the use value of the lake in general and in relation to fish and wetlands 
resources in particular (Berhanu et al. 2001). Thus, it is possible that degradation of the 
aquatic ecosystem could go unnoticed and eventually bring disastrous effects on the Lake 
Tana ecosystem and the livelihoods of the local community (Miheret and Tollner, 2009). 
 
The main characteristic of Lake Ecosystem landscapes is that they contain resource systems 
with multiple-use value and which are used by multiple actors. The relationship between 
these dynamic and diverse landscapes (multiple use) and the differentiated users (multiple 
users) can be analyzed and understood through how different stakeholders satisfy their needs 
and local people derive their livelihoods by having legitimate control over resources (Leach 
et al. 1999).  
 
When resource users interact without effective institutional arrangements limiting access and 
defining rights and duties, two potential CPR dilemmas are likely to happen; over use 
without concern for the negative effect on the others, and lack of contribution or incentive to 
maintain and improve the CPR itself (Ostrom, 1999). Principally, common-pool resources in 
and around Lake Tana share with public goods, the difficulty of developing physical or 
institutional means of excluding beneficiaries; therefore it is hardly possible to manage these 
resources among user groups in a sustainable manner. If exclusion is physically difficult and 
effective rules are not in place to limit who can use a resource and what can be withdrawn 
from it, then all harvesters face an incentive to increase their own harvesting rate without any 
concern for the impact of their actions on the costs for others (and eventually for 
themselves)(National Research Council, 2002). Second, the products or resource units from 
CPRs share with private goods the attribute that one person’s consumption subtracts from 
the quantity available to others (Ostrom, 2000).  
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The non-excludability and subtractability nature of CPRs coupled with environmental 
changes, population pressure, and the subsequent demand for more resources to sustain rural 
livelihoods, result in CPRs now being under severe threat in Ethiopia in general and Lake 
Tana sub-basin in particular. Unless harvesting or use limits are devised and enforced, CPRs 
in the sub-basin are potentially subject to problems of congestion, over-exploitation, 
depletion or degradation. On the other hand, when the multi-purpose values of Lake Tana 
are considered, there are conflicts arising from different stakeholders exploiting resources for 
various goals. In the context of environmental changes and livelihood dynamics, 
stakeholders tend to explore and capture resources for survival and/or for additional benefit 
in different ways. Unless means are devised to keep non-authorized users from benefiting, 
the strong temptation to free ride on the efforts of others will lead to a suboptimal investment 
in improving the resource, monitoring use, and sanctioning rule-breaking behavior (Ostrom, 
2000).  
 
However, despite a general natural resource management framework, there is no specific 
policy framework that addresses the CPR dilemma in the sub-basin. Also the existing 
general policies are not developed and implemented in such a way that resource user and 
other relevant stakeholders are involved at all stages of the policy making and 
implementation process. Resource user groups and other stakeholders in the study area have 
been confronted with a broad array of resource governance problems in the past two decades. 
Lake Tana is in a state of emergency where different development pressures and resource 
degradation cast doubt on the sustainability of the Lake ecosystem.  Stakeholders are in a 
continuous debate on resource management and governance.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Concerning Lake Tana, despite some analysis of institutional arrangements of the Nile Basin 
at Federal and sub-regional level, the extent to which existing laws, polices, programs and 
regulations devolved to the lowest level, may constrain or aid the development and 
implementation of natural resources management and governance at local/user level is not 
well known. Particularly, governance in relation to CPRs and the Lake Tana environment is 
relatively less explored and understood.  Institutional mechanisms for managing across Lake 
Tana jurisdictions under the CPR governance are largely unknown.  
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Analyzing and understanding of the common causes of conflict in CPR use and governance 
systems can help one succeed in overcoming the destructive effects of unresolved CPR 
conflict in the sub-basin. It is therefore important to identify and understand the institutional 
arrangements and CPR governance regimes, the factors that favour or retard the development 
and effectiveness of local institutions and organizations. However, to date there is 
insufficient evidence regarding the nature and type of local level institutional arrangements 
and organizations for CPR governance in particular for fisheries and wetland. More 
generally, since CPR management and governance is likely to be context specific; there is 
need for more research in Ethiopia in general and Lake Tana sub-basin in particular. 
Therefore, the present research is conducted to reveal the institutional arrangements and CPR 
governance systems in developing the strategies of improved and sustainable CPR 
governance and management systems. This research also focuses on the multiple and 
overlapping nature of resource users, governance structures and specific challenges created 
by these multiple use value-multiple actors in Lake Tana sub-basin.  
 
Generally, research approaches and empirical studies on CPR in Ethiopia and elsewhere in 
Africa are largely comprised of case studies or synthesis across disparate resources focusing 
on a single resource systems (such as grazing/range lands, irrigation systems, forest etc2.) 
without considering their interrelationships and complexity of the broader system while a 
holistic-systemic approach to problem solving, especially for large-scale and complex 
socioeconomic problems (Haimes, 1992) is vital to better understand the whole system. 
Therefore this study aims to address the complex nature of the Lake Tana ecosystem from 
the complex system thinking perspectives where dynamic patterns of interactions between 
human groups and their environment (social-ecological systems) are arranged in a nested 
series of tiers (McGinnis, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 See for example; Ashenafi and Leader-Williams, 2005; Stellmacher, 2007; Wondie, 2010; Atnafu et al. 2011; Awulachew 
et al. 2009. 
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1.3 Objectives of the study 
 
The general objective of the study is to investigate the current state and dynamics of CPRs, 
overall institutional environment, common-pool resource governance system and multi-
stakeholder interactions of Lake Tana sub-basin in the context of sustainability and 
environmental changes. The main hypothesis for this research is that the Lake Tana 
ecosystem, particularly CPRs (water, fish and wetlands), is under severe challenge and the 
existing institutional arrangements that are supposed to govern the CPRs are not effective to 
protect the Lake ecosystems from overutilization and degradation. Although proclamations 
and legislations to manage and govern natural resources are enacted at constitutional level, 
due to weak enforcement mechanisms and the lack of key stakeholders’ involvement and 
coordination, these rules and regulations are not put in place at user level.  
 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
 
 To analyze the current state and dynamics of CPRs and its policy implication for livelihood 
security and sustainable CPR use, management and governance.  
 
 To explore the drivers of change that affect CPR use, management and governance and the 
roles of key players in the process of CPR use, management and governance. 
 
 
 To identify the causes and management of conflict among stakeholders over CPRs at 
different scales. 
 
 To describe the existing institutional arrangements and identify factors influencing their 
effectiveness to govern the behavior of CPR users. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
 
This study seeks to identify the trends in conditions and describe the pressures being exerted 
on Lake Tana environment in general and CPRs in particular. In addition, the research seeks 
to understand how CPR institutions are devolved from the constitutional level to operational 
level to govern the behaviors’ of resource users and other stakeholders in efficient use, 
equitable allocation, and sustainable conservation of resources. The study specifically 
addresses the following questions;  
 
 What are the current states and dynamics of CPRs and what are the policy 
implication for livelihood security and sustainable CPR use, management and 
governance? 
 
 What are the drivers of change that affect CPR use, management and governance? 
 
 Who are the key players in the process of CPR use, management and governance 
and what are their interests and power over CPRs? 
 
 
 Why do conflicts arise around CPR use, management and governance and what are 
the underlying causes of conflict and resolution mechanisms? 
 
 What are the existing institutional arrangements that govern the behavior of CPR 
users and what are the factors influencing the effectiveness of CPR management 
and governance system? 
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1.5 Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is organized into eight main chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to 
the dissertation, which presents the overall context of the research, the research problems and 
the key research questions and objectives to be addressed. Chapter two describes the 
theoretical and conceptual framework of the research. The subsequent sections of this 
chapter explicitly discuss the concepts and definitions used in this research and elucidate the 
theoretical background of the research framework. The theoretical framework provides a 
general structure that can hold or support a theory of the research and it represents the theory 
which explains why the problem under study exists. The conceptual framework outlines the 
specific direction by which this research has been undertaken. 
 
Chapter three elucidates the research methodology of the dissertation. It describes and 
summarizes the study area, research design, sampling design and technique, data collection 
and analysis methods. Chapter four looks at the state of Lake Tana ecosystem (the natural 
‘sub-system-to-be governed’) from the interactive governance perspective. The current state 
and dynamics of CPRs and the policy implications for livelihood and sustainable CPR use, 
management and governance are briefly discussed. Chapter five describes the human ‘sub-
system-to-be governed’ where resources users and other stakeholders interact. The attributes 
of the community and other stakeholders, the drivers of change that affect CPR use and the 
governance system, the key players and their interactions in the process of CPR use, 
management and governance are discussed. Chapter six depicts the Ethiopian natural 
resource management and governance system which comprises the ‘rules of the game’ and 
the governance actors. The subsequent sections explain elements of the CPR governance 
system, the governing actors and the modes of CPR management and governance in Lake 
Tana sub-basin.  Chapter seven on the other hand portrays the ‘realities on the action 
situation’ where the governance system interacts with the ‘system-to-be governed’. It 
highlights the CPR management and governance situation, concerns and challenges, 
discusses the problems, identifies the missing link. Finally, Chapter eight summarizes the 
key findings of the dissertation, highlights theoretical and policy implications, puts forward 
recommendations, and discusses limitations and potential future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction   
 
This dissertation takes a holistic approach to the examination of institutional arrangements 
and common-pool resource governance of the complex Lake Tana ecosystem. As a result, 
many fields of research and various perspectives have been reviewed in the literature review. 
The major goal of this chapter is to describe the background and research that provide a 
conceptual and theoretical basis for the dissertation research. The chapter summarizes 
concepts and definitions related to the research questions and the problems concerning CPRs 
in Lake Tana ecosystem. The chapter starts with a very brief definition and description of 
institutions, organizations, institutional environment and institutional arrangements, 
strategies, norms and rules. More detailed discussions that address interactive governance 
theory, the theoretical debate on the ‘commons’ and empirical studies of CPRs in Global and 
Ethiopian context are presented. Finally, based on concepts and theories discussed, the 
conceptual framework that guides the roadmap to the dissertation research is presented. 
 
2.2 Concepts and Definitions 
2.2.1 Institutions and organization 
 
There are endless disputes over the definitions of key terms such as institutions and 
organizations, which have led some writers to give up on matters of definition and to 
propose getting down to practical matters instead. But it is not possible to carry out any 
empirical or theoretical analysis of how institutions or organizations work without having 
some adequate conception of what an institution or an organization is (Hodgson and 
Calatrava, 2006).  
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As stated by North (1990), institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Institutions are 
made up of formal constraints (rules, laws and constitutions), informal constraints (norms of 
behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics. Whereas organizations are made up of groups of individuals bound together 
by some common purpose to achieve certain objectives. If institutions are the rules of the 
game, organizations are the players. Hence it is the interaction between institutions and 
organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of an economy. 
 
Knight (1992) specifies institutions as ‘sets of rules that structure social interactions in 
particular ways’. These rules (1) provide information about how people are expected to act in 
particular situations, (2) can be recognized by social actors who are members of the relevant 
group as the rules to which others conform, and (3) structure the strategic choices of actors in 
such a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes. Aoki (2007) defines institutions as stable, 
shared systems of beliefs about the expected behavior of the members of a society in various 
contingencies.  
 
Pahl-Wostl (2009) agreed with North’s definition in which institutions do not refer to 
organizations or physical structures. Formal and informal refer to the nature of processes of 
development, codification, communication and enforcement. Formal institutions are linked 
to the official channels of governmental bureaucracies. They are codified in regulatory 
frameworks or any kind of legally binding documents. Correspondingly they can be enforced 
by legal procedures. Informal institutions refer to socially shared rules such as social or 
cultural norms. In most cases they are not codified or written down. They are enforced 
outside of legally sanctioned channels (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). A further distinction between 
formal and informal institutions is introduced by Scott (2001) who distinguishes between 
three pillars of institutions: regulative (what is formally allowed and what is not allowed), 
normative (what is right and what is wrong judged by societal standards), cultural-cognitive 
(what is thinkable and what is unthinkable).  
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Conversely, Hodgson and Calatrava (2006) identified some problems with North’s 
definitions of institutions and organizations. They start with the definition of institutions as 
socially embedded systems of rules; it is evident that organizations are a special kind of 
institution, with additional features such as involving criteria to establish their boundaries 
and to distinguish their members from non members; principles of sovereignty concerning 
who is in charge, and chains of command delineating responsibilities within the 
organization. North himself acknowledged that it is possible for organizations to be treated 
as actors in some circumstances and generally to be regarded as institutions. After a careful 
review of North’s distinction between formal ‘rules’ and informal ‘constraints’, they also 
suggested that these words should either be abandoned or used with extreme care. It may be 
best to use more precise terms such as legal, non-legal, and explicit instead. 
 
For this research however, the author follows the definitions of Hodgson and Calatrava 
(2006) where institutions are considered as socially embedded systems of rules and 
regulations binding the behaviors of social actors; and organizations are viewed as special 
kinds of institutions with additional features mentioned before. Specifically, institutions can 
be defined here as any established law, ordered, method, and custom that for a long time has 
been an important feature of the society, and specifically where CPR stakeholders are 
governed by these institutions. 
 
2.2.2 Institutional environment and institutional arrangement  
 
The Institutional Environment is the set of fundamental, political, social and legal ground 
rules that establish the basis for production, exchange, and distribution. Rules governing 
elections, property rights, and the right of contract are examples of the type of ground rules 
that make up the economic environment. Environment can of course be altered. Changes can 
come from an amendment to the constitution either by political action or a change in judicial 
interpretation or from a shift in citizen’s preferences (Lance and North, 1971). 
 
 
 
13 
 
Institutional Arrangement (structure of rules) is an arrangement between economic units 
that provide a structure within which members of a society-individually or collectively-
cooperate or compete and govern the ways in which these units can cooperate and/or 
compete (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). The arrangement may be either a formal or an informal 
one and it may be temporary or long-lived. It must, however, be designed to accomplish at 
least one of the following goals: to provide a structure within which its members can 
cooperate to obtain some added income that is not available outside the structure; or to 
provide a mechanism that can effect a change in laws or property rights designed to alter the 
permissible ways that individuals (or groups) can legally compete. The arrangement may 
involve a single individual, a group of individuals voluntarily cooperating together, or the 
government (alone or in cooperation with one or more individual) (ibid). According to 
Ostrom E. (1990) institutional arrangements are sets of working rules that are used to 
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some situation, and what actions are allowed 
or constrained. Further, the rules describe what procedures must be followed, what 
information must or must not be provided and what payoffs will be assigned to affected 
individuals. 
2.2.3 Strategies, norms and rules 
 
According to Ostrom (2007), in order to understand institutional arrangements, confronting 
three concepts (strategies, norms, and rules) that are frequently used interchangeably in 
social science literature is an important component of the analysis: Strategies are plans of 
action that individuals adopt primarily for prudential reasons to achieve preferred outcomes 
in light of expectations of the likely strategies of others. Norms represent preferences related 
to prescriptions about actions or outcomes that are not focused primarily on short-term 
material payoffs to self. Rules are linguistic statements similar to norms, but rules carry an 
additional, assigned sanction if forbidden actions are taken and observed by a monitor. For 
rules to exist, any particular situation must be linked to a rule-making situation, and some 
kind of monitoring and sanctioning must exist. Rules may be crafted in any of a wide 
diversity of collective-choice or constitutional-choice arenas in local, regional, national, or 
international domains. Contemporary scholarship tends to focus on rules that are formally 
prescribed by a national government, but we must understand the process of rule making at a 
community level as well. 
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Tuomela R. (1995 cited in Hodgson and Calatrava, 2006) described rules as the product of 
explicit agreement brought about by some authority, and they imply sanctions. Rules and 
norms therefore differ by virtue of the different ways they enforce tasks on individuals. Even 
as norms can evolve entirely internal to an individual, most norms are acquired in the context 
of the community in which the individual interacts frequently and change in this context. 
Thus, the chance that others in a relevant community may learn about a norm-breaking 
action strongly reinforces the internal value assigned to the norm conforming action 
(Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Rules structure human behavior into four categories: 
compulsory, permitted, authorized and non-authorized (Thomson, 1992). 
 
In this regard, Hodgson and Calatrava (2006) described rules as socially transmitted and 
customary normative injunctions or immanently normative disposions, that an individual in 
circumstances x has to do y. Rules include norms of behavior and social conventions as well 
as legal rules. Such rules are potentially codifiable. Members of the relevant community 
share tacit and explicit knowledge of these rules. 
 
2.3 Interactive Governance theory   
 
The Commission on Global Governance (1995 cited in Burger and Mayer 2003) defines 
governance as:  
‘The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal 
institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in 
their interest.’  
 
Governance is process by which the collection of rules, norms, and strategies that guide 
behaviour within a given realm of policy interactions are formed, applied, interpreted, and 
reformed(McGinnis, 2011). On the other hand Hyden et al. (2004) defines governance as the 
formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm 
where the state and other economic and societal actors interact to make decisions.  
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However the boundaries between governance, management and operations are not easily 
identified and are blurred. In most cases, the distinction between resource management, 
policy making and governance is not always very clear. Sometimes management and 
governance are even used as synonyms which are clearly not appropriate (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). 
Governance is much broader than management and policy making, and has many 
dimensions, including the interactions among all stakeholders that influence resource use 
outcomes as well as the principles that guide these interactions and the institutional 
arrangements within which they take place. Governance refers to a constitutional set of rules 
and regulations while management refers more to the practical level. 
 
Basically, there are important differences between governance, policymaking and 
management. Still the differences between these activities are not straightforward and clear, 
and may vary with different culture and language. Thus what is termed ‘policy’ in one 
political culture may be known as ‘governance’ in the other traditions. Yet, governance is the 
more inclusive term, followed by policy, with management being the most instrumental and 
practical of the three concepts. Thus governance considers longer term trends and 
requirements with regard to natural resources, basing itself on an assessment of institutions 
and a discussion of the values to be attained. Policy deals with specific subjects in tighter 
time frames, whereas management grapples with the practical dimensions of its 
implementation (Kooiman et al. 2008). 
 
Governance adds dimensions that are absent in a hands-on management approach (Kooiman 
et al. 2008). ‘Resources management’ refers to the activities of analyzing and monitoring, 
developing and implementing measures to keep the state of a resource within desirable 
bounds. The notion of ‘resource governance’ takes into account the different actors and 
networks that help formulate and implement environmental policy and/or policy instruments. 
Governance embraces the full complexity of regulatory processes and their interaction (Pahl-
Wostl, 2009). Governance arrangements need to be broad in scope, having the potential to 
encompass all relevant aspects and impacts although all may not be taken up at the outset 
(Chakalall, B., R. Mahon, et al. 2007). At broader level, environmental governance should 
be understood broadly so as to include all institutional solutions for resolving conflicts over 
environmental resources (Paavola, 2007).  
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According to Pahl-Wostil(2009), to deal with the complexity of governance systems in a 
more systematic fashion the following four dimensions are introduced as a base for 
analyzing the characteristics of environmental governance regimes: Institutions and the 
relationship and relative importance of formal and informal institutions; Actor networks with 
emphasis on the role and interactions of state and non-state actors; Multi-level interactions 
across administrative boundaries and vertical integration; and Governance modes-
bureaucratic hierarchies, markets, networks.  
 
In recent times, interactive governance has become an important approach for understanding 
multi-level governance issues in natural resource management and governance in general 
fisheries and coastal governance in particular.  As described by Edelenbos (2005), interactive 
governance is an approach whereby policy-making procedures have became more 
communicative and more participatory which means that most people to be affected by the 
plans are involved in early stages of decision-making. Kooiman et al. (2008), on the other 
hand, defined interactive governance as an integrated, communicative and politically 
informed approach which emphasizes solving societal problems and creating societal 
opportunities through interactions among civil, public and private actors.  
 
From a recent development of interactive governance theory, it is argued that natural 
resource governance particularly fisheries and coastal governance may be seen as a 
relationship between two systems that could be termed a ‘governing system’ and a ‘system-
to-be-governed’. The governing system is social, and therefore man-made: it is made up of 
institutions and steering instruments and mechanisms. The system-to-be governed is partly 
natural and partly social: it consists of an ecosystem and the resources that this harbors, as 
well as a system of users and stakeholders who form social and political coalitions and 
institutions among themselves. One should also be concerned with the relationship and 
interaction between the two systems, which forms a system in its own right.  
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The social system affects change in the natural system, but it is also dependent and therefore 
vulnerable to these changes, since they set limits to resource users’ potential (Jentoft, 2007).  
Interactive governance is a perspective that focuses on understanding the characteristics of 
the natural and social systems that are being governed, the governing systems, and their 
interactions.  
 
‘Interactive governance theory argues that for the relationship between the governing 
system and the social sub-system (that is to be governed) to be effective, structural 
adjustments are needed within both systems. The systems must be compatible in order to 
be mutually responsive. This is not a matter of natural mechanism, but of deliberate 
intervention, planning and institutional design by societal actors who are involved in 
different positions and levels of society such as legislative bodies, planning agencies 
and civic organizations-alone or, according to governance theory, preferably in 
concert’ (Jentoft, 2007).  
 
Generally, governance is not merely something governors do, but comprises the totality of 
the interactions between those governing and those governed-it is itself an interaction 
(Bavinck et al. 2005).  It is an ongoing social process that is constantly negotiated and 
achieved among relevant stakeholders (Wilkes, 2005).  
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2.4 Theoretical Debate on the ‘Commons’ 
2.4.1 Rethinking ‘The Tragedy of Commons’ 
 
The ‘commons’ include natural resources such as fisheries, wetlands, wildlife, forests, 
irrigation waters and pasturelands, which by their physical nature are not owned by 
individuals but are shared by a community or group of users, such as fishers. Over the course 
of almost fifteen years, between 1954 and 1968, scholars developed a number of models of 
‘tragedy of the commons’. In the 1950s, Scott Gorden and Antony Scott argued that open 
access conditions in fisheries lead to the economic destruction of fish stocks. Gorden called 
for government intervention in fisheries to limit fishers’ harvesting efforts while Scott 
demonstrated that such undesirable economic and biological outcomes might be avoided by 
imposing a single ownership (privatization) on the fishery (Gorden, 1954; Scott, 1955 cited 
in Durant et al. 2004). Hardin’s influential 1968 article in Science on ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons’ is one of the most often-cited scientific papers written in the second half of the 
twentieth century. The article stimulated immense intellectual interest across the natural and 
social sciences, extensive debate, and a new interdisciplinary field of study (National 
Research Council, 2002).  
 
As he develops the theory, Hardin (1968) envisaged a pasture open to all. It is to be expected 
that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the common pasture. As a 
rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or 
less consciously, he asks ‘what is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’ 
This utility has one negative component which is the function of the additional overgrazing 
created by one more animal and one positive component which is the function of the profit 
increment of one animal. Therefore, each herder receives the profit from adding animals 
while the costs are shared among other users; it makes sense for each herder to add more 
cattle, even though doing so contributes to their collective ruin. Then the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to the 
herd. And another; and another…‘But this is the conclusion reached by each and every 
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein lays the Tragedy’ (Hardin, op.cit.). 
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Based on the theory of the ‘Tragedy of the commons’ Hardin concludes that the ‘Commons’ 
has come to connote inevitable resource degradation and ‘freedom of the commons brings 
ruin to all’ because benefits accrue to individuals and costs are collectively shared. By 
combining Gorden’s and Scott’s recommendations, Hardin suggests that there are only two 
collective solutions to avoid the ‘Tragedy of the commons’, either privatization or 
government control as a solution to which rights to entry and use could be allocated. The 
theorists on common-pool resources often take their point of departure in challenging and 
criticizing Hardin’s notion of ‘the tragedy of the commons’,  that proposed common property 
arrangements would bring ruin to all, because individuals have a tendency to free ride and 
act selfishly (Hardin, 1968). However, one important contribution that has developed in the 
common-pool resource literature is that individuals can cooperate and create institutional 
arrangements that can provide the mechanism whereby individuals can transcend and 
overcome tragedy of the commons situations (Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996). 
 
In recent years, scientists have observed that not all common-property resources are subject 
to such a ‘tragedy’ and are not overexploited (Cox, 1985; Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Feeny et al. 
1990) and self-governance common-pool resources have frequently been observed in field 
studies (Dietz et al. 2003). Empirical studies (see for example, Bromley, 1992; Tang, 1992; 
Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996; National Research Council, 2002) of sustainable 
resources suggested that more solutions exist than Hardin proposed. Both government 
ownership and privatization are themselves subject to failure in some instances (Ostrom et 
al. 1999). Several recent volumes summarize a growing and rich body of evidence relevant 
to common-property resource management (Feeny et al. 1990). 
 
After analyzing different situations of common-property resources, Feeny et al. (1990) 
concluded by rejection of the simple one-to-one relationship between property-rights regime 
and outcome postulated by Hardin. The Hardin argument overlooks the important role of 
institutional arrangements that provide for exclusion and regulation of use. Societies have 
the capacity to construct and enforce rules and norms that constrain the behavior of 
individuals. What Hardin described is not a commons at all but what is nowadays called an 
unmanaged common-pool resource (Hyde, 2010).  
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There have been confusions that hinder communication among ‘common’ scholars across 
different disciplines and are still in the process of developing a shared language related to the 
broad set of things called ‘the commons’ (Ostrom, 2008). The sources of confusion relates to 
the difference between (1) common-property and open-access regimes, (2) common-pool 
resources and common-property regimes, and (3) a resource system and the flow of resource 
units (Ostrom and Hess, 2010). As clearly demarked by Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975 
cited in Ostrom and Hess, 2010) the difference between property regimes that are open 
access, where no one has the legal right to exclude anyone from using a resource, from 
common property, where the members of a clearly demarked group have a legal right to 
exclude non members of that group from using a resource. Open-access regimes have long 
been considered in legal doctrine as involving no limits on who is authorized to use a 
resource.  
 
The major distinction between them is the property rights. The open access does not imply 
any kind of ownership (no property rights of anyone) but it may be used or exploited by 
everybody. So, it may be exposed to the risk and possibility of over-exploitation and 
degradation. The term ‘common-pool resource’ refers to a natural or man-made resource 
system that is typically defined in economic terms as a resource system that are rival and 
non-excludable and held by an identifiable user group. In other words, CPRs are systems 
where it is difficult to exclude users through physical or institutional barriers and where the 
use of the resource by one person or group leaves less for another (Ostrom et al. 1994).  
 
According to Ostrom et al. (1994), a particular class of goods or events in the world shares 
two important attributes. These are: (1) the difficulty of excluding individuals from using or 
benefiting from a good and (2) the subtractability of the benefits consumed by one 
individual from those available to other users or beneficiaries. Therefore the goods and 
events that individuals value differ in terms of how easy or costly it is to exclude or limit 
potential users (beneficiaries) from consuming or using them once they are provided by 
nature or through the activities of other individuals, and the degree of subtractability of one 
person’s use from that available to be used by others. Based on these attributes of exclusion 
and subtractability four kinds of goods (private, public, toll and common-pool resources) 
were identified (see Table 2.1) 
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Table 2.1: A general classification of goods  
 Source: Ostrom et al. (1994) 
 
Private goods are characterized by the relative ease of exclusion and high subtractability for 
which one person’s consumption subtracts from the availability of consumable benefits to 
others. Public goods are the opposite of private goods with regard to both attributes for 
which consumption is not subtractable but exclusion is difficult or not possible either. Toll 
goods share with private goods the relative ease of exclusion and with public goods the 
relative lack of subtractability. Common-pool resources share with public goods the 
difficulty of developing physical or institutional means of excluding beneficiaries and the 
products or resource units from common-pool resources share with private goods the 
attribute that one person’s consumption subtracts from the quantity available to others 
(Ostrom et al. 1994).  
 
CPR are goods that can be kept from potential users only at great cost or with difficulty but 
that are subtractable in consumption and can thus disappear. Without institutional 
mechanisms that address excludability and subtractability, then, CPRs are essentially open- 
access resources available to anyone which is very difficult to protect and very easy to 
deplete (McKean, 2000). If anyone can use a resource, no individual or group has any 
incentive to conserve their use or to invest in improvements. The only way to exert control 
over the resource is to extract it before others can (Adams et al. 2001; Ostrom and Hess, 
2010). 
 
                                                 
3
   It is reasonably possible to prevent a class of consumers/users (e.g. those who have not paid for it) from   
    consuming the good. 
 
4
 consumptions by one consumer prevents simultaneous consumption by other consumers 
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 Subtractability4 
Low High 
Difficult Public Goods 
Free-to-air television, air, national 
defence 
Common-pool Resources 
Fish stock, timber, coal, national health 
service 
Easy Toll/club Goods 
Cinemas, private parks, satellite 
television 
Private Goods 
Food, clothing, cars, personal electronics 
 
22 
 
As Blomquist and Ostrom (1985) described common-pool resources are composed of 
resource systems and a flow of resource units or benefits from these systems. The resource 
systems (such as Lakes, rivers, irrigations systems, ground water basins, forests, fishery 
stocks and grazing areas) are systems that generate a flow of resource units and benefits. The 
resource units or benefits from a common-pool resource include water, timber, medicinal 
plants, fish, fodder etc. Therefore, devising property regimes that effectively allow 
sustainable use of a common-pool resource requires rules that limit access to the resource 
system and other rules that limit the amount, timing, and technology used to withdraw 
diverse resource units from the resource system (Ostrom and Hess, 2010). 
 
The term ‘common-property resource’ is frequently used to describe a type of economic 
good that is better referred to as a ‘common-pool resource’. Common-pool resources may be 
owned by national, regional, or local governments, by communal groups, by private 
individuals or corporations, or used as open-access resources by whom-ever can gain access 
(Ostrom and Hess, 2010) where varying degrees of access with multiple and often 
overlapping property rights may exist. Therefore, there is no automatic association that exists 
between common-pool resources and common property regimes or, with any other particular 
type of property regime (Ostrom and Hess, 2010; Hess and Ostrom, 2003).  
 
Common property regimes can be defined as ‘institutional arrangements in which a group of 
resource users share rights and duties toward a resource for the cooperative (shared, joint, 
collective) use, management, governance and sometimes ownership of natural resources’ 
(McKean, 2000). In these regimes, no member of the user group has the right to exclude 
others, but the group has the right to exclude non-members from the use of the resource. 
Membership of the user group is usually contingent on having a presence in a location close 
to the relevant CPR, with the members living and/or owning land in that location (Conroy, 
2002). 
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2.4.2 Collective action, devolution and property rights in CPR governance 
 
2.4.2.1 Collective action and multiple use-multiple user interaction 
 
 
Collective action can be defined as an action by more than one person directed towards the 
achievement of a common goal or the satisfaction of a common interest (that is, a goal or 
interest that cannot be obtained by an individual acting on his own) (Wade, 1987). As 
discussed in the previous section (sub-section 2.5.1), the debate about collective action in 
CPR management and governance has been distorted by a conceptual misunderstanding 
about the nature of such resources, caused by Garrett Hardin’s unfortunate use of the term 
“commons” and its’ ‘‘tragedy’’ to describe an “open access” regime (Steins and Edwards, 
1999). As a result for a long time, there was a prevailing belief among policy-makers that the 
problems associated with CPRs could only be solved through either privatization of the 
resource or through state intervention (ibid). However, during the past decades empirical 
evidence has been brought forward that local user groups are capable of managing and 
governing such resources through collective action (McCay and Acheson, 1990 cited in 
Steins and Edwards; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992) which is often considered as a 
prerequisite for the development of community-based institutions and the devolution of 
authority that is required from central to local authorities (Meinzen-Dick and Di Gregorio, 
2004). 
 
On the other hand, as indicated by  Swallow et al. (1997) most analyses of the efficiency of 
natural resource management and governance have failed to recognize that resources often 
have multiple uses and that there tends to be sub-groups of users who are characterized by 
their use patterns. For example the same water source can be used for irrigating, hydropower, 
fishing, navigating, washing, watering animals, or other enterprises by multiple stakeholders. 
They further argued that some resource uses are complementary, others are competitive, 
most are somewhere between. Some groups of resource users are mutually exclusive, others 
are overlapping, most are somewhere between. However issues of accommodating multiple 
uses and multiple-users are especially critical in the case of the commons. 
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The context of multiple-use can have a significant impact on the use of common-pool 
resources as a diversity of interests is linked with the common-pool resources, partly 
preserving and partly exploiting them. A multiple user context is defined if more than one 
person uses the resource for the same purpose. Multiple user scenarios are widely discussed 
and common-pool resources (CPRs) are defined for multiple user situations. The presence of 
multiple users in CPR situation can increase transaction costs in a dramatic way, especially 
by creating free rider problems and undermining negotiations about the optimal use (Smajgl, 
2007). 
 
According to Steins and Edwards (1999) complex, multiple-use CPRs are resources that are 
used for different types of extractive and non-extractive purposes by different stakeholder 
groups (multiple users) often with divergent interests and are managed under a mixture of 
property rights regimes. In such a scenario, collective action becomes increasingly 
complicated. Different resource uses will be regulated and governed through different 
decision-making arrangements by different user groups. Therefore when commons evolve 
into multiple-use resources, the institutional framework within which collective resource use 
takes place has to be re-negotiated among resource users and other stakeholders to avoid 
externalities associated with increased access of new users to the resource system, such as 
overexploitation, alienation of traditional users, and inter/intra-user group conflicts.  
 
Collective action among the user groups is required to agree upon decision making 
arrangements, regulations about access to, allocation of, and control over the resource. 
However, the presence of a well established set of decision-making arrangements is not 
sufficient to guarantee sustained and negotiated collective action in the long term. For this 
Steins and Edwards (1999) introduce the concept of ‘platforms for resource use negotiation’ 
as one way of re-negotiating institutional frameworks to deal with the complexities involved 
in the management and governance of multiple-use CPRs and to coordinate collective action 
by multiple users. 
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On the other hand, Dietz et al. (2003) pointed out that successful commons management and 
governance is easier to achieve when: (1) use of resources can be monitored by community 
members, and the information can be verified and understood at relatively low cost (trees are 
easier to monitor than fish, and lakes are easier to monitor than rivers (2) rates of change in 
resources, resource -user populations, technology, and other economic and social factors are 
moderate (3) community members maintain direct communications and increase their trust 
of one another; (4) outsiders can be excluded from using the resource at relatively low cost 
and (5) users are able to monitor and enforce their collectively designed agreements 
themselves.  
 
Successful self-organized resource regimes and institutions can initially draw upon locally 
evolved norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness and the likely presence of local leaders in 
most community settings (Ostrom, 2000). Local institutions such as chiefs and headmen can 
also played an important ecological role, setting boundaries that restricted natural resources 
use and enforcing them (Fabricius et al. 2013). Ostrom (1990) in her empirical research into 
the management and governance of local CPRs has identified eight (8) design principles (see 
Table 2.2) underlying successful collective action and long term institutions where fragile 
institutions tend to be characterized by only some of these design principles and failed 
institutions are characterized by very few of these principles (Ostrom, 2005). 
 
These principles identify characteristics of common-pool resource management and 
governance systems that have been observed to be regularly associated with the long-term 
sustainability of that system. However, not all principles need to be realized in all 
circumstances, but the prospects for sustainable governance tend to increase when more of 
these principles are in place (McGinnis, 2011). 
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Table 2.2: Design principles underlying successful long-term institutions 
 
Design Principle Explanation Function 
1. Clearly defined 
boundaries 
Individuals or households with rights to withdraw resource units 
from the CPR and the boundaries of the CPR itself are clearly 
defined 
Enables participants to know who is in and who is 
out of a defined set of relationships and thus with 
whom to cooperate 
2. Congruence a. The distribution of benefits from appropriation rules is 
roughly proportionate to the costs imposed by provisional 
rules. 
b. The rules governing the contribution required of each user 
must mirror local conditions 
Enables the local rules-in-use restrict the amount, 
timing, and technology and/or quantity of resource 
unit to be harvested 
 
3. Collective choice 
arrangements 
Participation by all affected individuals in deciding on and 
modifying operational rules should be possible 
Enables most of the individuals affected by a 
resource regime participate in making and 
modifying their rules governing their commons 
4. Monitoring Either the local users themselves or persons accountable to the 
local user are responsible for monitoring the biophysical 
conditions and compliance with collective decisions 
Enables users to keep an eye on resource conditions 
as well as on user behavior 
5. Graduated sanctions Sanctions should be graduated to reflect the severity, frequency, 
and context of resource use violation depending on the seriousness 
and context of the offense 
Enables users who violate rules-in-use are likely to 
receive graduated sanctions from other users, from 
officials accountable to these users, or from both 
6. Conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
Low-cost and readily available conflict-resolution mechanisms 
must exist to mediate conflicts among resource users and between 
users and officials 
Enables users and their officials have rapid access 
to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among 
users or between users and officials 
7. Minimum recognition 
of rights to organize 
Users must have recognition of their own rights to organize 
institutions  
 
Enables users to devise their own institutions that 
are not challenged by external authorities, have 
long-term tenure rights to the resource 
8. Nested enterprises5 Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple 
layers of nested enterprises 
Enables to understand governance activities that are 
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises 
Source: Based on Ostrom (1990, 2009) 
                                                 
5
 When common-pool resources that are being managed by a group are large and parts of larger systems, an eighth design principle may be present in robust systems (Ostrom, 2009). 
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2.4.2.2 Devolution of CPR management and governance 
 
 
Centralized forms of natural resources management have often been criticized for top down 
ineffective governance, rule making and enforcement mechanisms in most CPR situations. 
After failing to effectively manage natural resource systems centrally, many governments are 
now undertaking decentralization and devolution programs to transfer responsibility for 
resource management to local governments and user groups (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). 
Across different continents (Asia, Africa and the Americas) and across different natural 
resource sectors (including water, forests, fisheries and rangelands) there has been a major 
policy trend of devolving control over natural resources from government agencies to user 
groups (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999) and a paradigm shift in conservation and natural 
resource management and governance away from costly state-centered control towards 
approaches in which local people play a much more active role in CPR management and 
governance (Shackleton et al. 2002).  
 
As a result, the partial devolution of authority for natural resource management and 
environmental policy-making from centralised state control to community-based control or 
co-management has evolved over the past three decades as an alternative approach to 
centralized forms of management predicated on state control of resources (Ostrom, 1990; 
Singleton, 2000; Armitage, 2005). Devolution refers to transfer of right and obligations over 
natural resource decision-making and benefits to users groups and management roles from a 
government organization to a non-governmental or financially autonomous one, which is 
usually a local organization constituted by resource users (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999; 
Vermillion, 1999; Shackleton et al. 2002). Devolution is often part of a number of related 
policy reforms such as deconcentration6, decentralization7, and privatization8.  
                                                 
6
 In which decision-making authority is transferred to lower-level units of a bureaucracy, or government line agency, 
authority remains with the same type of institution, and accountability is ultimately still upward to the central government 
(see Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
 
7
refers to movement of management roles and decision making authority from higher or central levels to lower or local 
units within the same agency or ministry. Although still within the government, it provides a stronger role for local bodies 
(Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999; Vermillion, 1999). 
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At the heart of the theory of devolution is the argument that local, common users of a 
resource, who are empowered as a group to take over management and governance of the 
resource, have the incentive to manage and govern more efficiently and sustainably than 
does a centrally financed central government agency (Vermillion, 1999). When control over 
resources is transferred more or less completely to local user groups, it is often referred to as 
Community-Based Resource Management (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999). Community-
Based Resource Management (CBRM) efforts are based on assumptions that local 
communities and community-based organizations closely connected to natural resources are 
most likely to foster sustainable resource use and possess the knowledge required to do so 
(Armitage, 2005).  
 
In the process of devolution, when the state or central government retains a large role 
in resource management and governance, in conjunction with an expanded role for 
resource users, it may be referred to as joint management or co-management. However, 
these are often not clear-cut, with most cases involving some form of interaction between the 
state and user groups (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999).  On the other hand, many such 
programs emphasize the transfer of responsibilities without transferring the corresponding 
rights. As a result, resource user groups may lack the incentive, and even the authority, to 
manage and govern the resources (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999; Meinzen-Dick et al. 
2004). 
 
Based on evidence from a number of empirical studies on the impacts of natural resource 
devolution policies and strategies in several Asian and southern African countries from the 
perspective of local people, Shackleton et al. (2002) concluded that most ‘devolved’ natural 
resources management and governance reflects rhetoric more than substance, and is 
characterized by some continuation of substantive central government control, management 
and governance over natural resources rather than a genuine shift in authority to local people.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
8
 refers to transfer from the public sector to private groups or individuals. This can include non-profit service 
organizations (grassroots or external NGOs) and for-profit firms (Uphoff 1998). 
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In most instances central government retained key aspects of management and governance 
authority, placing tight constraints on local decision-making. States, communities and other 
stakeholders have different visions of devolution and its mode of implementation. They 
further argued that more powerful actors in communities tend to manipulate devolution 
outcomes to suit themselves. The degree of organization amongst poor resource users and 
awareness of their rights were critical factors influencing devolution outcomes (ibid).  
 
2.4.2.3 Property rights and natural resource management and governance   
 
 
The ability to have effective command over natural resources however is based on firstly, 
securing resources access and use rights, and secondly on a series of processes that transform 
the rights into livelihood outcomes (Kepe, 2008a). Transferring property rights as part of 
devolution programs demonstrates a commitment on the part of the government to the 
devolution process that user groups' rights are commensurate with their responsibilities in 
managing and governing the resource. This implies that cases of "community-based resource 
management" would have stronger user rights than cases of joint management, where the 
state retains an active role in managing the system (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999). 
 
Institutions, such as property rights (the structure of rights to resources and the rules under 
which those rights are exercised) are mechanisms people use to control their use of the 
environment and their behavior toward each other (Bromley, 1991). People use and allocate 
land and natural resources through systems of property rights. What is important is not the 
type of resource, but the property rights regime in combination with the resource it is subject 
to, namely open access, private property, communal property and state property. Property 
rights define actions that individuals can take in relation to other individuals regarding some 
‘thing’. If one individual has a right, someone else has a commensurate duty to observe that 
right (Ostrom, 2003).  
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Property rights are the rules that define an owner’s rights and duties in the use of a particular 
resource. The types of property rights, and the strength of those rights, are key factors in 
determining the status of natural resources and the environment. Property rights to man-
made goods and services are usually well-defined and well enforced. However, many 
environmental problems are the result of weak or poorly defined property rights over land 
and natural resources. This leads to the problem of over-exploitation and degradation of 
natural resources because there is no incentive on behalf of the user to manage or protect 
those resources. Yet, the resolution of property rights is only one necessary condition for 
resolving natural resource management and governance problems. There is no single set of 
property rights that can be applied as a common solution to natural resource problems (Bond 
et al. 2006).  
 
The property rights of an actor is also embodied both in informal rules, social norms and 
customs, and their economic relevance depends on how well the rights are recognized and 
enforced by other members of society. It is important to note that the ability (power) of an 
actor to use valuable resources derives both from external/exogenous control and from 
internal/endogenous control. External control depends on the property rights of an actor or, 
in other words, on how his or her institutional environment-constitutions, statutes, 
regulations, norms, enforcement and sanctions- constrains and directs both the actor in 
question and outsiders. Internal control is established by the actors themselves through 
various investments aimed at gaining control over scarce resources involving monitoring, 
fencing, hiring private guards, checking reputations, and other measures (Alston et al. 1996).  
 
The following definitions are given by Feeny et al. (1990) to describe these regimes: 
  Open access: the absence of well defined property rights. Access to the resource is 
unregulated and free and open to anyone. It is characterized by the absence of any 
regulations, and the reference is to a situation where no identifiable entity has the right 
to exclude others from the use of the resource 
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 Private property: the rights to exclude others from using the resource and to regulate 
the use of the resource are vested in an individual or group. Private-property rights are 
generally recognized and enforced by the state and are usually exclusive and 
transferable; no individual or group has any incentive to invest in conserving the 
resource or refrain from harvesting the resource (Adams et al. 2001).  
  Common /Communal/ property: the resource is held by an identifiable community of 
interdependent users who exclude outsiders while regulating use amongst members. 
The rights are unlikely to be exclusive or transferable and are often rights of equal 
access and use. The rights of the group may be legally recognized or de facto.  
  State property: rights to the resource are vested exclusively in the government which 
makes decisions concerning access to the resource and the level and nature of 
exploitation. The category of state property may refer to property to which the general 
public has equal access and use rights. The nature of the state property regime also 
differs from the other regimes in that, in general, the state, unlike private parties, has 
coercive powers of enforcement. 
 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify five property rights that are most relevant for the use of 
natural resources in general and CPRs in particular, including access, withdrawal, 
management, exclusion, and alienation. Access to a CPR can be limited to a single 
individual or firm or to multiple individuals or teams of individuals who use the resource 
system at the same time. Property rights are regarded as well-defined where the entitlements 
of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation are clearly and effectively 
articulated (Stebek, 2011). However, property-rights systems that do not contain the right of 
alienation are considered to be ill-defined (Ostrom, 2000). In 2001 Ostrom further defines 
five classes of property-rights holders where individuals or collectivities may hold well-
defined property rights that include or do not include all five of the rights defined below (see 
Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Bundles of property rights and classes of owners 
Source: (Ostrom, 2001:135) 
 
 
‘Authorized entrants’ (Access right only) include most recreational users of national parks 
who purchase an operational right to enter and enjoy the natural beauty of the park, but do 
not have a right to harvest forest products. Those who have both entry/access and withdrawal 
use-right units are ‘authorized users’. The presence or absence of constraints upon the 
timing, technology used, purpose of use and quantity of resource units harvested are 
determined by operational rules devised by those holding the collective-choice rights (or 
authority) of management and exclusion. ‘Authorized claimants’ possess the operational 
rights of access and withdrawal plus a collective-choice right of managing a resource that 
includes decisions concerning the construction and maintenance of facilities and the 
authority to devise limits on withdrawal rights. ‘Proprietors’ hold the same rights as 
claimants with the addition of the right to determine who may access and harvest from a 
resource. ‘Owners’ possess the right of alienation - the right to transfer a good in any way 
the owner wishes that does not harm the physical attributes or uses of other owners - in 
addition to the bundle of rights held by a proprietor (Ostrom, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Right owner proprietor Authorized 
claimant 
Authorized 
user 
Authorized 
Entrant 
Access X X X X X 
Withdrawal X X X X  
Management X X X   
Exclusion  X X    
Alienation  X     
With the 5 property rights defined as: 
Access:            The right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non subtractive benefits.  
Withdrawal:     The right to obtain resource units or products of a resource  
Management:   The right to regulate internal use patterns and making improvements  
Exclusion:        The right to determine who will have access rights and withdrawal rights 
 
Alienation:       The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights 
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Several solutions have been proposed to overcome the potential externalities that arise from 
the free and open exploitation of CPRs. The ‘privatization of the commons’ is a form of 
decentralized approach which endeavors to create exclusive, private and transferable rights 
over the flow (and where possible, the stock) of CPRs. On the other hand state-based rights 
is a form of centralized approach which try to overcome the externalities through state 
ownership of the resource stock and by imposing rules of access and withdrawal on resource 
users. A community right is another approach which defines how resources are used by 
community members with some form of exclusion of non-members (Grafton, 2000). 
However, which mix of rights and definition of characteristics is desirable, and who should 
have the right, will depend upon many factors including the objectives of management and 
the physical attributes of the resource (Ostrom, 1990; Grafton, 2000). 
 
Community rights based property regimes over CPRs have existed for thousands of years 
and help manage resources (Grafton, 2000). Research evidence (Ostrom, 1990) also shows 
that community rights can help resources users ‘avoid the conflict, uncertainty, and the 
deterioration or destruction of the resources involved’. However the existence of community 
rights and customary land tenure systems are challenged by privatization and state 
dominance in the management of CPRs.  
 
Alden (2011) argued on conventional positions that customary land tenure is an anachronism 
that is diminishing, rather, customary land tenure is clearly being practiced for example by 
the majority of communities in Africa, is vigorous in its norms, has considerable 
commonalities across boundaries, and mirrors existing rural society in all its complexities, 
contradictions, and trends. However most rural Africans occupy and use lands that are not 
accepted in statutes as their private individual or collective property. This particularly affects 
their tenure over their commons (forests, rangelands, and marshlands). As the values of 
CPRs grow and state capture consolidates, the opportunity to recognize those resources as 
local property declines. As a result, the world is now witnessing a new era of resource 
capture (through privatization and land grabbing), one which deeply interferes with local 
rights and especially the commons (Alden, 2008). 
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The harmful effects of nationalizing common-pool resources particularly forests and that had 
earlier been governed by local user groups have been well documented. Resources that had 
been under a de facto common property regime enforced by local users were converted to a 
de jure government-property regime, but reverted to a de facto open-access regime. When 
resources that were previously controlled by local participants have been nationalized, state 
control has usually proved to be less effective and efficient than control by those directly 
affected (Curtis, 1991; Hilton, 1992; Panayotou and Ashton, 1992; Ascher, 1995 cited in 
Ostrom, 2000). 
 
As reported by Poteete et al. (2010) case studies in Africa and Asia shows that how 
centralized resource management affected the traditional rights of local users that sparked a 
mix of sabotage and violent protests as resource users lost access to the resource system. 
Commercial development and privatization of common-pool resources without considering 
traditional private property rights is an example of State power and the desire to concentrate 
resource rents in the hands of a few. Policy interventions that threaten informal rights often 
generate considerable opposition among resources users and other stakeholders. Such clashes 
may be more frequent with multiple-use resource systems, where the State tends to prioritize 
privatization of resources and commercial uses while overlooking or discouraging 
subsistence use. 
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2.5 Empirical studies on CPR use, management and governance 
 
Though humans have interacted with the biophysical environment since the beginning of 
human history, the scope and intensity of these interactions have increased dramatically 
since the 1970s. The magnitude, extent, and rate of change in human-natural interactions 
have been unprecedented in the past several decades (Liu et al. 2007b). And yet, coupled 
human-natural systems are not static; they change over time (Liu et al. 2007a). Particularly, 
the human population has almost tripled from 2.5 billion in 1950s to over 7 billion by the 
year 2012. As a result, the accelerating human impacts on natural systems may lead to 
degradation and collapse of natural systems which in turn compromise the adaptive capacity 
of human systems (ibid). 
 
International research investigating the state of CPRs across different regions suggests that 
there is tremendous pressure on natural resource systems and the change to ecosystems 
during the past half century has been more rapid than any comparable period in human 
history (Ostrom, 2008, MA, 2005; 2006). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report 
shows that forests have effectively disappeared in 25 countries, and another 29 have lost 
more than 90% of their forest covers. More than half of the world’s wetlands have been lost 
(Schuyt, 2005).  
 
The sustainable governance of water resources in times of global change is one of the most 
pressing challenges of the 21st century (Pahl-Wostl & Toonen, 2009). Ostrom (2008) 
reported that, although some of the specific niches where some commons are in a better 
condition today than they were a decade or two ago, the tragedy of massive overfishing of 
the oceans and on major deforestation has been observed. She further argued that the reason 
for mixed results is that most common-pool resources differ vastly from one another and 
vary from place to place.  
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Wisborg et al. (2000) indicated that many developing countries experience an increasing 
trend that appears to threaten CPR management regimes through institutional changes 
leading to open access situations or conversion to private property, legally or illegally. They 
further argued that lack of adequate institutional frameworks and effective implementation 
coupled with competing interests of multiple stakeholders in withdrawals from CPRs 
increase the pace at which these resources are depleted and leads to overconsumption and 
degradation of CPRs.  
 
Williams (1998) was able to highlight that, in the semi-arid West African region, climatic, 
demographic and economic changes are beginning to threaten the existence and long-term 
sustainability of CPRs. The combination of increasing aridity, drought and population 
pressure has resulted in substantial shifts in land use and put stress on CPRs. He further 
argued that this substantial shift has led to the expansion of area under cultivation that 
involved mainly the conversion of large areas of CPRs such as forests, wetlands and 
rangelands into cropland, with farmers overriding and ignoring the traditional use rights of 
other groups to these resources. As a result the loss of rangeland through alienation and 
encroachment of farming has heightened conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in the 
region. 
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2.6  Modified Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
 
The development of a conceptual framework for this dissertation began with a brief review 
of concepts and theories related to institutions, interactive governance, complex system and 
CPRs as discussed in the previous sections, which enables the researcher to identify and 
include the most relevant institutional and CPR management and governance problems in 
Lake Tana sub-basin. Therefore in order to better understand the complex Lake Tana 
ecosystem, an integrated and modified Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework developed by Ostrom et al. (1994) and Interactive Governance framework by 
Kooiman et al. (2008) were used. 
 
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at the workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis 
developed the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework in the context of an 
analysis of irrigation institutions. The method focuses on a technique for arraying a norm 
and rule inventory and recording changes in that inventory over time brought about by 
diverse processes for making changes (Ostrom, 2007). The IAD framework has been 
developed to enable the analysis of ‘institutional settings’-any situations that involve people 
interacting together in a certain context and following certain rules. The sets of rules relevant 
to any institutional setting are the institutional arrangements of that setting. This framework 
has been trialed and applied in a range of situations to systematically analyze the structure of 
situations faced by individuals and to determine how rules, the nature of events and the 
attributes of the surrounding environment and local community affect these situations over 
time (Smajgl et al. 2009). 
 
The strength of the IAD framework developed by Ostrom and her colleagues is derived from 
its systematic theoretical focus on the impact of rules and norms on individual incentives in 
complex ecological-socio-economic systems, its empirically-oriented focus on outcomes, 
and by its accounting for dynamic system interactions at multiple tiers of analysis (Ostrom, 
1999). This framework allows the integration of several theories of action across domains 
that would otherwise be examined in isolation from each other (Koontz, 2003).  
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Unlike the earlier approaches IAD deals mainly with CPRs. IAD perceives that each 
commons situation is different and requires its own language and explanatory theory. The 
most important part of the IAD framework is the identification of a conceptual unit, the so 
called action situation, in order to position a clearly defined research frame, hence to narrow 
down what has to be regarded as relevant and non-relevant for the research (Stellmacher, 
2007).  
 
The IAD framework focuses on seven important elements in order to understand various 
CPR situations. They are (i) attributes of physical world (ii) attributes of community (iii) 
rules in use (iv) action situations which include individuals (acting on their own or as agents 
of organizations) observe information, select actions, engage in patterns of interaction, and 
realize outcomes from their interaction (McGinnis, 2011) (v) patterns of interaction (vi) 
outcomes and (vii) evaluative criteria (Reddy, 2000). Whereas, it should be noted that the 
IAD framework is not a fundamental model in which data is inputted and an output is 
generated, rather the framework is a method for logically arranging information, examining 
relationships among attributes and considering or describing outcomes. 
 
Despite the fact that this set is comprehensive and useful for situational analysis, the 
framework focuses mainly on institutional sustainability and does not address other 
important aspects such as institutional innovation and change triggered by the external 
environment. Besides, it neglects the supply side factors such as policy environment, 
political environment, external factors, etc, which are equally important not only for 
institutional innovation and change but also for sustainability. Hence, the framework remains 
one-sided (Reddy, 2000).  
 
Though the IAD framework precisely offers a multi-level structure, linking the operational 
level where actors make decisions on natural resource management and governance to the 
collective choice and constitutional levels, where actors decide on the rules for decision-
making, most commons literature has been restricted to the study of collective action among 
local communities without expanding the framework to higher government and institutional 
levels. The application of the framework to the study of natural resource management and 
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governance has often been restricted to the study of operational rules designed by the 
communities managing natural resources with little consideration of policy decisions taken 
at higher governance and government levels (Clement, 2010). 
 
Clement (2010) further argued that the framework has been little applied insofar to the study 
of environmental policy processes across government levels because of a number of 
weaknesses. First, it lacks locating the unit of analysis in its historical, social and discursive 
context. As a result, it does not help the analyst to explain why some of the identified 
variables are more important in some contexts than in others. Secondly, the framework does 
not adequately capture how power distribution at each governance level and between 
different levels affects rule crafting and the transformation of rules into actual practices.  
 
As a result Clement (2010) proposed modifications to the IAD framework to incorporate two 
exogenous variables to the original IAD framework: the politico-economic context and 
discourses. These variables impact both the action situation-notably in the way they position 
actors-and the actors, as they shape values, norms and preferences. The development 
Clement (2010) proposes aims at “politicizing” the framework, i.e. adding to its ability to 
analyze natural resource policy processes, including the assessment of policy impacts and 
policy change, across multiple governance levels. It is hoped that the modifications to the 
framework will support more accurate analyses of the success and failure of decentralized 
natural resource policies, guide the design of sound policy recommendations and ultimately 
contribute to improved policies.  
 
Similarly Ostrom (2009) provides a framework for analyzing socio-ecological systems 
(SES), showing the relationships among four first-level core subsystems of an SES that 
affect each other as well as linked social, economic, and political settings and related 
ecosystems. The subsystems are (i) resource systems (in this research context, lake Tana and 
its associated resource systems like fish stock and wetlands); (ii) resource units (e.g., fish, 
and amount and flow of water); (iii) governance systems (e.g., the government and other 
organizations that manage the CPR in the sub-basin, the specific rules related to the use of 
specific resources, and how these rules are made); and (iv) users (e.g., individuals who use 
the resources in diverse ways for sustenance, recreation, or commercial purposes). In 
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addition, Epstein et al. (2013) considers the biophysical components of the SES framework 
and proposes the addition of ‘ecological rules’ as core subsystem. The use of ecological rules 
can identify important ecological features, and avoid attributing success or failure to the 
social aspects of a set of cases when there are theoretically relevant ecological differences. It 
also helps to explore the interplay of social and ecological factors. 
 
On the other hand, supplementing the modified IAD with other frameworks such as the 
Interactive Governance (IG) framework provides a promising integrated framework to better 
understand complex systems like Lake Tana ecosystem. The Interactive Governance (IG) 
model developed by Kooiman et al. (2008) is an innovative approach for understanding and 
dealing more adequately with societal problems and opportunities, and takes a systems 
approach to examining the nature of these interactions, the likely consequences for 
governance outcomes, and what governing interventions should be considered.  
 
The model is a diagnostic lens to identify where in the systems problems may lie, and what 
aspects of the systems may foster or inhibit governability. The integrated and comprehensive 
lens that the interactive governance perspective brings to the concerns, challenges and 
problems related to CPR systems and human interactions helps broaden the possibility and 
opportunities for better solutions. It is also a prescriptive tool in that it helps determine which 
governing responses and interventions, including institutions and policies, need to be put in 
place in order to improve the overall natural resource governance system (Chuenpagdee, 
2011). 
 
IG-theory provides a framework for studying the interactions between ecosystem and 
society, and for providing direction to policy (Bavinck et al. 2005).  According to this 
framework every societal sector can be divided into two parts: a System-to-be-Governed 
(SG), and a Governing System (GS). For a governing effort to be successful these parts need 
to be compatible; in other words, the GS must take adequate account of the nature of the SG. 
Where this is ignored, governance fails and society suffers (Bavinck, 2009). Both 
frameworks can complement each other to maximize their strengths and minimize the 
weaknesses. Besides, there are similarities in both models that could be shared as common 
features.  
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As indicated by Lee (2003), levels of institutions (Constitutional, Collective-choice and 
Operational levels) explained by the IAD framework correspond exactly to the levels of 
governance (Meta or third, Second and First order governance) explained by the IG 
framework. Ostrom (1986) also suggested that, governance can be understood even more 
clearly by the IAD framework, which is a meta-theoretical framework for analyzing social 
phenomena and ‘nestedness’ of governance can also be better analyzed with the help of the 
IAD framework by identifying three levels of analysis (‘operational, ‘collective choice, and 
‘constitutional choice’). 
 
Therefore, the overall approach used in this study for attempting to identify the overall 
human-nature interactions in Lake Tana sub-basin is summarized in Figure 2.1. The figure 
presents the combined general elements of the IAD and IG framework, which involves an 
integrated framework to guide the research. At the heart of the framework are the ‘action 
situations’ where the ‘system-to-be governed’ (SG) and ‘Governance system’ (GS) overlap 
to make the Governance Interaction (GI) happen (Chuenpagdee, 2011). According to 
governance theory, these systems share similar structural attributes: they are diverse, 
complex, and dynamic and operate at different scales. They are also affected by external 
environments that trigger changes at different levels. Ultimately the interactions of actors 
with the existing scenario (attributes of the natural and human sub-systems) and the ‘rules of 
the game’ will yield an outcome that will affect in turn the whole system at different scales.  
 
The following section discusses the different components of the modified framework.  
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   Figure 2.1: General elements of the integrated framework 
                        Source: Adapted and modified from Ostrom et al. (1994), Kooiman et al. (2008) and Clement (2010)
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i) System-to-be governed (SG) 
 
Biophysical world, communities and other stakeholders: The IG-approach highlights four 
features/system properties of SG that are of crucial importance for governance design: their 
diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale. The act of governing is deeply influenced by 
these features of the system, as well as by issues of scale (Bavinck and Salagrama, 2008). 
Hence, diverse SGs are argued to require a rich diversity of governance efforts, whereas 
complex SGs necessitate a sophisticated governance approach. Dynamic SGs mean that 
policy makers must be flexible and be capable of acting on the basis of learning about the 
changes continuously taking place.  
 
Attributes of the resources/biophysical world: Describe biophysical conditions and trends. 
This varies from setting to setting across the Lake Tana Ecosystem. The fishery sub-
ecosystems, for example might include elements such as rate of growth, diversity of species 
present, climate and weather, terrain, and other physical factors that impact the state of the 
fishery ecosystem and the humans that interact with it. Other elements include size of the 
resource, temporal and spatial variability of resource units, current condition (Ostrom, 1990). 
Technology also affects how a biophysical world operates over time, and changes in 
technology may have substantial impact on the incentives facing individual participants 
(Ostrom, 2007).  
 
Attributes of Community and other stakeholders: The attributes of resource users 
encompasses both local communities and extra-local users (Oakerson, 1992; Ostrom, 2005). 
Many variables can be used to analyze relevant attributes of a community that are likely to 
affect behavior in human interaction situations (Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Community 
attributes such as resource users’ sources of incomes and the presence or absence of social, 
economic, cultural and location differences among resource users affect the users’ incentives 
to cooperate (Tang, 1992). The knowledge and perception of community members and other 
stakeholders  is an important context that affects individual actions, including things like 
‘generally accepted norms of behavior, the level of common understanding about action 
situations, the extent to which preferences and perceptions are homogeneous, and 
distribution of resources among members’ (Ostrom, 1990). 
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ii) The governing system (GS):  
 
Politico-economic context and discourses: The examination of the role of the politico-
economic context and discourses is meant to bring the analyst to explicitly consider power 
and values within the action arena. The politico-economic context is to be examined under a 
dynamic perspective to understand how power has been distributed among actors who take 
decisions and how political and economic interests have driven actors’ decisions within a 
particular set of rules-in-use (Clement, 2010). Discourse in this context means a “specific 
group of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed 
in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social 
realities” (Hajer, 1995). Discourses are linked to institutions not only in how discourses 
affect institutions but also in how discourses have emerged in a particular institutional and 
politico-economic context (Clement and Amezaga, 2009). This research focuses particularly 
on development versus environmental protection discourses. 
 
Institutions/Rules-in-use: The rules in use cover broad governance arrangements at 
constitutional and collective choice level down to specific rules regulating use of a given 
CPR (Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom et al. 1994). The interactive governance model recognizes three 
modes of governance, hierarchical, co-governance and self-governance, all of which are 
possible, depending on the properties of the systems that are being governed, the capacity of 
the governing systems, and the quality of their interactions. Self-governance refers to 
situations in which actors take care of themselves, outside the purview of government, where 
management authority and decision-making power rest within resource users organizations. 
It is also embedded within the societal realm of societal interferences, where individuals, 
families, groups, organizations, and even societal sectors govern themselves (Bavinck et al. 
2005; Kooiman et al. 2008; Chuenpagdee, 2011).  
 
Hierarchical governance is the classical governance mode and characteristic of the 
interactions between a state and its citizens. It is a top-down style of intervention, with 
steering, planning and control as key concepts, which are expressed in instruments such as 
laws, rules, regulations and policies (Bavinck et al. 2005). In the co-governance perspective, 
parties co-operate, co-ordinate and communicate ‘sideways’, without a central or dominating 
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governing actor. It is a situation where governments, resource users and/or community 
groups work collaboratively or engage in partnership arrangements to care for the 
ecosystems (Chuenpagdee, 2011). 
 
The model further depicts three kinds of governance orders, namely first, second and third 
order governance, which is similar to that of Ostrom’s constitutional choice, collective 
choice and operational levels at which rules can be crafted and operate. According to 
Kooiman et al. (2005, 2008), the order of governance can be imagined as three concentric 
circles nested as in the peels of an onion. The outer ring deals with day-to-day affairs, and is 
termed first order governance/operational level. The second ring - second order 
governance/collective choice level-deals with institutions, whereas the third-meta-
governance/constitutional choice level, involves debate on the underlying values and 
principles of the overall governance system.  
 
First-order (operational level) governance takes place wherever people and their 
organizations interact in order to solve societal problems and create new opportunities. At 
this order, governance is occupied with day-to-day problem solving, enforcement of rules, 
resolution of conflicts within and among stakeholders, taking actions that are normally 
followed. It focuses on the day-to-day impacts of existing rules and norms on the incentives 
of actors (Rudd, 2003). Second order (collective choice level) governance focuses on the 
institutional arrangements within which first order governing takes place and rules that are 
chosen for a resource use (fishery or wetlands) and decision-makers create rules to impact 
operational-level activities (Koontz, 2003). Here, the term ‘institution’ denotes the 
agreements, rules, rights, laws, norms, beliefs, roles, procedures and organizations that are 
applied by first-order governors to make decisions.  
 
Third order (Constitutional choice level) governance feeds, binds, and evaluates the 
governing exercise at the second order governance. At this level the main normative 
principles and values are articulated in order to guide the behavior of first-and second-order 
governing. Constitutional choice outcomes affect collective choice decision-making, which, 
in turn, affects operational-level activities (Koontz, 2003). Particularly, in resource 
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management issues, the primary focus is on who has the rights and power to set lower level 
rules regarding access to, and utilization of resources. The rules-in-use at this level are 
concerned with the aggregation and expression of stakeholder and societal preferences. This 
is largely a matter of property rights that define what level of control resource users and 
other actors have over resource access and appropriation (Rudd, 2003). For effective and 
legitimate governance of CPRs all these orders of governance are needed. 
 
Action Situations: The point of intersection for Governance Interaction (GI) to happen 
 
When conducting an institutional analysis, the analyst first identifies the ‘action situation, 
where governance interaction takes place’. In ecological-socioeconomic analyses, a 
geographically explicit action situation accounts for the behavioral linkage between 
contextual variables and rules-in-use on the one hand, and ecological, social and economic 
outcomes on the other (Rudd, 2004). However, the action situation is not bound to a limited 
structural or geographical size; it may exist within households, village communities, local, 
regional, national and international councils, as well as in firms and markets (Ostrom, 2005). 
In all institutional analyses, the contextual variables that frame and constrain the action 
situation need to be specified, including variables relating to the physical and material world 
within which the actors interact, the attributes of community and the institutions or ‘rules-in-
use’ that govern behavior (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). The IAD framework starts with the 
action situation as the unit of analysis and focus of investigation.  
 
An action situation is the ‘social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and 
services, engage in appropriation and provision activities, solve problems, or fight in 
conflicting situations’. It includes the following elements: ‘participants in positions who 
must decide among diverse actions in light of the information they possess about how 
actions are linked to the potential outcomes and the costs and benefits assigned to actions 
and outcomes’. Ideally, the action situation is one for which the institutional arrangements 
can be modified to bring about more desirable outcomes (Smajgl et al. 2009).  
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The participants in an action situation are the decision-making entities who play a certain 
role and who are capable of selecting actions from a set of alternatives available in a decision 
process (Ostrom, 2005).  An actor is the individual, or group functioning as a corporate 
actor, who takes action. Actors are characterized by four features: ‘(1) the preference 
evaluations that actors assign to potential actions and outcomes; (2) the way actors acquire, 
process, retain, and use knowledge contingencies and information; (3) the selection criteria 
actors’ use for deciding upon a particular course of action; and (4) the resources that an actor 
brings to a situation’ (Ostrom, et al. 1994). The IG assumption related to the Governing 
System (GS) is, every societal sector has many people and organizations involved in the 
governing process. Some of these people and organizations belong to ‘government’; others 
are involved in ‘the market’ and ‘civil society’ (Bavinck et al. 2005). 
 
Patterns of interaction: Patterns of interaction refer to the bargaining processes among 
actors in which they exchange resources, devise new rules, and demand action from other 
stakeholders (Di Gregorio et al. 2008). The patterns of interaction between participants in an 
action situation result in outcomes that may feed back into the original exogenous variables 
and action situation and thereby restructure the situation (Smajgl et al. 2009). Actors make 
choices based on their own preferences, objectives or mandates (in the case of government 
agencies), the costs and benefits that they assign to alternative actions and outcomes, and 
strategic considerations (e.g., expectations of the behavior of others). These individual 
choices lead to aggregate patterns of interaction relevant for user- based resource governance 
and management. Patterns of interaction result directly from the aggregate effects of 
individuals going about their day-to-day decision-making.  In fishery system for example 
usually five main patterns will be of interest: fishing effort (or use of other resource users), 
fishing location, choice of technology, compliance with existing rules, and conflict or 
cooperation with other resource users (Rudd, 2003). 
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Outcomes and evaluative criteria  
 
According to McGinnis (2011) outcomes are shaped by both the outputs of the action 
situation and by exogenous factors. Evaluative criteria may be used by participants or 
external observers to determine which aspects of the observed outcomes are deemed 
satisfactory and which aspects are in need of improvement in terms of:  Efficiency in use of resources.  Equity in distributional outcomes and processes.  Legitimacy as seen by participants in decision processes.  Participation tends to increase legitimacy and co-production.  Accountability, especially to direct users of resource.  Consistency with the moral values prevalent in that community  Adaptability, Resilience, Robustness, or Sustainability-a system’s capacity to suffer a 
disturbance and yet still continue to function, without losing its basic structural or functional 
integrity. 
 
The evaluations of the outcomes depend to a great extent on the evaluative criteria used by 
participants or the external evaluative criteria of the system (society) they operate within. 
These criteria may differ between stakeholder groups and it is important to be clear about 
which groups will evaluate the outcomes from which perspective. The same physical 
outcome may be evaluated positively by one group and negatively by another.  
 
Depending on the particular action situation chosen and the nature of the impacts and how 
they are evaluated, the analysis may then lead to insights about how current institutional 
arrangements restrict or enable desirable outcomes and to recommendations about a set of 
institutional arrangements that may be able to bring about more desirable outcomes. The 
assessment of the outcomes of any action situation depends to a great extent on the 
evaluative criteria used by participants (Smajgl et al. 2009).  
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2.7 Chapter summary  
 
Globally, literatures that exist concerning CPR management and governance are too 
diversified to be exhaustively reviewed here. Hence, for this research, attempts were made to 
review relevant literatures and draw on selective theories to develop and explain the 
conceptual framework. The review of literature addresses the main issues pertinent for this 
study, particularly institutional arrangements, CPR management and governance. Much 
theoretical and original work conducted on the analysis of CPRs management and 
governance has focused and implicitly only considered single-use resources like water, 
pastureland, forest, or fishery resources use by a single distinct user group (Adams et al. 
2001). However, in a very complex and multiple use-multiple user resource systems, it 
would be difficult to understand the general picture of the resource-user interaction with a 
single case study. It is therefore necessary to also investigate the relationships between 
different common-pool resource systems, multiple users and their relationships under a 
complex system.  
 
Therefore, this research framework attempts to capture a more holistic and systemic 
approach to CPR use, management and governance issue in Lake Tana sub-basin. The study 
has adopted a combination of the modified IAD framework and Interactive Governance 
model since; first this approach provides a comprehensive lens to explore the research 
problem through an elaborated and extended framework that addresses the key features of 
the CPR governance system; second, the framework helps to identify and depict the missing 
link in the Lake Tana resource management and governance system. Building on the 
institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, and incorporating principles from 
the interactive governance, CPR and Complex systems theories the framework is applicable 
across multiple scales of analysis, linking local stakeholder dynamics to the broader 
institutional and governance context. The framework however does not attempt to solidify 
any blue print for CPR use, management and governance system in the region, but rather to 
assess the overall governance environment and to better understand the action situation 
where multi-stakeholders are interacting with an outcome that eventually has an impact on 
CPR system with a particular emphasis on Lake Tana (water), fishery and wetland 
commons.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Introduction  
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research methodology used preceded by 
a brief description of the study area. An over view of the context as well as social and 
environmental setting of sampled districts and case studies are also presented. Specific 
research methods and approaches that were used in this study are discussed in detail.  
3.2 Description of the Study Area 
 
3.2.1 Ethiopia: an overview  
 
 
Ethiopia is geographically located between 330 and 480 East longitude, and 30 and 15 
minutes and 180 north of the equator; it is bounded by the Sudan and South Sudan on the 
West, Somalia and Djibouti on the East, Eritrea on the North and Kenya on the South. 
Ethiopia comprises an area of 1.14 million square kilometers (which is approximately as 
large as France and Spain combined). Out of this, 74 million ha or 66 percent of the total 
area is deemed suitable for agriculture. Located in the East Africa sub-region better known 
as the Horn of Africa, the topography of the country is largely a high plateau. It ranges from 
100 meters below sea level in the Dallol depression of Afar, to mountain peaks of over 4,000 
meters above sea level in the Semin Mountains. Ethiopia is the oldest independent country in 
Africa and one of the oldest in the world. What are believed to be the oldest remains of a 
human ancestor ever found, which have been dated as being some five million years old, 
were discovered in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia. This beats the discovery of ‘Lucy’, a 3.2 
million year old skeleton, who was unearthed in the same area in 1974 (CIA, 2012; FDRE, 
2012). 
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Based on the 2007 population and housing census, the Ethiopian Central Statistical 
Authority (CSA) estimated the population of Ethiopia to be 84,320,987 in July, 2012. 
However, according to CIA estimation in 2012 the population is 93,815,992 which would 
place the country as one of the most populous in Africa (ranked 2nd following Nigeria) and 
the 13th most populous country in the world. With an annual rate of population growth of 
3.179%, Ethiopia also ranks 5th in the world. The Population Reference Bureau (PRB) has 
estimated a population of 174 million in 2050, which would make Ethiopia the 9th most 
populous country. 
 
       
 
Figure 3.1: The trend of Ethiopian population growth since the 1980s 
                Source: Extracted from CSA, 2007 and CIA, 2012. 
 
As indicated in Figure 3.1 (above) each successive population and housing census 
demonstrates that national population size increased in steady increments of significant 
proportions. For instance, a comparison of the 2007 census results with those from 1994 
shows that the population of the country increased by more than 20 million persons over that 
time period. Similarly, in the previous decade (1984 to 1994), the population of the country 
increased by 13.2 million (CSA, 2007). As per the CIA estimation, after 35 years or more the 
Ethiopian population will be almost doubled.  
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The Ethiopian economy largely depends on agriculture with an employment rate of 80% of 
the population and which accounts for about 83.1% of the exports (MoFED, 2008/09). 
Agriculture, which contributes 41% of GDP, is still predominantly small holder (85%) and 
traditional. Coffee is a major export crop. The national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
Ethiopia for the years 2011 was estimated 94.76 Billion USD. Since the 1990s, Ethiopia is 
following an Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy with the major 
goal of bringing about transformation of the country’s economy. The assumption is that 
growth in agriculture spurs a series of inter-linkages in other sectors of the economy, as it 
has forward and backward linkages.  
 
Very recently, the country is implementing a new Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), a 
medium term strategic framework for the five-year period (2010/11-2014/15). The ambitious 
five year growth plan and transformation projects Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 
11-15% per year from 2010 through 2015. This plan is expected to create significant 
investment opportunities primarily in the agricultural and industrial sectors. At the same time 
a Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy (CRGE) was developed in 2011 and launched 
at the 17th  Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in Durban, in 2011(EPA, 2012). The GTP envisages that the country’s GDP 
per capita would grow from 378 USD in 2010 to 1,271 USD in 2025. Besides, the CRGE 
strategy projects that the contribution of agriculture will diminish from 42% to 29%, 
indicating migration of jobs from the agriculture sector to industry and services (MoFED, 
GTP, 2010). 
 
According to the African Economic Outlook report, in 2011 (fiscal year [FY] 2010/11), the 
Ethiopian economy grew at 11.4% marking the eighth consecutive year of rapid growth. 
Moreover, growth has continued to be broad-based with industry, services and agriculture 
growing by 15%, 12.5% and 9% respectively. Hotels and restaurants, real estate, renting and 
business activities, and financial intermediation made the largest contribution to the growth 
of the services sector. The services sector is expected to continue to grow rapidly, though at 
a slower pace than in previous years, at 7% and 7.6% in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The 
agricultural sector, which accounts for 80% of employment, remains a key source of growth. 
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In 2011 the sector grew by 9%, driven by cereal production which reached a record high of 
19.1 million tons in 2011. Ethiopia’s overall growth prospects in 2012 and 2013 are good, 
with public investment in infrastructure, commercialization of agriculture and non-traditional 
exports expected to continue driving growth. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth for 
2012 and 2013 is projected at 7% and 7.6% respectively. While these projections are lower 
than the GTP projections and official GDP out-turn figures, at these levels the Ethiopian 
economy would still maintain its high growth momentum (AEO, 2012). 
 
3.2.2 CPR management and governance in Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia is a country with high biodiversity, distinctive ecosystems and richly endowed with 
huge manpower, arable land and natural resources. However, much of its potential is not yet 
exploited and uncontrolled population growth puts ever- increasing pressures on the 
country’s natural resource base.  Ethiopia’s ecological system is fragile and vulnerable to 
climate change. Key challenges include soil degradation, deforestation and loss of 
biodiversity, which have been compounded by population pressure on land, especially in the 
highlands (ibid).  
 
The literature on CPR in Ethiopia, particularly studies on institutional arrangement and 
governance is limited. In this sub-section, a number of empirical studies that have been 
conducted on CPR issues are highlighted. Existing research reports show that common-pool 
resource in Ethiopia in general and Lake Tana sub-basin in particular are rapidly degrading, 
not only threatening the livelihood of the local communities but also contributing to rural 
poverty, but also affecting the region’s ecosystem.  
 
Ethiopia was once richly endowed with common-property resource regimes among a variety 
of social groups (Admassie, 2000 cited in Ashenafi and Leader-Williams, 2005). However, 
CPRs are under heavy stress in Ethiopia in large part resulting from a long period of 
institutional change from feudalism (before 1974) through centralized socialism (between 
1974 and 1991) to democracy and decentralization (since 1991), that abolished or 
undermined the traditional management and governance systems, combined with large scale 
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resettlements, incoherent environmental policies and weak formal rule enforcement all of 
which created many quasi open access areas across different regions (Reichhuber et al. 
2009). Despite the fact that rules and regulations are enacted at constitutional level, the 
enforcement of these rules to govern and protect the natural resources is very weak. Rules 
are enacted in a top-down manner without considering the local context and informal 
institutional arrangements. 
 
A study conducted by Kebede (2002) based on fifteen rural sites in Ethiopia confirms that 
most CPRs are in a state of either exhaustion or stress. In some areas, apparently there are no 
restrictions on the use of certain resources (effectively open-access resources).The dominant 
trend which emerged from the description of conditions of CPRs in the survey sites indicated 
that they are increasingly being depleted. The depletion of grazing areas is particularly 
increasing at an alarming rate. In almost all the survey sites, forest areas and other vegetation 
cover found on land, not directly used by households, have significantly decreased. 
 
Bogale et al. (2006), in their case study of Hirna watershed in Western Hararge 
administrative zone of Oromiya Regional State, highlighted that, the drive for collective 
action to successfully  govern and maintain the natural resources is failing. Their household 
survey result shows that the degree of belongingness to conserve and manage natural 
resources particularly common-property resources has declined. This is manifested by the 
decline in frequency and duration of participation of households in community affairs. 
Almost all sample households feel that it is the responsibility of the government to look after 
the sustainability of the natural resources. They further argued that, resource scarcity also 
causes individual households to focus on narrow survival strategies, which reduces the 
interaction of civil society and weakens local institutions. This segmentation reduces social 
capital-trust, norm and networks-which gives an opportunity for powerful groups to grab 
control over resources inviting conflict. 
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On the other hand, several studies documented that the role played by informal or traditional 
resource management and governance systems is vital for successful resource management 
and governance (Markelova and Swallow, 2008, German et al. 2010). A study conducted in 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries reveals that informal institutions have contributed to 
achieving most of the sustainability outcomes because they acknowledge the local 
knowledge of the community in the process of sustainable CPR management and governance 
by creating a suitable environment for joint decision making, enabling exclusions at low cost 
for CPR users and using locally agreed sanctions. Whereas formal institutions in most cases 
contributed less to sustainable CPR management and governance due to several factors such 
as unclear responsibilities, mandates, and power sharing in the decentralization reforms, and 
their low endurance to change with political conditions (Yami et al. 2009).  
 
A typical example here is the Guasa area indigenous natural resource management and 
governance system in Amhara regional state. The common-property resource system in the 
Guassa area of Menz, in the Central Highlands of Ethiopia, has continued since 1975 to 
protect local livelihoods, as well as endemic and threatened biodiversity. The Guassa area is 
managed and governed by the Menz community as a common-property resource area. The 
community continues to protect the area by enacting various bylaws, which restrict 
community use of the natural resources; without any formal protection status, this 
indigenous resource management system was structured under an indigenous resource 
management institution.  
 
However in recent times, the common-property resources of Guassa area are now managed 
by the newly formed peasant associations (PAs- the lowest government structures) which are 
structured on the basis of geographical location and the premise that ‘everybody is equal’ 
rather than on the old system based on kinship and parishes, both of which are tremendously 
important to communal belief, trust and unity. This has resulted in the erosion of the sense of 
‘belongingness’ in the community, and created tensions and conflict between the old and the 
newly authorized users and managers (Ashenafi and Leader-Williams, 2005).  
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Wakjira et al. (2013) indicated that Harenna forest in the Southern part of the Bale 
Mountains of Oromiya regional state has been governed by local informal institutions. 
Despite repeated and profound changes in the governance approaches for Ethiopia, local-
level traditional institutions governing the use of forest coffee, beekeeping and livestock 
grazing have not fundamentally altered for more than 150 years. However, these traditional 
institutions have experienced numerous modifications in recent times. They further argued 
that major factors causing or triggering such adaptations included; the imposition of formal 
governance systems from the central government that undermined the previously existing 
informal institutions (like the Gada system), an increasing number of inhabitants and thus 
potential forest users, and an increasing value of resources. 
 
Recently, Yami et al. (2013) also reported the existence of informal institutions where 
village bylaws devised by communities govern the management of enclosures.  They found 
that the informal institutions played important roles in mobilizing the CPR users for 
collective action in CPR management and governance in the Northern Ethiopian context. 
The village bylaws in Southern Tigray regional state mitigated forest degradation by 
facilitating users to have common goals in the management of enclosures, and resolved the 
conflicts among users by using monetary sanctions including penalties.  
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   a) Map of Ethiopia                                
         
      b) Lake Tana sub-basin                                               
  Figure 3.2: Map of the study area (Ethiopia and Lake Tana sub-basin) 
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3.2.3 Amhara National Regional State  
 
The Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) is one of the 9 ethnically based administrative 
regions of Ethiopia. The region is geographically located in the north-western part of the 
country between 9
o
-13
o 45’N latitude and longitude of 36o-40o 30’E.  With an estimated area 
of 154,708.96 square kilometers, this region has an estimated density of 121.9 people per 
square kilometer. Based on the 2007 population and housing census, the Central Statistical 
Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) estimated the population of Amhara region to be 18, 866,002 in 
July 2012 of whom 9,461,005 are men and 9,404,997 women. 
 
Agriculture is the dominant economic sector in the region and biggest employer of the 
economically active population. It accounts for 63.1% of the regional GDP and 89% of the 
population derives its livelihood from agriculture and allied activities. Agriculture in the 
region is characterized by extremely small holdings, mostly private peasant holdings, 
dispersion of crop land holdings, traditional farming and low level of literacy among the 
holders (CSA, 2003; BoFED, 2004). It is the major source of food, raw materials for local 
industries, and export earnings. Crop production and animal husbandry are the major 
agricultural activities undertaken in the region. Crops such as cereals, pulses, oil seeds, 
fibers, and roots crops are grown in different parts of the Region. Major crops include maize, 
sorghum, potato, bean, wheat, and barley in the highlands, and teff (Eragrostis tef), cotton 
and sesame in the lowlands. Small-scale subsistence cultivation is the dominant agricultural 
practice, and ancient methods of land preparation and harvesting continued to be applied. 
Absence of relevant agricultural technologies, combined with a low level of extension 
services, contribute toward low productivity and production levels.  
 
The region is endowed with a huge natural resource potential including the world-renowned 
Nile River and its source, Lake Tana together with its historical monasteries as well as 
historical sites such as the Gondar Castle, the rock-hewn churches of Lalibela, Tis issat fall, 
the Semen Mountain etc.    
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3.2.4 The research locations: Lake Tana and sample districts  
 
Lake Tana  
 
At 12°N, 37°15′E, and 1,830 m altitude, Lake Tana is situated on the basaltic plateau of the 
north-western highlands of Ethiopia covering an area of about 3,050 km2 stretching 84 Km 
north-south and 66 Km east-west.  Its maximum depth is 14m with a decreasing trend due to 
siltation and lowering water level. The lake is believed to have originated two million years 
ago by volcanic blocking of the Blue Nile River (Mohr, 1962; Baker et al. 1972). It assumed 
its present shape through blocking of a 50 km long quaternary basalt flow, which filled the 
exit channel of the Blue Nile River (Chorowicz et al. 1998). However, a recent seismic 
survey reveals that there are strong evidences that Lake Tana had dried up between 16,000 
and 50,000 years ago (Lamb et al. 2007). Lake Tana is the largest freshwater lake in the 
country and the third largest in the Nile Basin which contributes about 85% of the Nile 
water. It supports huge livelihood and development activities. The aesthetic value of the lake 
coupled with the historic monasteries on its islands, have added to its use value through the 
development of tourism and the growth of inward investment.  
 
The sub-basin area of the lake at its outlet is 15,321 km2 of which about 20% is covered by 
the lake itself. More than 40 rivers (some researchers reported 60 rivers) and streams flow 
into the lake, but 93% of the water comes from four major rivers: Gilgel Abbay, Ribb, 
Gumara and Megech. The mean annual inflow to the lake is estimated to be 158 m3s-1 (i.e. 
4,986 Mm3y-1). The mean annual outflow is estimated to be 119 m3s-1 (i.e. 3,753 Mm3y-1) 
(SMEC, 2008). This basin is of critical national significance as it has great potential for 
irrigation; hydroelectric power; high value crops and livestock production; ecotourism and 
others (Setegn, 2010) and it is one of the growth corroders selected by the Ethiopian 
government to accomplish the ambitious Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP).  
 
 
 
 
60 
 
The total population in the lake catchment was estimated to be in excess of 3 million in 2007 
(CSA, 2003). The largest city on the lake shore, Bahir Dar, has a population of over 200,000 
and at least 15,000 people are believed to live on the 37 islands in the lake. Most islands in 
Lake Tana are small, but two of them are larger (Daga estifanos, and Dek, which used to be 
the seat of Ethiopian emperors). The majority of the population depends for their livelihoods 
on rain fed agriculture. Fishery is an integral part of their livelihood both for household 
consumption and income generation. Despite the huge potential, there is very little irrigated 
agriculture in the sub-basin. During the rainy season, Dembiya from the North, Fogera and 
Libokemkem from the East form extensive floodplain wetlands of the lake. Recession 
cropping, mainly for maize and rice, is carried out in the wetlands adjacent to the lake shore 
(Awulachew et al. 2009).  
 
Lake Tana ecosystem is important in ecological and economic terms, and it has both local 
and global significance. It is an important source of fish both for the people immediately 
around the lake and elsewhere in the country (Awulachew et al. 2009). Its unique and 
isolated landscape includes forested islands, immense and varied wetlands and high 
mountain areas. The region is renowned for its biodiversity, and it is also the home of 
churches and monasteries dating from the 14th to the 16th century. As a result of the high 
heterogeneity in habitats, the lake and surrounding riparian areas support high biodiversity 
and are listed in the top 250 lake regions of global importance for biodiversity(McCartney et 
al. 2010). About a quarter of the 65 fish species found in the lake are endemic. The lake 
contains eighteen species of barbus fish (i.e. of the Cyprinidae family) and the only extended 
cyprinid species flock in Africa (Eshete, 2003). 
 
Ninety per cent of the area’s rapidly growing population of 2.5 million people depends on 
subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods. The productivity and sustainability of mixed 
farming practices depend on ecosystem goods and services, which rely on the functional 
integrity of the Lake’s ecosystems- rivers, wetlands, lake, forests, pastures and soils. 
However recent research reports show that the integrity of the overall ecosystem has been 
undermined and continues to be under serious threat.  
 
 
61 
 
Sampled districts 
  
Recently, the former Achefer district was split into North and South Achefer. North Achefer 
is situated about 560 km north of Ethiopia’s capital city, Addis Ababa. The study area within 
North Achefer has geographical boundaries between 11o 00’ 40” to 11o 38’ 00” North and 
36o 48’ 00” to 37o 01’ 35” East. It is part of the West Gojam Zone which is bordered on the 
south by South Achefer, on the west by North Gondar, on the north by Lake Tana, on the 
north-east by Bahir Dar Zuria and on the south-east by Merawi. Lake Tana’s tributary rivers 
within this district include the Lesser Abbay (locally called ‘picolo Abbay’, Gilgel Abbay to 
mean small Abbay) and it defines the area's Eastern boundary. The district includes Dek 
Island. The administrative center is Yesmala; other towns in Achefer include Durbete, 
Kunzela and Wandege. According to the Central Statistical Agency (2007), in July 2012 
North Achefer has an estimated total population of 206,658, including 105,451 males and 
101,207 females (see Table 3.1). 
 
Bahir Dar zuria district is found in the south shore of Lake Tana. With an estimated total 
population of 196,766 in July 2012, of whom 100,834 and 95,932 are male and females 
(CSA, 2007), the district is sub divided in to 38 kebeles (the lowest unit of administration). 
Farming and fishing are the most common occupations outside Bahir Dar town. A survey of 
the land in this district show that 21% is arable or cultivable, 9% pasture, 8% forest or shrub 
land, 36% covered with water, and the remaining 26% is considered degraded or other. The 
topography of the district comprises of 48% plain and 45% rigid and 7% valley bottom. 
 
Dembiya district is found in North Gondar Administrative Zone, North of Lake Tana. Based 
on figures published by the Central Statistical Agency in 2007, the district has an estimated 
total population of 295,423 in July 2012, of which 150,347 are men and 145,076 women. 
The district is divided into 40 rural and 5 urban kebeles. More than 10 kebeles have wetland 
along the shore of Lake Tana. Rivers within this district include the Lesser Angereb and 
Derma, which flow south into Lake Tana, and the Atbarah. The topography of the district 
comprises of 87% plain and 13% rigid. A survey of the land in this district shows that 64% is 
arable or cultivable and another 25% under irrigation, 6% pasture, 4% forest or shrub land, 
and the remaining 1% is considered degraded or other.  
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Fogera district has an estimated total population of 249,826 in July 2012(CSA, 2007) of 
whom 127,286 are males and 122,540 are females. It is located on the south-eastern shore of 
Lake Tana. The capital of the district is Wereta, some 625 km from Addis Ababa and 55 km 
north of the Regional capital of Bahir Dar. The district is divided into 25 rural and 5 urban 
kebeles and has a land area of 117,414 ha, out of which 9,602.36 ha is grazing land. Flat land 
accounts for 76%, mountain and hills 11% and valley bottom 13%. Some 55% of the land of 
the district is cultivated; 29% is pasture land. The district borders Lake Tana and has an 
estimated water body of 23,354 ha. Altitude ranges from 1,774 to 2,410 m.a.s.l. It is situated 
at 11058 latitude and 37041 longitudes.  The mean annual rainfall is 1,216.3 mm and average 
temperature is 19oC (IPMS, 2005).  
 
The area is well endowed with diverse natural resources and is one of eight districts 
bordering Lake Tana. There are two major rivers of great economic importance to the 
district, the Gumara and the Ribb. The area mainly consists of a flat, open plain across which 
the Ribb River flows into Lake Tana. The Gumara River forms the southern boundary. Both 
rivers originate from the high plateau to the East, and as they reach the plains the gradient 
decreases and they form meanders. During and after the rainy season, as the Ribb River 
approaches the level of Lake Tana, water overflows its banks and floods the surrounding 
area. The perennial Gumara River also overflows its banks as it approaches the Lake, but 
causes less flooding than Ribb (Fishpool and Evans, 2001). 
 
Libokemkem district is found in South Gonder Administrative Zone, East of Lake Tana. The 
capital of the district is Addis Zemen Town which is located 81km North of Bahir Dar. The 
district is divided into 32 kebeles. It extends from a latitude of 37o15‘36” E to 38o06’36” E 
and from a longitude of 11o54‘36” N to 12o22‘48” N. According to the Central Statistics 
Agency, the district has an estimated total population of 217,029 in July 2012 (CSA, 2007) 
including 110,407 males and 106,622 females. The area receives a uni-modal rainfall of 
approximately 1300 mm per year, the majority of which falls between June and August. The 
mean annual temperature in the area is 19.7ºC.        
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Table 3.1: Population and land area of sampled districts 
 
Source: Central Statistics Authority (CSA, 2005 estimated as of July 2012) 
             * MoWR, 2005 
 
3.3 Research Methods 
3.3.1 Research design 
 
In order to investigate the research objectives, the research approach needed to integrate 
exploratory and descriptive research frameworks. Therefore, to better understand the 
complex human-nature interaction of Lake Tana sub-basin, a combination of a descriptive 
quantitative approach and case study research using qualitative methods was seen as the 
most suitable research approach. Particularly, the qualitative approach affords an in-depth 
analysis of complex human cultural experiences and their interaction with the natural system 
in a manner that cannot be fully captured with measurement scales and multivariate models 
(Plano et al. 2008).  
 
The main arguments for choosing case studies for this research however are the descriptive 
and exploratory  nature of the research (not requiring control of behavioral events but rather 
describing and documenting them) and the dominance of ‘how’ (and exploratory ‘what’) 
questions (Weerd-Nederhof, 2001). More importantly, as many researchers argues, unlike 
other qualitative designs such as grounded theory and ethnography, the case study approach 
is open to use of theory or conceptual categories that guide the research and analysis of data. 
 
 
 
Characteristics Sampled District 
North 
Achefer 
Bahir Dar 
Zuria 
Dembiya Fogera Libokemekem 
Population  206,658 196,766 295,423 249,826 217,029 
Land Area (km2) 1,152.43 1,443.37 1,261.96 1,111.43 999.71 
Density per km2  179.3 136.3 234.1 224.8 217.1 
% area in the sub-basin* 100 80 100 100 60 
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Situation analysis methodology was applied to the research setting: this helped to understand 
the broad context of human-nature interaction, particularly the status, trends and key issues 
affecting local people and their livelihoods, ecosystems or institutions in Lake Tana sub-
basin and the CPR context at different levels (local, national, regional and international). A 
situation analysis is a process that helps to create understanding of the Lake Tana sub-basin 
including the natural environment, the social, economic, political and institutional systems 
that affect the overall natural resource management and governance system of the sub-basin. 
Situation analysis is important to: (i) clearly identify the needs and concerns, interests and 
power of all stakeholders, (ii) ensure whether multi-stakeholder interaction is appropriate to 
the situation or not, (iii) assess the likely consequences of the multi-stakeholder process 
within its wider context, (iv) assess situational factors that will influence the implementation 
phase of the multi-stakeholder process and effectiveness (WUR, 2012).  
  
Towards this end, this research addresses the issue of institutional arrangements and CPR 
use, management and governance by using a combination of analytical tools including the 
modified Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom et al. 1990) and 
Interactive Governance framework (Kooiman et al. 2008) to describe the CPR governance 
environment and to better understand the action situation where multi-stakeholders are 
interacting with an outcome that eventually has an impact on CPR systems. The modified 
IAD framework is used as an evaluation and diagnostic tool, focusing on both the process of 
resource management, governance and its outcomes. The framework is used to separate the 
underlying rules (institutions) from the strategy of the players (organizations) and to 
understand how and to what extent rules and regulations enacted at constitutional level are 
enforced to affect the behavior and outcomes achieved by resource user and grassroots 
stakeholders. In addition, the Interactive Governance framework is used as an integrated and 
comprehensive lens to see the overall governance system of Lake Tana sub-basin from three 
broad perspectives namely; system to-be-governed, governing system and governance 
interaction. This approach is used to assess the governability of CPRs by analyzing the 
natural and human systems in an integrated manner. It is also used as a prescriptive tool in 
that it helps determine gaps and potential interventions to improve the CPR management and 
governance system in the sub-basin (for details see section 2.6 of previous chapter). 
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3.3.2 Sampling design and technique 
 
This study is based on a survey conducted from February to March 2011 in 5 districts 
bordering Lake Tana, namely North Achefer, Bahir Dar Zuria, Dembiya, Fogera and 
Libokemkem. The sample households were selected by utilizing a three-stage sampling 
procedure. The first stage involved the purposive selection of 5 districts (North Achefer, 
Bahir Dar Zuria, Dembiya, Fogera and Libokemkem) out of the 8 districts bordering Lake 
Tana based on their percentage area coverage of the district in Lake Tana sub-basin (see 
Table 3.1), tributary river passing through the district, having an extended wetland and good 
market access.  
 
At the second stage, in consultation with district experts and local development agents, 7 
kebeles namely Kunzila, Gonbat, Achera, Nabega, Kidisthana, Tezamba and Agidkiregna 
were purposely chosen from the above mentioned districts. These kebeles were selected 
based on the presence of an extended wetland and/or located alongside major tributary rivers 
(Gilgel Abbay, Gumara, Ribb, Lesser Abgereb and Derma). Another consideration taken in 
the selection process of kebeles was to select areas adjacent to Lake Tana.  Moreover, 
Fogera and Libokemekem districts share one of the Lake Tana’s tributary rivers (Ribb) and 
become the source of conflict among users of these districts, therefore to better understand 
the common-pool resource situation, two additional adjacent kebeles (Nabega-from Fogera 
and Tezamba- from Libokemekem) were selected purposively.  
 
At the third stage, a household list of residents residing in each selected kebeles was obtained 
from respective kebele administrations. Then, a total of 200 sample respondents were 
selected randomly from a total of 7 kebeles based on their proportion to size (see Table 3.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Table 3.2: Sampling of respondents based on the CSA, 2007 population census 
Source: own survey, 2011 
 
3.3.3 Method of data collection 
 
In order to acquire the data to address the research questions, primary as well as secondary 
and qualitative as well as quantitative techniques of data collection were applied. Data for 
this study were drawn from five main sources: (i) Focus group discussions (ii) Key 
informant interview (iii) Stakeholder identification and analysis workshop (iv) Household 
survey (v) Unstructured observation and (vi) Secondary data sources.  
3.3.3.1 Primary data 
 
Primary data were collected during 2010 and 2011 using focus group discussion and key 
informant interviews (see Appendix 5), stakeholder identification and analysis workshop, 
semi-structured interview schedule (see Appendix 4) and unstructured observation. 
i) Focus Group Discussion  
 
Since one goal of the research was to emphasize the ways in which individuals collectively 
make sense of the socio-economic, institutional and environmental issues related to Common 
pool resources, it was important to conduct focus group discussions among resource users 
(particularly fishers and subsistence farmers), development agents and kebele administrators. 
Accordingly it was imperative to understand how people respond to each other’s views and 
build up a view out of the interaction that takes place within the group (Bryman, 2012). A 
series of Focus Group Discussions (FDGs) were conducted with community members, 
district experts and kebele administrators selected from more than 8 districts and 35 kebeles 
Sampled Districts Sampled Kebeles No of Total HHs No of Sampled HHs  
North Achefer Kunzila 1,153 23 (11.5%) 
Bahir Dar Zuria Gonbat 1,235 25(12.5%) 
Dembiya Achera 799                 16(8.0%) 
Fogera 
 
Nabega 2,283 46(23.0%) 
Kidisthana 1,790 36(18.0%) 
Libokemkem Tezamba 1,040 21(10.5%) 
Agid-kiregna 1,599 33(16.5%) 
Total 9,899 200(100%) 
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bordering Lake Tana. Most of the group discussions were conducted by superimposing on 
different community awareness creation training sessions conducted on ‘Sustainable 
Wetland Management and Use’ training organized by Bureau of Environmental Protection 
Land Use and Administration (Bo-EPLUA) at Dangila-42 participant (from January 27-29, 
2011), Maksegnit-38 participants (from January 30-February 1, 2011) and Wereta-32 
participants (from June 22-24, 2011).  
 
Across all the 3 training sessions conducted at different periods and places (at Dangila, 
Maksegnit and Wereta) a total of 6 sub-groups were formed. In each training places, after the 
training session, participants were divided into 2 small sub-groups consisting of 
approximately 16-21 participants. Two moderators including the researcher ran and guided 
the focus group sessions with a great precaution not to be too intrusive and with minimal 
intervention. The moderator has to straddle two positions: allowing the discussion to flow 
freely and intervening to bring out especially salient issues, particularly when group 
participants do not do so. The moderator also has an important role in encouraging those 
who have not said much and discourage systematically opinion leaders who dominate the 
discussion (Bryman, 2012). Each session lasted approximately one hour and was tape-
recorded. The outcomes of each sub-group’s discussion were presented and discussed with 
whole participant.  
 
ii) Key informant interview 
 
 
In total 24 key informant interviews (3-regional government officials, 8-experts from 
different districts, 5-cooperative members and 8-community elders at different districts) were 
conducted. Particularly community elders, who are knowledgeable of the historical trends, 
existing rules and regulations, and overall situation of Lake Tana sub-basin CPR system, 
were selected by community members. Checklists were used for both focus group discussion 
and key informant interview (see Appendix 5). 
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iii) Stakeholder identification and analysis workshop  
 
The general purpose of stakeholder identification and analysis may be seen as providing a 
methodology for better understanding environmental and development problems and 
interactions of a given system through comparative analysis of the different perspectives and 
sets of interest of stakeholders at various levels (Grimble and Wellard, 1997). The basic 
premise behind stakeholder identification and analysis was primarily to generate knowledge 
about the relevant stakeholders so as to understand their behavior, intentions, interrelations, 
agendas, interests and the influence or resources they have brought or could bring to bear on 
CPR use and rule making processes, to identify different categories of stakeholder and 
anticipate the kinds of influence they could exert on the management and governance of 
CPRs, potential areas of synergy, collaboration, potential conflicts of interest among 
stakeholders and between stakeholder groups.  
 
A two days stakeholder identification and analysis workshop was conducted from February 
26-27, 2011 at Wereta town (Fogera district). Since resources, time, and finance for this 
research were limited, the participants from different stakeholder groups were prioritized. 
Therefore, participants (who may have important knowledge about or perspective on the 
issues) were selected purposively from different organizations representing different 
stakeholder groups (Governmental, Non-Governmental, Academic and Research) and 
various disciplines (for instance ecologists, environmentalists, hydrologists, fishery experts, 
animal scientists and economists) (see Appendix 1). In addition, representatives from NGOs 
who are working in relation to natural resource management (for example, Ethiopian 
Wetlands and Natural Resource Association- EWNRA) and experts from districts were 
involved. However, it was too difficult to bring local people (the majority of whom are 
illiterate) together with the panel of experts in the workshop. Therefore, in order to capture 
the views of resource users and their interaction with other relevant stakeholders at 
grassroots level focus group discussions with resource users at different districts were held 
(see Figure 3.3-a). 
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Different groups have different concerns, capacities and interests in and power over CPR 
management and governance. Therefore, these need to be explicitly understood and 
recognized in the process of CPR use, management and governance. The analysis yielded 
useful and accurate information about those individuals, groups and organizations that have 
an interest in and power over CPRs (water, fish and wetlands) of Lake Tana sub-basin. The 
information generated from the analysis is also important for making decisions on which 
stakeholders ought to be involved in CPR use, management and governance decisions in 
Lake Tana sub-basin. As noted by different scholars (Grimble and Wellard 1996; Engel, 
1997; Roling and Wagemakers, 1998 cited in Ramirez, 1999) the reasons for carrying out 
stakeholder analysis are; i) empirically to discover existing patterns of interaction; ii) 
analytically to improve interventions; iii) as a management tool in policy making; and iv) as 
a tool to predict conflict. For this study the primary focus is on the first and forth reasons.  A 
stakeholder analysis also helps to identify whom to interview first.  
 
For this research, a stakeholder is defined as: an organization, group or individual that is 
concerned with or has an interest in and control over CPRs (water, fish and wetlands) and 
that would be affected by decisions about CPR use, management and governance.  A number 
of possible tools such as Stakeholder Matrix, SWOT Matrix, spider diagram and useful 
frameworks such as importance/influence matrix (used to map out the relative interests/stake 
value and power level of key stakeholders) (Matsaert, 2002) were used. Particularly, 
matrices were used, in which stakeholder groups appear on one axis and a list of criteria or 
attributes appear on the other. For each overlapping area, a qualitative description or 
quantitative rating were given (Ramirez, 1999). After a brief explanation of the overall 
concepts and definitions of CPRs, stakeholders, stakeholder analysis, tools for stakeholder 
identification and analysis, a flexible set of steps for conducting stakeholder analysis as 
suggested by Grimble et al. (1995); Grimble (1998) and Schmeer (1999) were followed for 
this research. These are: 
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Step 1. Identify the main purpose of the analysis; 
 
Information generated from stakeholder identification and analysis may serve several 
purposes: to provide input for other analyses (institutional analysis, the main objective of this 
research); to inform the development of action plans, policy reform or institutional change to 
increase sustainable management and governance of CPRs (the expected outcome of this 
research as a recommendation); or to identify ways to guide a participatory, consensus-
building process in conflicting situations. 
 
Step 2. Develop an understanding of the system and decision-makers in the system 
 
The sorts of questions that were addressed at this stage include how stakeholders use and 
manage the CPR in question. For example, what direct goods and services do they extract 
from the CPRs? What indirect (including environmental) goods and services do they 
provide? What restrictions do they face over the use of CPRs? What de jure and de facto9 
rights or claims do they have over using and managing the CPRs? What are the forms and 
degree of management of the CPR in question? 
 
Step 3. Identify principal stakeholders  
 
A list of possible stakeholders with input from participants was developed. All stakeholders, 
who could have an interest in and control over the selected CPR situations (water, fishery 
and wetland) including stakeholders outside this situation that could affect or be affected by 
those actions were identified. Potential stakeholders in different sectors, geographic or 
administrative areas within Lake Tana sub-basin were also considered; experts who know 
the sector (water, fishery and wetland), policy, CPR situations and players in and around 
Lake Tana helped a lot in this process. 
 
 
                                                 
9
  De jure: means according to law, by right, legally 
  De facto: means actual, exercising power or serving a function without being legally or officially established.  
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Some of the questions asked at this step include: 
 Who uses the resources? Who is most dependent on the resources at stake? Is this a 
matter of livelihood or economic advantage?  
 Who has the rights and responsibilities over the use of the resources? Who possesses 
claims-including legal jurisdiction and customary use-over the resources at stake? Are 
several governmental sectors and ministry departments involved? Are there national 
and/or international bodies involved because of specific laws or treaties? 
 Who impacts on the resources, whether positively or negatively? 
 Who are the people or groups most knowledgeable about, and capable of dealing with, 
the resources at stake? Who is managing these resources? With what results? 
 Are the stakeholders and their interests geographically and seasonally stable, or are 
there migration patterns? 
 Are there major events or trends or have there been currently affecting the 
stakeholders (e.g., development initiatives in and around Lake Tana, land reforms, 
migration, population growth)? 
 
Step 4. Investigate stakeholder interests, power, characteristics, and circumstances  
 
For each stakeholder, participants were asked to estimate how much value they place on each 
stakeholder’s stake or interest in the CPR use, management and governance system. The 
value can be positive or negative or both (i.e. their stake may be to affect the system 
positively (+) or negatively (-), or both). The values were 1-5, 1 denotes non-essential and 5 
denotes critical. At the same time, participants were assigned a power level to each 
stakeholder. The power levels were from 1-6, where 1 denotes lowest and 6 denotes 
complete control. This rates the ability of the stakeholders to take effective action and ensure 
their stake. Then the value of the stake to the stakeholder was multiplied by the power to 
take action. The result was an indication of the stakeholder’s likely impact on CPR 
management and governance in Lake Tana sub-basin.  
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Step 5.  Investigate patterns of interaction and dependence.  
 
Stakeholder’s attributes (powers to influence the action situation and legitimacy of a 
stakeholder’s relationship to the action situation) were investigated. Interactions between 
stakeholders and differing groups of stakeholders were partly a function of the degrees of 
power and influence that groups have, including key organizations. Such links may take a 
variety of forms-conflict, co-operation and dependency- with corresponding opportunities 
for resolution, analysis of trade-offs and synergies. After a careful assessment of the interest-
power level of each stakeholder participants were allowed to identify criteria to evaluate the 
organizational capacity of the most influential stakeholders in Lake Tana sub-basin. 
Accordingly eight assessment criteria were identified and used. In addition to identifying 
patterns of interaction, the workshop participants were asked to identify the reasons behind 
conflicts, complementary actions and co-operation, both to increase understanding of a 
specific situation and to be able to draw general lessons about what factors are likely to lead 
to conflict or successful collective action.  
 
iv) Semi-structured interview schedule  
 
Semi-structured interview schedule was used to gain a range of insights on both quantitative 
and qualitative information from a sample of respondents. The household survey was 
conducted to gain insights and understand the demographic, socio economic status, 
livelihood activities (important sources of community livelihoods and their reliance on 
CPRs), ways of using and managing the CPRs, formal and informal CPR governance rules 
perceived by individuals, the structural and proximate causes, trends and management of 
conflict over resources. 
 
A. Interview schedule development 
A comprehensive interview schedule comprising of both closed and open ended questions, 
so as to allow the gathering of quantitative and qualitative information was prepared. The 
interview schedule included such topics as demographic characteristics of respondents, 
livelihood sources, common pool resource use pattern and management, knowledge and 
perception of the institutional environment. The detailed interview schedule is presented in 
Appendix 3. 
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B. Enumerators training, pre-testing and semi-structured interview 
 
For the semi-structured interview, 15 Enumerators and 3 supervisors were selected based on 
their professional proximity to natural resource management.  Two days of training on the 
concepts, definitions of CPRs and the contents, approaches and instruments of the survey 
was provided to all enumerators and supervisors. Before the actual implementation of the 
survey, interview schedule was pre-tested in 2 nearby villages as part of the training session. 
The purpose of pre-testing the interview schedule was to expose the enumerators to a real 
life interview situation as well as to get feedback on the interview schedule for further 
amendment. Therefore, based on the feedback, amendments were made to the interview 
schedule and the final version was completed. From March 2-22, 2011 and October 10-30, 
2011, semi-structured interview were conducted with 200 sample respondents.  
 
v) Unstructured Observation  
 
Observation provides direct access to the social phenomena under consideration. Instead of 
relying on some kind of self-report, such as asking people what they would do in a certain 
situation, the researcher actually observes and records their behavior in that situation 
(University of Strathclyde, 2013). In this study naturalistic and narrative methods of 
observation were used. These methods are a type of unstructured observation which was 
carried out in real-world settings that attempt to observe things 'as they are', without any 
intervention or manipulation of the situation itself by the researcher and attempt to 'tell the 
story' of what is happening in a given situation (University of Strathclyde, 2013). Recording 
sheets and check lists, observation guides and field notes were used as data collection 
methods. In addition, with a careful ethical consideration (like requesting permission and 
convincing the subjects), photo and video cameras were used. However, precautions were 
taken to avoid the researcher’s biased towards the phenomenon under consideration. 
Subjective bias on the part of the observer (in this case the researcher) was triangulated by 
other means of data collections (such as key informant interview). 
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3.3.3.2 Secondary data  
 
Primary data collected from focus group discussion, stakeholder identification and analysis 
workshop, key informant interviews, household survey and unstructured observation were 
supplemented by a documentary analysis at all levels of organization (at national, regional 
and district level) and literature review. The documentary data sources include: research 
publications and reports; policies, proclamation; legislation; administrative/executive 
regulations or orders; compensation arrangements; guidelines/advice; meeting reports and 
minutes. The legal and administrative framework for natural resource management and 
changes during 1990-2011 were identified by searching official documents and the scientific 
literature. Particularly, the legislative and policy environment that can impact critically on 
the CPR context were reviewed.  
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(a)                                                                          (b) 
Figure 3.3:  Focus Group discussion (a) and Stakeholder Analysis workshop, 2011 (b) 
              Source: The Author (2011)     
 
                      
      
                    ( c)                                                                                       (d) 
Figure 3.4: Enumerators training (c) Household survey supervision (d)   
              Source: The Author (2011) 
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3.3.4 Methods of data analysis  
 
Quantitative measures of the causes or consequences of institutional arrangements and their 
change are difficult to develop; even when they are available, better evidence may come 
from the qualitative historical record (Alston et al. 1996). Arguably, while econometric 
analysis may be useful in delineating specific factors that determine the causes or driving 
forces of institutional changes, performance and their effect on common-pool resource 
management, it does not help much in analyzing processes of institutional origin and 
changes, attitudes of different stakeholders and conflict resolutions and management 
systems.  Hence, qualitative and descriptive analysis were used to analyze the current state 
and dynamics of CPRs and policy implications for livelihood security and sustainable CPR 
use, management and governance, to identify the trends in conditions and describe the 
pressures being exerted on Lake Tana environment in general and CPRs in particular, 
identify institutional arrangements and enforcement mechanisms to govern common-pool 
resources.  
 
Most data analyzed in this research were generated through a series of semi-structured in-
depth qualitative and quantitative interviews, stakeholder identification and Analysis 
workshop, focus group discussions and key informant interviews conducted from September 
2010 to December 2011. Following the household survey data collection, data were coded 
and entered in to SPSS software version 17. Simple descriptive statistics such as mean, 
standard deviation, frequency were used to analyze the socio economic variables of the 
respondents. For the analysis of data collected from semi-structured interviews that were 
administered to sample households, this makes reflection on background possible by 
enabling triangulation with the data from focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews.  
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Before the actual qualitative analysis, data collected from open ended questions and written 
comments on the household survey, testimonials, individual key informant interviews, tape 
recorded focus group discussions, observations (pictures), field notes, documents, reports, 
stories and case studies were translated into English, transcribed, coded, patterns and 
connections within and between categories were identified by using Word processing and 
Excel spread sheet. The different elements of evidence were used to develop narratives 
describing CPR situations. Qualitative data were analyzed using narrative data analysis and 
interpretation methods such as logical analysis, historical narratives and matrix analysis 
which outline generalized causation by using flow charts, spider diagrams to pictorially 
represent these; in addition written descriptions were used to understand the trends of 
resource use and interaction of stakeholders in resource management and governance of 
common-pool resources. Where relevant, secondary resources were consulted to triangulate 
and supplement the primary data sources. 
 
For trends in resources management and governance, historical narratives and analysis were 
used to elicit the past events and conditions, to understand the CPR situation, why changes 
have occurred and why things are the way they are today. After initial identification of 
stakeholders, their stake value and power level were identified in a stakeholder identification 
and analysis workshop; for this purpose a computer based stakeholder Analysis Support tool 
developed under Rural Economy and Land Use (RELU) Program by Anil Graves was used. 
This tool allowed stakeholders to be classified in an ‘‘interest-influence’’ matrix, which 
displayed and map their attributes and inter-relationships in CPR management and 
governance (Reed et al. 2009).  
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3.4 Chapter summary  
 
This chapter sought to give an outline of the research approach and techniques adopted by 
the study. The research project took a scientific approach that combines qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. A related challenge is the integration of knowledge from qualitative 
case study research with quantitative research. Quantitative analyses are often criticized for 
overgeneralization since they disregard context by hiding processes behind data and 
variables. In contrast, qualitative studies are questioned for being vague and not transferable 
to other cases. This asserts a dichotomy between quantitative (statistical, mathematical, 
computational) and qualitative (interpretative, dialectic) methods (Eisenack et al. 2006). This 
combination of methods, also referred to as triangulation, helps to overcome the limitations 
and weaknesses inherent in each type of method and contributes to the validation of research 
findings. Triangulation entails using more than one method or source of data in the study of 
social phenomena (Bryman, 2012).  
 
The study sample (200 respondents) was achieved on a very limited budget and as such the 
time spent in the local communities was also limited. With this arrangement, it is likely that 
discussions with the community members were not as deep as they might have been 
required. Therefore complementing the household survey with other methods such as key 
informant interview, focus group discussion, stakeholder analysis workshop was very 
imperative. Particularly multiple case studies (such as water, fish and wetlands) were studied 
and compared in their totality (in this case Lake Tana ecosystem). Intensive case study 
typically focuses on a small number of cases and examines them in depth. This case-study 
strategy is well suited for close examination of complex empirical processes, for assessing 
the meanings actors attach to their actions (Ragin et al. 2003). Table 3.3 summarizes the 
research methodology used in the study. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of research methodology   
Research Questions Data sources and data collection 
methods 
Data analysis Addressed 
in Chapter  
1. What are the current states and 
dynamics of CPRs and its policy 
implications for livelihood security and 
sustainable CPR use, management and 
governance? 
 Household survey using semi-
structured interview schedule 
 Simple descriptive analysis (Using 
SPSS V.17 software)  Ranking  and Likert scale 
Chapter 4 
 
 A set of case studies   Focus Group Discussions  In-depth key informant interview  Unstructured observation  Review of relevant policy documents  
 Trend and historical narratives and 
matrix analysis   Ranking  
2. Who are drivers of changes that affect 
CPR use, management and 
Governance?  
 Household survey using semi-
structured interview schedule  Focus Group Discussions  In-depth key informant interview  Unstructured observation 
 Simple descriptive analysis  Chapter 5 
3. Who are the key players in the process 
of CPR use, management and 
governance? 
 Stakeholder Identification and Analysis 
Workshop  Focus Group Discussions  In-depth key informant interview 
 Stakeholder Analysis Support tool  SWOT Analysis  Ranking  
4. Why do conflicts arise around CPR use, 
management and governance? What are 
the underlying causes of conflict and 
resolution mechanisms? 
 Household survey using semi-
structured interview schedule 
 Simple descriptive analysis  Ranking  Chapter 7  A set of case studies   Focus Group Discussions  In-depth key informant interview 
 Trend and historical narratives and 
matrix analysis   Ranking  
5. What are the existing institutional 
arrangements that govern the behavior 
of CPR users and what are the factors 
influencing the effectiveness of CPR 
management and governance system? 
 
 In-depth key informant interview  Review of relevant policy documents 
and legislations  Stakeholder Identification and Analysis 
Workshop 
 SWOT Analysis  Documentary Analysis  Spider diagram 
Chapter 6 
and 7 
 Household survey using semi-
structured interview schedule 
 Simple descriptive analysis  
Source: own presentation, 2012
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. THE STATE OF LAKE TANA ECOSYSTEMS 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter presents findings regarding the state of Lake Tana ecosystems. The findings 
give an impression for further analysis of institutional arrangements and CPR governance of 
the Lake Tana sub-basin. Understanding the big picture of the human environment nexus at 
a local level with its complex interactions in and across ecosystems as well as in and across 
human systems is essential if policy and action responses are to contribute to the goals of 
sustainable development and improved human well-being at different levels (Karkkainen, 
2002; UNEP, 2011).  
 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to analyze the state of Lake Tana ecosystem from a 
sustainable development perspective.  This chapter will answer the question of what are the 
current states and dynamics of CPRs and the policy implications for livelihood security and 
sustainable CPR use, management and governance. It addresses the ‘Physical/Ecological 
conditions’ of the conceptual framework indicated in section 2.6 Figure 2.1. The data 
analysis and interpretations discussed in this chapter are derived mainly from secondary 
sources supplemented by focus group discussions, key informant interviews, personal 
observations10 and household survey.  
 
The chapter has three substantive sections, the first of which presents an overview of the 
state of Lake Tana and its ecosystems. The primary objective of this section is to explore the 
dynamics and the future challenges for sustainable development. The second and third 
discussion sections that follow will give further analysis of the state of fish and wetland sub-
systems respectively. Both sections focus on the dynamics of resource use patterns and their 
implication for sustainable resource utilization and livelihoods of the local community and 
beyond. 
                                                 
10
 The researcher resides and works in the study area. 
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4.2 The Lake Tana sub-system: Exploring the dynamics and the future challenges for 
sustainable development  
 
Lake Tana Ecosystem located in the north-west highlands of Ethiopia, has a global 
significance on which a huge livelihood, economic and socio-cultural groups are highly 
dependent. It is also one of 250 lakes identified by Lake Net11 as having globally significant 
biodiversity (Barker, 2004). However, due to natural and human induced calamities, the 
Lake ecosystem is under severe threat.  A recent decadal trend analysis of Lake Tana at four 
decade level (from 1968-2007) confirms that the water level was increasing for the first three 
decades and negative and declining for the last decade. The lowest depth was recorded in 
2002/2003 and after that time onwards the level of Lake Tana was not able to restore to its 
original level. It was revealed that within the last 35 years more than 6.2% of the lake’s area 
was converted to other land covers (Minale and Rao, 2011).  
 
According to Vijverberg et al. (2009) despite the limited direct human influences on Lake 
Tana, both wetlands and surrounding catchment area have already been seriously damaged 
by human activities and most of the original forest in the upper stream of the watershed has 
disappeared. The littoral region and wetlands of the lake are currently under severe 
degradation by the local inhabitants. Especially the area covered by papyrus has been 
decreasing recently by the ever growing human population. The local community is 
harvesting papyrus reed roots during low water level to use it as fuel wood. Farmers are 
cultivating the wetlands when the water is retreating.  
 
In addition, Bahir Dar is a rapidly growing town, a six times population increase up to 
1,800,000 inhabitants is expected in the next 50 years (Teshale, 2003).  Based on the 2007 
census conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA), the city has a total 
population of 221,991, an increase of 130.90% over the population recorded in the 1994 
census. The current practice of Lake shore investments and discharging untreated industrial 
and domestic waste into the lake is causing adverse effects on the quality of the lake water 
and other aquatic life particularly fish species. Furthermore, pollution from agricultural 
sources such as fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides are recently increasing. 
                                                 
11
 LakeNet- is U.S.-based nonprofit organization dedicated to bringing together people and solutions to protect 
and restore the health of the world's lakes. 
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In the outflow of the Blue Nile from the lake, a large dam (Chara chara) was constructed in 
1995 with additional gates added in 2001, resulting in increased silt load and turbidity of 
lake water and reduced water levels. The purpose of the dam is regulation of outflow from 
Lake Tana for downstream diversion to the Tis Abbay hydroelectric power stations located 
35km downstream of the dam. Though fed by more than 40 rivers and streams, more than 
93% of the water comes from Gilgel Abbay, Ribb, Gumara and Megech rivers (SMEC, 
2008).  The Northern and Northwest part of the Lake sub-basin is drained largely by five 
rivers namely, Ambagenene, Dirma, Megech (being the major tributary contributing large 
proportion), Gumaro and Arno-Garno which accounts for 18% of the basin. Ribb and 
Gumara rivers that account for 28% of the basin drain the eastern portion of the basin. Koga 
and Gilgel Abbay are the two major rivers draining the southern portion of the basin which 
accounted for 30% of the basin (MoWR, 2005). However, the future of these tributaries may 
not be continuous feeding of the Lake Tana. Koga Dam is already completed and functional 
since 2010. Construction of more major dams around the major perennial tributaries of Lake 
Tana particularly at Ribb, Gumara Megech, and Gilgel Abbay are underway (Figure 4.1 and 
Table 4.1).  
 
Water withdrawal from the Western part of the Lake is already on track. Further feasibility 
studies and identification of potential lake water withdrawal at different sites are taking 
place. For instance, Tana-Beles power generation (estimated 460MW) and irrigation project 
that solely depend on diverted water from the Western shores of Lake Tana through a canal 
(12km) in the western part around Kunzila and connected to Beles river was inaugurated in 
2010 (see Figure 4.2). The project cost of 7 billion Ethiopian Birr was fully covered by the 
Ethiopian government and expected to serve the country without any major interruption for 
the next 25 years (since March, 2010). After generating hydropower, it is also expected to 
irrigate 130,000 hectares of land. Generally, the project administrators and some government 
officials are claiming that there is no significant negative impact on the Lake’s water level 
and surrounding ecosystem however, the debate on the impact of those development 
initiatives and water withdrawal from the lake is still ongoing.  
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On the other hand, a number of recent studies suggest that future development will 
exacerbate pressure on the lake ecosystem. There will be a significant fall of the water levels 
and massive wetland degradation in Lake Tana sub-basin in response to the planned water 
withdrawal and other development interventions (Dargahi and Setegn, 2011; McCartney et 
al. 2010; Setegn, 2010). If all the planned development occurs (see Table 4.1), the mean 
water level of Lake Tana will drop by 0.44 meters (m), and the average surface area will 
decrease by 30 square kilometers (km2) (i.e., 1%) and up to 81 km2 (i.e., 2.6%) during some 
dry seasons. There will be prolonged periods of several years during which water levels will 
be much lower than they would be naturally. If environmental flow requirements (estimated 
to average 862 Mm3y-1) are maintained in the reach containing the Tis Issat waterfall, the 
mean water level of the lake will reduce by a further 0.37 m and the average lake area will 
reduce by an additional 26 km2. Without careful management these changes are likely to 
have severe ecological and social consequences (McCartney et al. 2010). 
 
During the course of this study an invasive weed, water hyacinth (Eichornia crassipes) 
which floats on water by forming a huge mass that blocks light and damages the fish 
breeding and feeding sites has been identified and reported around adjacent districts of Lake 
Tana. Researchers speculate that, if it is not controlled urgently, the weed will have a 
dramatic negative impact on the Lake’s ecosystem. The species reproduces very fast and 
enhances evapo-transpiration which eventually reduces the water volume. In due course, it 
might have the potential adverse effect on the Lake ecosystem and cover the whole lake 
surface within short period of time. Eventually it may also have negative impact on the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (also known as Grand Millennium Dam)  which is 
currently under construction on Blue Nile River about 40 Km East of Sudan in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz Region of Ethiopia. With 6,000MW, the dam will be the largest 
hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed as well as the seventh largest in the 
world. 
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Figure 4.1: Lake Tana sub-basin, major rivers and planned development activities      
         Source: Awulachew et al. (2009) 
                                                                              
                                                                              
Figure 4.2: Tana-Beles hydropower and irrigation project inaugurated in 2010 
 
 
 
? 
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Table 4.1: Planned and implemented irrigation development in Lake Tana sub-basin   
Source: BCEOM 1998; Mott MacDonald 2004; WWDSE and ICT 2008; WWDSE and TAHAL2008a, 2008b  
               cited in McCartney et al. (2010). 
Notes:* Demands estimated through crop water modeling and presented in feasibility study reports. Where a  
             range of demands is presented this reflects alternative cropping patterns. Gross-net demand is water  
             returned to the rivers. 
  
4.3 Learning from other lake ecosystems as a development and policy guide 
 
Global research evidence show that the majority of lake ecosystems across the globe are 
under severe pressure. According to the World Preservation Foundation (as cited in Smith, 
2012) one third of the world’s major rivers and lakes are drying up, and the groundwater 
wells for 3 billion people living around the Lakes are being affected. The loss of rivers, lakes 
and underground water reserves are impacting the livelihoods of millions of people. While 
climate change is playing a role, the building of hydropower and irrigation dams, over 
extraction and mismanagement of water and over-fishing are all playing a part in the 
disappearing of the world’s lakes and rivers (Smith, 2012). 
 
An international synthesis that investigates the state of the Earth’s ecosystems (the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment) reveals that, over the past 50 years, humans have 
changed ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period of time in 
human history, largely to meet rapidly growing demands for food, fresh water, timber, fiber 
and fuel. This has resulted in a substantial and largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life 
Irrigation 
Scheme 
Irrigable 
Area 
(ha) 
Estimated 
annual gross 
water demand 
(Mm3)* 
Estimated 
net water 
demand 
(Mm3)* 
Large dam 
storage (Mm3) 
Stage of development 
Koga 6,000 62 52 78.5 Functional since 2010 
Northwest 
Lake Tana 
6,720 54 46 Withdrawal 
from the lake 
Completed and inaugurated  in 
2010 
Ribb 19,925 172-220 146-187 233.7 Under construction since 2008 
Megech 7,300 63-98 54-83 181.9 Under construction since 2008 
Gumara A 14,000 115 98 59.7 Feasibility studies completed 
GilgelAbbay B 12,852 104-142 88-121 563 Feasibility studies ongoing 
Jema 7,800 57 48 173 Feasibility studies ongoing 
Northeast Lake 
Tana 
5,745 50-62 43-53 Withdrawal 
form the lake 
Pre-feasibility studies 
completed 
Southwest 
Lake Tana 
5,132 42 36 Withdrawal 
from the lake 
Identification 
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on Earth. Global ecosystem conditions and trends show that 50-80 per cent of original 
mangroves have been lost in the coastal ecosystem (Burke et al. 2000), and fifty per cent of 
world’s wetlands lost during the 20th century in freshwater ecosystem (Revenga et al. 2000).  
 
Some 60 percent (15 out of 24) of the ecosystem services examined in the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment-including fisheries and fresh water- are being degraded or used in 
ways that cannot be sustained. These problems will substantially diminish the benefits that 
future generations obtain from these CPRs; unless human attitudes and actions change, the 
pressure and degradation of ecosystem services could grow significantly worse during the 
first half of this century and is a barrier to reducing global food shortages and achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) across nations (MA, 2005; 2006). 
 
Experiences learned from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) project which studied 28 
lakes in the world, also show that development intervention of resource values for lake 
ecosystems typically take place in phases. Even stakeholders may not recognize the progress 
in the lake ecosystem. In early stages of resource development at ‘A’ (see Figure 4.3), they 
may be limited only to construction of lakeshore facilities for fisheries, navigation and small 
scale water supplies. As the population increases, the need for water for domestic, 
hydropower, industrial and agricultural uses increases, generally leading to construction of 
large scale flow control facilities. Through time the number of stakeholders involved and 
their interests also increases.  
 
The commercial interest, development of tourism and recreational facilities may then grow, 
perhaps sufficiently to exploit the lake’s cultural and natural heritage assets. As the resource 
values peak at ‘B’, the resource development activities are inevitably associated with 
infrastructure development and landscape alterations in and around the lake basins which, 
together with wastewater discharges from cities and industries, gradually accelerate 
degradation of resources, water quality and ecological integrity, usually without being 
noticed when they began at ‘C’ (ILEC, 2007). As a result conflict over resources among 
stakeholders is inevitable.  
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Figure 4.3: Changing resource values of a hypothetical lake  
                Source: (ILEC, 2007) 
 
The progression of degradation inside a lake often takes place on a wider and deeper 
scale than is apparent. If the seriousness of a lake problem is realized in time by scientific 
means, resource conservation and restoration measures may produce some promising 
results. Often, however, the symptoms of degradation remain unnoticed for a long period 
of time because of their incremental nature, and the introduced conservation and 
remedial measures may be too little too late. The level of ecological and water quality 
degradation may have already reached crisis proportions, suddenly leading to instant loss 
of ecosystem sustainability (ILEC, 2007). 
         
 
Figure 4.4: The resulting environmental state of a hypothetical lake 
                  Source: (ILEC, 2007) 
E 
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The same is true for Lake Tana ecosystem, where enormous development activities have 
been taking place since the 1990s. Without noticing what is going on inside and outside the 
Lake surroundings, there might be a serious degradation in the Lake ecosystem. There is 
research evidence that shows the overall progression of the Lake and its critical problems 
(Dargahi and Setegn, 2011; McCartney et al. 2010; Setegn, 2010; Vijverberg et al. 2009). 
However, minimal or no effort has been done so far at policy/higher governance level to 
reverse the situation. Unless protective measures are put in place, there might be a disastrous 
effect on the Lake ecosystem.  As seen from Figure 4.4, once a lake ecosystem reached a 
serious environmental degradation (at F), recovery is slow (at G) and full restoration is rarely 
possible (at H).  
 
Especially for poor nations like Ethiopia where economic, institutional and technological 
capacity to reclaim the environment is limited, it will be very difficult to preserve valuable 
environmental resources effectively. According to the Environmental Sustainability Index 
(ESI, 2005), which  evaluates a country’s potential to avoid major environmental 
deterioration, Ethiopia ranks 135th  out of 146 countries with a score of 37.9 which is the 
least score among the 40 NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) member 
countries just above Sudan (with ESI score of 35.9). Even when compared with the 21 
countries that are more than 50% desert, 15 countries scored from 39.8- 56.7. The ESI score 
quantifies the likelihood that a country will be able to preserve valuable environmental 
resources effectively over the period of several decades (Esty et al. 2005). 
 
4.3.1 The Lake Haromaya Demise, Ethiopia 
 
The then Alemaya now Haromaya lake in the Ethiopian Eastern highlands originally covered 
more than 1,751 km2 but had shrunk to 879 km2 (which is 50% of the original) in 1985 and 
to a mere 586 km2 (33.5% of the original) in 2002. It is now believed that the lakes have all 
but completely dried up. The loss of the lakes, which were a source of drinking water, 
irrigation and fisheries, has affected the livelihoods and well-being of more than 550, 000 
people in the Ethiopian towns of Haromaya and Harar. Preliminary research seems to 
suggest that serious siltation has been a major factor in the destruction of the lakes. A 
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dramatic increase in urban and rural settlements is also believed to have put tremendous 
pressure on natural resources in the area, including water resources (RCMRD, 2005).  
Increasing irrigation and domestic water use, change in the local climate, and changes in the 
surrounding land cover are believed to be the causes of Haromaya’s demise (Setegn et al. 
2011). 
 
4.3.2 Lake Chad, Africa 
 
Lake Chad, once one of Africa's largest freshwater lakes, shared by Nigeria, Chad, 
Cameroon and Niger has shrunk dramatically in the last 40 years. In 1963, the lake covered 
about 25,000 km2. Today it is one-twentieth of that size. The size of Lake Chad has gone 
from 30,000 km2 to 3,000 km2 in 40 years, according to some sources - from 25,000 km2 to 
less than 1,500 km2 in almost 30 years between 1966 and 1997(Coe M.T et al. 2001). 
According to Smith (2012) global warming, with steadily reducing rainfall, and water 
extraction have seen it diminish around 80% of the lake in the last 30 years. Major irrigation 
projects built in the 1980s, which made use of the two main rivers, Chari and Longone, 
which supplement the lake, were believed to be the causes of the drastic change in the lake 
ecosystems. According to Noury (2009), increased irrigation demands are said to have 
significantly decreased the flow of water into the lake; some speculating that the irrigation 
demands, which increased a phenomenal four times between 1983 to 1994, have accounted 
for a 50% decrease in the lake's water level. 
 
4.3.3 Aral Sea, Asia 
 
The Aral Sea, formerly one of the four largest lakes in the world with an area of 68,000 km2, 
has been steadily shrinking since the 1960s. In 1965, the Lake had lost over 75% of its 
volume. By 2007 it had declined to 10% of its original size. The major reason for the Aral 
Sea demise was the two major rivers (Amu Darya and Syr Darya) that fed it were diverted by 
a Soviet Union irrigation project (Philip et al. 2008; Smith, 2012). Fish stocks-previously a 
stable diet for those living around have diminished, drinking water is saline and disease is 
rife. The region's once prosperous fishing industry has been essentially destroyed, bringing 
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unemployment and economic hardship, totally closing an industry that had employed 60,000. 
The Aral Sea region is also heavily polluted, with consequent serious public health 
problems. The retreat of the sea has reportedly also caused local climate change, with 
summers becoming hotter and drier, and winters colder and longer (U.S. Geological Survey, 
2007; Smith, 2012). The shrinking of the Aral Sea has been called ‘one of the planet's worst 
environmental disasters’ (Daily Telegraph, 2010).   
 
What can be learnt from those lake ecosystems which have disappeared completely (Lake 
Haromaya) and/or are partially endangered and under reclamation program (Lake Chad), is 
that it is an alarm bell for other lake ecosystems across the globe and the Lake Tana 
ecosystem in particular. It is therefore essential that key stakeholders should be aware of the 
potential threats of the Lake ecosystem so that for any hydropower and irrigation 
development in and around Lake Tana appropriate lessons can be learned from the above 
cases.  
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4.4 Case study of the fish commons: Overview of the Lake Tana fishery 
 
4.4.1 The economic importance of fish in Ethiopia 
 
Following the secession of Eritrea in 1993, Ethiopia lost access to an estimated 1,011 km of 
Red Sea coastline. Since then Ethiopia is a landlocked country and its main fish resources 
are from lakes, rivers and reservoirs. Despite being considered as the ‘water tower’ of the 
Horn of Africa and endowed with huge water resource potential, the current status of the 
Ethiopian fishery sector contribution to GDP is considered as marginal. And yet, aquaculture 
is recognized as an alternative means of achieving food security in the rural areas, and is now 
considered an integral part of rural and agricultural development policies and strategies in 
Ethiopia. Even though there is no fishery policy framework, a range of national development 
documents identify fisheries as being a sector in need of support to enable it to increase 
production and contribute to the food security of the growing population.   
 
Ethiopian fresh water bodies (of which Lake Tana’s share is about 50%, whereas Minale and 
Rao (2011) reported 36% of total inland water of Ethiopia) are known to contain over 180 
species of fish  and some 37-57 are reportedly endemic (Golubstov and Mina, 2003). As 
reported by African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states (ACP) Fish II project, currently 
the bulk of the fish catch (74%) originates from 6 main lakes: Lake Tana (25%), Awasa, 
Ziway and Langano (19%), Chamo (18%) and Abaya (12% of the national total production) 
and a further 26% from other water bodies. On the other hand, Abebe and Geheb (2003) 
reported that over 60% of Ethiopia’s fish supply originates from the Rift Valley Lakes with 
significant benefits to the local and national economy. Commercial fishery in the Rift valley 
started in the 1950s, whereas in Lake Tana it started very late in the 1980s. Despite catches 
on these lakes declining in recent years there is still widespread belief in the country that 
potential exists to raise the annual production to over 49,000 tons per year possibly through 
the development of new constructed reservoirs, under-exploited river fisheries and 
aquaculture.  
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4.4.2 The status of Lake Tana fish resource 
 
Lake Tana contributes 20-31% of the total fish potential of the country and is used for 
commercial fishing (Wondie, 2010). Lake Tana fishery has employed more than 50,000 
persons who are directly and indirectly dependent on the major activities of fishing, 
marketing, and processing, and reliant on self employment for their livelihood. It is also 
contributing in giving employment opportunities to women and other landless people such as 
ex-soldiers as well as the fishermen (Eshete, 2005). 
 
Over recent years fish demand has grown significantly and the food habit of the population 
has also changed. As a result, fishermen are motivated to harvest more fish to fetch a good 
price. The introduction of new fishing technology in 1986 was expected to result in a rapid 
increase in utilization of the fish resource (Wudneh, 1998).  As indicated by Nagelkerke 
(1997), being not well exploited at the time when commercial fishing started, there has been 
a temporary rise in the yield. But gradually as the fishing pressure increases, fish production 
is decreasing (see Figure 4.5). In the absence of binding rules, regulations and effective 
government oversight, the status of important endemic and commercial fish species are 
declining; uncontrolled access and increased fishermen are exerting tremendous pressure on 
the fish resources. Moreover, if fishing pressure continues to be intense at the time of 
spawning, the fish populations are expected to decrease rapidly.  
 
Members of the Tana Haik No.1 fishery cooperative (selected as a case study in this 
research) also confirmed that in the last 10 years fish production and marketing increased for 
the first five consecutive years and gradually has been declining since (see Figure 4.5). As a 
result, they are struggling to secure and sustain their livelihood. Those who are not able to 
cope with the situation are planning to leave the sector and search for other livelihood 
options such as sand mining and casual labor in the town. Too much fishing pressure and 
uncontrolled fishing activities are believed to be causing overexploitation of fish stocks and 
threatening the livelihood of the local fishermen. 
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Figure 4.5: Trends of fish production and marketing (2002-2011) 
Source: Calculated from Tana Haik No.1 fishing cooperative data sheet, 2012 
 
After the introduction of more efficient gillnets compared with traditional fishing gear, 
unregulated fisheries have had a severe impact on the stocks of these rivers in spawning, 
lake-dwelling cyprinids. Gillnets were set near river mouths, effectively blocking them off 
from the lake, preventing mature individuals from reaching the upstream spawning areas (De 
graff et al. 2004). As reported by Vijverberg et al. (2009), the abundance of endemic 
Labeobarbus species in Lake Tana decreased dramatically by ca 75% over 10 years (1991–
2001). With the advancement of the fish sector in the last two decades, it can be imagined 
what happened to the fishery resource in the following 10 years (from 2001-2011). The 
destructive fishing operations during the spawning season (August–September) in river 
mouths and upstream on the spawning grounds, alteration and destruction of spawning 
habitats has ultimately resulted in the loss of some fish species  and extinction of 7 of the 15 
endemic labeobarbs (ibid).  
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4.4.3 Historical trends of fishing around Lake Tana 
 
Fishing in Lake Tana is believed to have been started around the 18th century by the Negede 
woyto and then the other poor members of the communities gradually adopted the activity. 
Though it is the largest freshwater body in Ethiopia, modernization of Lake Tana’s fishery 
did not occur until the end of the 1980s. Before 1986 Lake Tana fisheries was made up by a 
predominantly subsistence reed boat fishery, operated by the Negede people (De Graaf et al. 
2006).  
 
In 1986 motorized boats and modern, nylon gillnets were introduced as part of Lake Tana 
Fisheries Resources Development Program(LTFDP) which was initiated by the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church and two Dutch NGOs 
(ISE-Urk and ICCO-Zeist) (Reyntjes et al. 1998; Anteneh, 2005). This created new 
opportunities for the fishermen, extending their fishing area from the shore to deeper, 
offshore waters and, more importantly, to distant river mouths. Since then, the commercial 
gillnet fishery of Lake Tana developed rapidly and total annual catches increased from 39 
tonnes in 1987 to 360 tonnes in 1997 (Wudneh, 1998). Despite the fact that they pioneered 
the Lake Tana fishery, the Negede woyto community has not participated in the process of 
modernizing the fishery sector in the study area.  
 
Generally the historical trends of the Lake Tana fishery can be divided into three different 
but interrelated periods (see Table 4.2). The first period was before 1986 where the Negede 
woyto community members were the dominant fishermen. During this time technologies 
used for fishing were predominantly traditional and mostly they used reed boat, local fish 
traps and poisonous plants. As a result, the fishermen, limited in their mobility, only had 
access to the shore areas. Any dispute and complaints of local fishermen that might have 
happened were resolved informally. 
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The second period was between 1986 and 2003 where both modernized fishermen and the 
traditional fishermen co-existed. However, having modernized boats and nylon gill nets, the 
modernized fishermen were the most dominant and had access to both deeper offshore 
waters and distant river mouths. During this period there were no clear and specific formal 
rules and regulations to govern the behaviors of traditional and modern fishermen. The third 
period covers from 2003 up to present where the Fishery Development and Utilization 
Proclamation No. 315/2003 was enacted. The enactment of this proclamation was considered 
as a breakthrough for the fishery sector in general and Lake Tana fishery in particular. 
However, the preparation of regulations took a long time than expected which has affected 
the enforcement process.  
 
Table 4.2: Major changes in Lake Tana fishery 
Source: Own survey result, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time 
period  
Predominant 
fishers 
Types of 
technologies used 
Fishing ground  Rules and regulations of 
fishing  
Before 
1986 
The Negede 
woyto 
community  
-Reed boat 
-Local fish traps and 
hooks 
-Poisonous plants 
-Limited to the 
Lake shore areas 
Informal/self governed 
institutions 
Between 
1986-2003 
-Negede woyto 
- organized/ 
modern fishers 
-Modernized boats 
and nylon gill nets 
-Lake shore areas 
-Deeper offshore 
waters 
-Distant river 
mouths 
No formal rules and 
regulations  
2003 to 
present 
Organized 
fishermen  
-Modernized boats 
and nylon gill nets 
-Illegal gill nets 
imported from Sudan 
-Deeper offshore 
waters 
-Distant river 
mouths 
- Proclamation and 
Regulation enacted 
-No directive since then 
-Not yet implemented 
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Box1: Fishing organizations in Lake Tana Sub-basin 
 
Fishers around Lake Tana are organized in cooperatives for credit and technical provision. 
With 78 members, Tana Haik No.1 Fishing Co-operative is the first that was established in 
1987 around the Southern Gulf of Lake Tana. Currently, the Tana Haik No.1 cooperative 
consists of 114 (of which 13 of them are women) active members who are divided into 18 
groups assigned to boats and 33 members who are waiting to be assigned to boats (in 4 
districts adjacent to the lake, Bahir Dar Zuria (8), Dera (9), Fogera (8), Libokemkem (8)). 
The Tana Haik No.1 Fishing Co-operative has a net making facility mainly run by women. 
Women members of the cooperatives are engaged in net making and fish processing, 
whereas fishermen are involved in fishing and engine/boat maintenance. Some women 
members who have no husband or mature men in their family are obliged to hire someone 
who will be engaged in fishing. This cooperative rents out motorized boats to its members on 
a full cost recovery basis.  
 
St. Georgis and ‘Zege Fish for All’ associations are recently organized associations which 
are functional. Other associations are now emerging across 10 surrounding districts. 
According to the plan of the Regional Cooperative Agency, each district adjacent to Lake 
Tana will have a minimum of 1 association with 80-120 members. In general it is estimated 
that 1,300 fishers will be organized in association with modern fishing methods. The new 
cooperatives will get credit service to buy new engines, boats and gillnets (Eshete, 2003). 
 
    Source: Author, 2011 
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4.4.4 Institutions governing the Lake Tana fishery sector 
 
According to key informants (members of Tana Haik No. 1 Fishery cooperative), the Lake 
Tana sub-basin fishery administration and governance is characterized by a lack of 
stakeholder participation and insufficient government commitment which leads to 
overexploitation and resource degradation. Before 2003, there were no specific formal rules 
that governed the behaviors of fish resource users. However, the introduction of more 
efficient gillnets compared with traditional fishing gear, unregulated fisheries and an 
increasing number of fisherman have had a severe impact on the fish resource in Lake Tana 
and its tributary river mouths. As the number of fishermen and motorized/reed boat 
increases, competition and conflict over the fish resource also increased which has ultimately 
led to decline of the fish stock (both in species and abundance).   
 
The existing broad institutions governing the natural resource were not able to tackle fish 
resource degradation, depletion, minimize and/or prevent conflict among stakeholders, and 
secure sustainable livelihoods for the local fishermen and local community. Hence, crafting a 
new and/or modifying the existing institutions have become a paramount need for the fish 
sector in general. As a result, in 2003 the Fishery Development and Utilization Proclamation 
No. 315/2003 was enacted at Federal level to effectively use, manage and govern the fishery 
resources throughout the country. This is the only proclamation in Ethiopia that legally 
describes and elaborates capture fishery and aquaculture at the Federal and Regional level.  
 
Following the Federal proclamation, the council of Amhara National Regional State enacted 
its own Fisheries Development, Prevention and Utilization Proclamation No. 92/2003. The 
objectives of these  proclamation are almost similar: to conserve fish biodiversity and its 
environment as well as to prevent and control over-exploitation of the fisheries resource; to 
increase the supply of safe and good quality fish and to ensure a sustainable contribution of 
the fisheries towards food security; and to expand aquaculture development (Article 3).  
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The Regional proclamation covers the same area as the Federal proclamation, but has an 
additional objective relating to the creation of employment opportunities in fishing 
communities. It also states that information, including research findings, should be made 
available to the fishing communities. The Federal proclamation states that any fisherman 
who wishes to undertake commercial fishing from natural and man-made water bodies needs 
to have a legal fishing permit or license.  It is also forbidden to transfer a fishing license to 
another person, to use illegal fishing materials such as explosive, ammunition, poisons, fish 
narcotizing plant or any devise that produces electric current and fishing from any water 
body by way of sifting the water (Article 5). 
 
Concerning environmental protection, both proclamations state that the concerned organs of 
the Federal or Regional governments shall ensure that development programmes and 
projects are drawn up in such a way that they will not have direct or indirect negative impact 
on the fisheries resource constituted in the basin where the programmes or projects are 
intended to be implemented. According to the Amhara region Proclamation Article 8 (2), the 
concerned body shall firstly ensure that different factories and other similar institutions 
established in and around basins found in the region will not damage the basin, the fisheries 
resource and all things in the water. Powers and responsibilities to enforce the proclamation 
were given to the fishery inspector assigned by the Regional Bureau of Agriculture. The 
fishery inspector has the power to stop and search any fisherman found on any water body 
and inspect the fishing boat and/or gears, demand any fishermen reasonably suspected of 
contravening the proclamation and regulation etc.   
 
After three years, the council of the Amhara National Regional government, in accordance 
with the powers vested in it under the provisions of Article 58, sub-article 7 of the revised 
Regional Constitution and Article 18 of the Fisheries’ Resource Development, Protection 
and Utilization Proclamation No. 92/2003, enacted enforcement Regulation No. 50/2007. 
The purposes of the regulation was to determine the manpower, fishing equipment and 
productive methods which are necessary for the activities of the fish cultivation to be 
normally harvested without jeopardizing the overall potential resource and not exceeding the 
amount of annual produce dully prescribed beforehand, from any water body in the Regional 
state.  
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This regulation provides that the number and type of the fish harvesting gears to be 
appropriately used in the activity of producing fish from a certain water body shall not 
exceed the maximum number of harvesting instruments which should be employed to 
cultivate the fisheries resource without affecting the potential of same (Article 4/1).  As a 
result, any fish cultivar shall register the type and number of fishing license granted to him, 
and wherever any variation of type or size occurs as to the registered fishing gears, the 
licensee shall notify same to the Bureau of Agriculture (Article 4/2). The Bureau may issue a 
specific guideline containing the type of instruments to be permitted for use in each water 
body along with the requirement to be complied with. Gill net, cast net and local trap and 
hook are fish harvesting gears permitted for use under this regulation (Article 4/3). Whereas, 
the regulation prohibits the following fish harvesting gears or for any other purpose in any 
water body (Article 5):  
  Nets, whose size of meshes is narrow in width  Pulling and/or trawl nets which may be hauled or pulled by manpower or boat for the 
purpose of fishing  With the details to be determined by a directive issued by the Bureau (BoA), narcotic 
or polluting plants and chemicals  Explosives, dynamites and other devices causing an electric shock. 
 
The right to harvest fish resource for commercial purposes has been granted for those who 
acquired a fishing license to produce fish from a water body. Any fish harvesters, having 
acquired a lawful license, have the right to harvest fish either permanently or temporarily, in 
an individual, group or associational capacity (Article 6/1and 2). However, the regulation 
states that ‘any person dwelling nearby a water body, is permitted (without license) to 
undertake fishing and have the right to capture up to 3 kg fish per day using a single hook for 
his personal or household consumption; provided that he/she may not avail the captured fish 
to market and sell’ (Article 6/3). The regulation further vested power to BoA to determine 
the number of fish harvesters who may engage themselves in the activity of fish production 
in a certain water body, the type and number of the fish harvesting gears that a fish cultivator 
may possess taking into account the amount of the fish potential and fishery resource 
potential available in the water body (Article 6/5 and 6). 
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According to Article 7 of this regulation, to conserve the fishery resource available in any 
water body, fishing may not be undertaken in fishing breeding areas and seasons designated 
beforehand. On condition that such breeding areas and seasons are specified in the course of 
study the water bodies pertaining there to may partially or fully be closed. It is a prohibited 
act to cause the flow or drainage of industrial agricultural or maritime, urban and other 
sewage, possibly entailing harm to the fishery resource into any water body. Prior to any 
decision having been taken to utilize any water body for the purpose of irrigation 
development, generation of an electric power, water transportation, tourism and the like 
services, it shall be ascertained that no harm may be done to the product and quality as 
regards the potential of the fishery resource. 
 
However, despite the existence of proclamations and regulations at Federal and Regional 
level, during the time of this study there was no limitation on the manpower, number or type 
of gill nets and fishing technology used, because directives to enforce the proclamation and 
regulations were not yet prepared and implemented at a regional level. There are no formal 
rules that govern the local fishermen. The fishery resource development, protection and 
utilization proclamation enforcement regulation No. 50/2007, Article 4/4 states that the sizes 
of meshes of gill nets that may be used in any water body shall, being varied and determined 
depending on the species of fish, and its developmental condition as well as the type of water 
body, be over 8cm in width. However, the district office of Agriculture and development 
agents reported that illegal fishing nets with less than 8cm are being introduced from Sudan 
and causing a rapid depletion of the fish resource around Fogera, Libokemkem and Dembiya 
districts. Until the time of this survey, there was no initiative from the concerned bodies to 
control the situation.  
 
Generally, despite its potential contribution to the country’s drive to food and livelihood 
security, Lake Tana fishery is threatened by a multitude of management and governance 
related problems. Proclamations and regulations for fisheries resource development, 
protection and utilization were enacted at national and regional level, but there were no 
binding legal rules that govern the behaviors of fishermen and other stakeholders at user 
level because directives to enforce rules and regulations at the operational level were not 
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prepared yet.  Bureau of Agriculture and other key players in Lake Tana fishery sector have 
not been discharging their mandates and responsibilities as a result. 
 
In summary the major problems of the fishery identified in the group discussion and key 
informant interviews are: 
  Uncontrolled overfishing  and loss of the endemic species   Illegal fishing activities (mesh size less than 8mm is used)   Importation of Illegal fishing gear from Sudan   Lengthy law making process and weak rule enforcement to protect the declining stock 
of fishery resource   Stakeholders’ poor knowledge and perception of legislations, proclamations and their 
derivatives  Mandated agencies not discharging their responsibilities (particularly BoA)  Weak institutional framework to guarantee sustainable fish resource management and 
development  Very limited stakeholder participation in the decision making process 
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4.5 Case study of the wetland commons and associated resources 
 
According to the Ramsar Convention (1971) wetlands include a wide variety of habitats such 
as marshes, peat lands, floodplains, rivers and lakes, and coastal areas such as salt marshes, 
mangroves, and sea grass beds, but also coral reefs and other marine areas no deeper than six 
meters at low tide, as well as human-made wetlands such as waste-water treatment ponds 
and reservoirs (Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 2007). Wetlands are biologically important 
elements of landscapes and among the most threatened ecosystems on Earth (Laurance et al. 
2012). Wetlands are of value because they play an important role in maintaining 
environmental quality, sustaining livelihoods of the poor and marginalized groups and 
supporting biodiversity. Wetlands are also eco-tones between lakes and terrestrial 
ecosystems which are vital for protection of the lake ecosystem against anthropogenic 
impacts (Wondie, 2010). Wetlands are commonly referred to as the ‘kidneys’ of the 
environment and are a crucial resource for rural livelihoods.  
 
4.5.1 Ethiopian wetlands and the Ramsar Convention  
 
 
As a result of different geological formations and climatic conditions, Ethiopia is endowed 
with vast water resources and wetland ecosystems including 12 river basins, 8 of which  are 
River Basins, 1 Lake Basin and the remaining 3 Dry basins, with no or insignificant flow of 
the drainage system (MoWE, 2012). It is estimated that Ethiopian wetlands cover an area of 
13,699 km2 or 1.14% of the country’s land surface (Abebe and Geheb, 2003). More than 
80% of the country’s wetlands are found in four regional states; Amhara (26.29%), Oromiya 
(24.23%), Somali (15.26%) and Gambela (15.08%) (WBISPP, 2002).  However, wetlands 
are only addressed as components of other Federal water or environmental policies (Abebe 
and Gehb, 2003). Despite the recognition of wetlands as a key feature in watershed 
management in national water resources management policy, the practical implementation of 
conservation strategies for wetlands is almost none or very minimal. Consequently, many of 
wetlands in the country are at the edge of collapse due to continuous threats they are facing. 
Draining for growing food crops which involves double cropping, over harvesting of the 
resources, year round and over-grazing, the appearance of invasive plant species due to 
mismanagement of the resources, and the introduction of perennial crops (like eucalyptus) 
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into the wetland ecosystem are the major threats that are posing a danger to the country’s 
wetlands (Hailu, 2005). 
 
The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands is an intergovernmental treaty adopted on 2 February 
1971, in the Iranian city of Ramsar, entered into force in 1975, whose mission is ‘the 
conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local, regional and national actions and 
international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development 
throughout the world’. It is the first of the modern global intergovernmental treaties on the 
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.  As of July 11, 2013, 168 nations have 
joined the Convention as Contracting Parties among which more than 45 African countries 
are members of the convention, and more than 2,131 wetlands around the world, covering 
over 205 million hectares, have been designated for inclusion in the Ramsar list of Wetlands 
of International Importance (Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 2013). Wetlands across the 
globe are identified as being of international importance if they meet at least one of the 
Criteria as adopted by the 4th, 6th, and 7th meetings of the Conference of the Contracting 
Parties to the Convention (COPs). Currently there are eight criteria (see Table 4.3) adopted 
by COP7 in 1999 as part of the Convention’s Strategic Framework and guidelines for the 
future development of the list of Wetlands of International Importance. 
 
Table 4.3: Criteria adopted by COPs for identification of wetlands across the globe  
 Source: Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 2012 
Criteria  Description 
A wetland should be considered internationally important; 
1 If it contains a representative, rare, or unique example of a natural or near-natural 
wetland type found within the appropriate bio-geographic region. 
2 If it supports vulnerable, endangered, or critically endangered species or threatened 
ecological communities. 
3 If it supports populations of plant and/or animal species important for maintaining the 
biological diversity of a particular bio-geographic region. 
4 If it supports plant and/or animal species at a critical stage in their life cycles, or 
provides refuge during adverse conditions. 
5 If it regularly supports 20,000 or more water birds. 
6 If it regularly supports 1% of the individuals in a population of one species or 
subspecies of water bird. 
7 If it supports a significant proportion of indigenous fish subspecies, species or families, 
life-history stages, species interactions and/or populations that are representative of 
wetland benefits and/or values and thereby contributes to global biological diversity. 
8 If it is an important source of food for fishes, spawning ground, nursery and/or 
migration path on which fish stocks, either within the wetland or elsewhere, depend. 
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Most of the Ethiopian wetlands will qualify as potential Ramsar sites. Particularly Lake Tana 
ecosystem is the home of internationally important flora and fauna. The ecosystem fulfills 
almost all criteria possibly except criteria 5 adopted by COPs for identification of wetlands 
across the globe. However, despite it being a party to many of the international 
environmental treaties, Ethiopia has yet to ratify the Ramsar convention for wetlands. As 
reported by Barker (2004), one reason that has been given for this is a concern among 
government officials that designation of Ramsar sites will restrict the development activities 
that take place there, for example, converting natural wetlands into irrigated agricultural 
lands. However, during the period when this study was being conducted, a draft policy paper 
on wetland management was prepared and is waiting to be submitted for endorsement at the 
parliament level, and efforts are undergoing to make Ethiopia a signatory of the Ramsar 
Convention.  
 
4.5.2 Lake Tana and its surrounding wetlands 
 
Wetlands are located all around the lake, with the exception of the Northeast. The littoral 
zone of the lake is bordered by low plains in the North (Dembia), East (Fogera and 
libokemkem) and South-West (Kunzila) that are often flooded in the rainy season. Together 
they are the largest in the country and integral parts of the complex Lake Tana-ecosystem 
(Atnafu et al. 2011). During the raining period these wetlands are connected with the lake. 
They act as nurseries for most of the fish populations in the lake, and serve as breeding 
ground for water fowl and mammals (Vijverberg et al. 2009). Riverine wetland, semi-
permanent wetlands (ponds), seasonally-flooded grassland are also found along the course of 
the major tributary rivers. Wetlands in the Lake sub-basin  are crucial to the survival of the 
rural population as well as urban poor like the Negede woyto community who use them as a 
source of drinking water, craft and construction materials, medicinal plants, all season 
grazing land and fertile agricultural land for rice, maize, vegetables and cereals cultivation 
during the dry season. 
 
Fogera Plain is well known for the ‘ponds’ which provide internationally important bird 
habitats. There are three main ponds, Shesher, Welela and Daga-Takua, all historically 
maintained by overbank flooding from the Ribb River. Following the river's change in 
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course to the north and increased human intervention such as dam construction at the upper 
stream, these ponds are now seasonal, drying out almost completely late in the dry season. 
Their drainage has been accelerated by excavation of small channels. Grazing and flood 
recession agriculture are practiced around the edges of the ponds, and they are subject to 
invasion by unpalatable weeds such as Argemone mexicana, resulting in reductions in plant 
diversity and the creation of single species communities dominated by Sacciolepis africana 
(Burnside and Tonkin and Taylor 2009). The Shesher wetlands are spread over at least 4 
kebeles namely, Nabega, Kidisthana, Shaga and Shina, as a result conflict over the use of the 
wetlands transcends even beyond individuals to kebeles.  
        
                                  (a)                                                                        (b)  
Figure 4.6: Retreat farming around Welala pond (a) and invasive weeds (b)    
             Source: The Author (2011) 
 
For the last two decades there has been a dramatic loss of the wetlands in the district. Since 
1987, more than 90% of Shesher, 47 % of Welela and 73% of Daga-Takua wetlands were 
lost (see Table 4.4). The driving forces of massive destruction are; population pressure, 
unclear property rights and greedy self-interest of individuals.  
 
 
Table 4.4: Percentage change in area of key wetlands in Fogera district 
*Split into two parts, Daga and Takua 
Source: Burnside and Tonkin and Taylor (2009) ** Own calculation 
Wetlands of Fogera 
plain 
Area (ha) 
1987 2008 Loss in 21 years (ha)  **Percentage loss (%) 
Shesher 1,557 136 1,405 90 
Welela 298 159 139 47 
Daga-Takua 248 75* 181 73 
Total 2,103 370 1,733 82 
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4.5.3 Major threats to the wetlands of the sub-basin  
 
International reports suggested that since the 1900s, more than half of the world’s wetlands 
have been lost through conversion to other forms of land use systems (Schuyt, 2005). 
According to Dugan (1990), 65% of wetland disturbances are of human origin, while the 
remainder has natural origins. Out of these, 73% of human origin disturbances are thought to 
result from direct human actions which can have lasting effects on wetland ecosystems, 
including drainage, dredging, filling, conversion to other land use, discharge of industrial 
wastes and municipal sewage, mining, dam construction etc. while the remaining 27% are 
believed to come from indirect sources like sediment diversion and hydrological alterations. 
Natural causes for instance drought, erosion, biotic effects can also affect the wetlands.  
 
The survey result and focus group discussions with community elders also confirm that (see 
Table 4.5), the major threats of the shoreline and riparian wetlands include conversion to 
agriculture by draining the wetlands, industrial pollution, appearance of invasive species, 
introduction of perennial vegetation (like eucalyptus tree), overgrazing and overharvesting of 
wetland resources. Another quite different change in the past two decades that has 
dramatically affected the wetland ecosystem was the introduction and spread of a new rice 
cropping system in Fogera, Dembiya and Libokemkem districts and other Lake shore areas 
of the Lake.  
 
According to local experts and community elders (key informants), despite its potential 
positive impact on the livelihood of the local farmers, rice cultivation has created a 
tremendous pressure on the wetland ecosystem. Farmers were encouraged by officials to 
cultivate waterlogged areas which were considered as either unused or waste land. Even 
though they considered wetlands as a valuable resource to keep the health of the Lake 
ecosystem, the temptation to free-ride is high among community members. This is because 
of the absence of specific rules and regulations that protect the wetlands from 
overexploitation and because there are no incentives to conserve the wetlands. On top of 
that, lack of clear awareness in general public, decision and policy makers coupled with the 
absence of clear policy and direction on wetlands issue are contributing to the problems 
mentioned before (Hailu, 2005).  
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Table 4.5: Threats to wetland resource as prioritized by resource users 
Source: Own survey result and focus group discussion, 2011 
 
 
Wetland cultivation is derived by a multitude of stakeholder interests. The survey and focus 
group discussion also reveals that conversion to crop land, excessive grazing and 
government led development activities are the most threatening factors significantly 
affecting the wetland resource in Lake Tana sub-basin. Community members are competing 
to use the wetlands for crop production particularly for rice and maize cultivation, and for 
grazing. The majority (60.5 %) of respondents agreed that both conversion to crop land and 
excessive grazing significantly affect the wetland resource. Others (28%) argued that 
conversion to crop land has severe impact than excessive grazing because once converted 
into cropland the likelihood of recovering from degradation will not be easy, where as 
excessive grazing can be managed easily and recovery is not difficult (see Table 4.5).  
 
As stated by the group discussants the driving forces are: population pressure, resource 
scarcity, seeking short term benefits, market access and Bureau of Agriculture’s policies and 
programmes that encourage farmers to boost agricultural production by cultivating the 
unused lands (including wetlands). This creates an incentive for farmers to clear the wetlands 
for rice and other vegetable crops. Degradation of arable lands and depletion of soils 
encouraged the local community members to search for other alternative lands (wetlands). 
New technologies and irrigation facilities such as water pumps motivated the farmers to 
pump and cultivate the wetlands. In recent times, plantations of eucalyptus trees on wetlands 
are reported as one of the potential threats to the wetland ecosystem. 
 
 
 
 
 
Threat to the wetland resource 
(n=200) 
Frequency Percent 
Conversion to crop land and excessive grazing 121 60.5 
Conversion to crop land 56 28.0 
Other development activities 23 11.5 
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4.5.4 The downside of local proverb ‘If Tana dry, plough up to dek’  
 
According to community elders retreat farming around Lake Tana had been started several 
years ago. Whereas a dramatic intensification of wetlands production started in the 1990s 
when the Bureau of Agriculture (BoA) promoted the ‘Double or triple cropping per year’ as 
a motto. Since then farmers were encouraged to seek other alternative lands (wetlands). In 
offseason (when the lake water level drops) farmers in the shore of Lake Tana practice 
retreat farming. For this purpose, farmers uproot the papyrus grass and other plant species 
and use them as a fuel wood so that it will not appear again for the next season (see Figure 
4.7). During the rainy season, the water covers the area. Then, when the water level drops 
again, they will plough and cultivate the wetland. Most of the farmers who have cultivable 
land adjacent to the Lake shore wish to see the Lake level decrease without considering its 
impact on the lake ecosystem. Because they are always saying their motto ‘If Tana dry, we 
will plough up to dek’-in Amharic; ‘Tana biderk eske dek’‘ጣና ቢደርቅ እስከ ደቅ’.  
 
All wetlands adjacent to Lake Tana are assumed to be a common-pool resource shared by 
the community members in their particular locality. However, community members believe 
that individuals owned the wetlands privately through illegal procedures but with legal land 
certification. This is due to corrupted kebele administrators and land administration experts 
at kebele and district level. On the other hand, for the purpose of farming, papyrus vegetation 
in most of the adjacent districts of Lake Tana has been destroyed by the local farmers. For 
instance, a report shows that in 2003 more than 10 hectares of papyrus vegetation were 
destroyed by deliberate fire outbreaks around Zenzelma kebele near to a village called Debre 
Mariam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 4.7: The papyrus grass and other plant species uprooted and rolled    
Location: Lake Tana, near to the border of Fogera and Libokemkem districts, Teza-amba Kebele     
Source: The Author (2011)  
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4.5.5 Lakeshore investment: The enclosure of the commons  
 
Experience from different field settings and this study on the commons confirms a complex 
set of experiences, patterns and drivers of change and degradation that organize and re-
organize across multiple levels of interactions among stakeholders. Outsider perceptions of 
local commons as wasteland, unused or inefficiently used resources, exacerbate processes of 
degradation. Extra local drivers of this kind often interact with local conditions in which 
indigenous or long-term residents already experiencing difficult livelihood conditions face 
access problems and declining resource availability (Armitage, 2007). 
 
In the recent past, with the exception of regional government offices and residences, 
lakeshores around Lake Tana were considered as commons for the surrounding communities 
and public spaces that were open to other people elsewhere in the region. They used to fish, 
harvest papyrus grass, recreate, and celebrate rituals along the beaches and the shore of the 
Lake. Now, except some places which are still open to the public, the majority of the 
lakeshores are enclosed or privatized and access to those places is only allowed with a 
special entrance fee. Here typical examples are Titu recreation-entrance fee that charged 2 
Birr/person, and Kuriftu Resort and Spa - there was a special membership entrance fee of 
approximately 200 Birr/person that will be charged upon first entrance. Except on Sunday 
morning for about 1 or 2 hours, it is not allowed to visit the Resort without this special 
entrance permit. 
 
As has been argued by Bollier (2007) enclosure of the lakeshore means that people have to 
start paying for resources they previously got free, or cheaply. It means that people need to 
ask for permission to use something that was previously theirs by right. Therefore, enclosure 
shifts the ownership and control of a resource from a given community or the public at large, 
to private owners/investors. Once the cash value has been harvested from the commons, 
corporations/investors tend to dump their wastes and social disruptions (precisely known as 
‘market externalities’) back into the commons, in this case Lake Tana, where upon they 
declare to government and the commoners: ‘it’s your problem’.  
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According to experts in BoEPLUA, lakeshore investment at the expense of wetlands around 
the Southern part of Lake Tana (see Figure 4.8) started since 1993, when Bahir Dar city 
became the seat of the Amhara National Regional Sate (ANRS). Since then, a tremendous 
level of investment particularly hotels, harbor facilities, and recreational sites steadily 
increased. Although the Environmental laws of the country require social and environmental 
impact assessment for large scale projects and investments, in practice such assessments are 
rarely conducted prior to investment. If an EIA is conducted, mostly it is to the satisfaction 
of the investors rather than to the environment or to the local community. 
 
Article 3(1) of the EIA Proclamation No. 299/2002 states, 
 
Without authorization from the Authority or from the relevant regional environmental 
agency, no person shall commence implementation of any project that requires 
environmental impact assessment as determined in a directive issued pursuant to Article 
5 of this Proclamation. 
 
In most cases, the regional Environmental Protection Authority (Bo-EPLUA) is not well 
informed about the investments that take place in the vicinity of Lake Tana.  If informed, 
they have to approve as per the request of the investors.  
 
Article 3(3)   
 
Any licensing agency shall, prior to issuing an investment permit or a trade or an 
operating license for any project, ensure that the Authority or the relevant regional 
environmental agency has authorized its implementation’. 
      
      
 Article 14 (2) further stipulated that, 
The regional environmental agency in each region shall be responsible for the 
evaluation and authorization or any environmental impact study report and the 
monitoring of its implementation if the project is not subject to licensing, execution and 
supervision by a federal agency and if it is unlikely to produce trans-regional impact. 
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Despite the existence of binding rules and regulations, however, the Investment Bureau, 
Bureau of Environmental Protection and Land Use Administration and other relevant 
stakeholders like city administration/municipality are not working synergistically. 
Sometimes, even they are in conflict where one promotes investment at the cost of the 
environment while others are striving for conservation and preservation of the lake 
ecosystem (Personal observation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Wetlands converted into ‘bare land’ by private investors  
                Location: Near to Bahir Dar Fishery and Aquatic Life Research Center (BDFALRC). 
                Source: The Author (2011) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.8 daily laborers are filling the wetlands to change into ‘bare land’, so 
that the ‘investor’ will construct a building or use as a harbor for his/her boats. Surprisingly, 
experts from the Bo-EPLUA, who are expected to do Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) and monitor the regional environmental condition, were not aware of what is going on 
there. Within a 1 Km radius, there is a protected wetland area designated by Bo-EPLUA.  
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4.5.6 Attitudes and perceptions of wetland users 
 
Perception of wetland users about the value to be attached to the resource could affect the 
management and governance of wetland positively or negatively. It is their views of apparent 
benefits or costs arising from the resource system which will determine whether they will 
cooperate positively or act negatively towards governing the resource. Particularly 
conservation of natural resources is greatly affected by the perception and attitudes of the 
stakeholders who are involved in the process of resource use, management and governance. 
Therefore, in order to better understand their attitude towards the wetland commons, 
sampled wetland users were asked about their general perception of the wetlands in their 
localities.  
 
Respondents had varying perceptions, knowledge and understanding of wetland resources. 
Particularly, perception and attitudes of wetland users towards the use value of wetlands is 
diverse and sometimes with a mixed feeling. Users' perception of wetland values have varied 
with time and other factors. They have ranged from an attitude where people viewed 
wetlands as wastelands to the present trend where some people view wetlands as 
opportunities for development. For instance, more than 90% (Agree +strongly agree) of the 
respondents are agreed that wetlands play a vital role in groundwater regulation and they are 
considered as the ‘kidney of the environment’ and heads of rivers and streams. And yet more 
than 70% (Agree +strongly agree) of the respondents still believe that ‘wetlands are waste 
lands’ so that they have to be put to better use (see Table 4.6). 
 
Particularly in Fogera, Dembia and Libokemekem districts where the people had been 
severely affected by seasonal floods, to them the creation of a rice scheme and the 
controlling of floods was a relief. However the majority (66%) of wetland users were not 
agreed on considering wetlands as the only sources of malaria so that wetlands have to be 
put to better use, whereas more than 30 % of the wetland users in those flooded areas 
perceive wetlands as a source of malaria and seen as breeding grounds for mosquitoes and 
other pests, so that they proposed draining and cultivation of the wetlands as a solution. 
Despite their diverse perceptions of the wetlands, the majority of the respondents (94%) 
were agreed on the conservation and protection of the wetlands by Law.  
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However, group discussion results show that youths and landless farmers in each district 
considered wetlands as waste lands so that they wish wetlands should be distributed among 
themselves and cultivated for better use. From the household survey and focus group 
discussion results, it was understood that there were a variety of opinions about wetlands and 
resource users perceived wetland values differently. Mostly poor perceptions of wetland 
users lead to a massive destruction of wetlands in Lake Tana sub-basin.  
 
Table 4.6: Resource users’ perception of wetlands (n=200) 
Source: Own survey result, 2011 
 
In summary, the major problems of wetlands are:  Low public awareness on the values of wetlands  Population and development pressure   Low level of awareness, knowledge and skills of experts and lack of commitment   Incompatible needs, often without a serious EIA and unsustainable investments near 
to the Lakeshore  Lack of key stakeholders’ accountability and responsibility   Lack of clear and specific policy and legal framework on wetlands 
 
Items  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Wetlands should be used for cattle 
grazing 
# 13 44 18 74 51 
% 6.5 22.0 9.0 37.0 25.0 
I feel, wetlands were not very useful 
except for the provision of materials 
for thatching and making crafts 
# 43 112 10 31 4 
% 21.5 56.0 5.0 15.5 2.0 
Wetlands played a vital role in 
groundwater regulation, flood 
control and other related benefits 
# 4 8 7 100 81 
% 2.0 4.0 3.5 50.0 40.5 
All wetlands should be conserved 
and gazette so that they could be 
protected by law 
# 2 5 4 87 102 
% 1.0 2.5 2.0 43.5 51.0 
Wetlands are wastelands which 
could be put to better use 
# 22 27 3 101 47 
% 11.0 13.5 1.5 50.5 23.5 
Wetlands are the sources of malaria, 
so that it should be drained and used 
for other. 
# 33 99 7 44 17 
% 16.5 49.5 3.5 22.0 8.5 
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4.6 Chapter summary   
 
 
In summary, the Lake Tana ecosystem is endowed with multipurpose use values such as, 
fisheries, water supply, transportation, hydro-electric power supply, irrigation, 
heritage/religious practice, diversity of flora and fauna, tourism, quality of life for Bahir Dar 
residents, sources of food, income and livelihood for the local community and marginalized 
ethnic group (Negede woyto), waste processing (as a basket for Bahir Dar town), mining 
(sand), wetland products etc. These resources provide an array of social, cultural, religious 
and economic benefits for a wide variety of resource users and other stakeholders in and 
around Lake Tana sub-basin (see Table 4.7). Lake Tana ecosystem is also considered as an 
international commons where downstream stakeholders are claiming their stake, since the 
Lake ecosystem is the source of the Blue Nile which contributes more than 85% of the water 
that enters into the Nile River. 
  
As can be seen from Table 4.7, the same stakeholder groups were identified for a number of 
resource functions and uses. This helps to see the interconnected groups and stakeholders 
that have an important stake in and power over the resource under consideration. However, 
as the number of resource users and demand for resources increases, accommodating the 
interests of multiple users at different levels becomes challenging for the Lake Tana sub-
basin resource management and governance system. As examined by Swallow et al. (1997) 
accommodating multiple uses and multiple users of resources in complex resource systems 
(like Lake Tana ecosystem) has been identified as one of the priority themes for natural 
resources management and governance, policy formulation and intervention.  
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Table 4.7: Comparative analysis of different CPR systems in Lake Tana sub-basin  
Source: Own survey result, focus group discussions and stakeholder identification and analysis 
workshop, 2011 
CHAPTER 5 
5. HUMAN SUB-SYSTEM: RESOURCE USERS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The resource 
systems 
Fish and other aquatic life Wetlands and associated resources Lake Tana
Resource units   Fish   Other aquatic life  Wetlands  Reef/reeds /Papyrus, medicinal plants   Bird species  
 Water Sand 
Resource 
functions 
 Source of food, income and livelihood  Eco-hydrological balance   Educational and research value  Biodiversity  Aesthetic and recreational value  Source of potential  indigenous 
knowledge (The ‘Negede woyto’ 
community)  
 
 Source of food and feed,  income and 
livelihood, fuel, construction  Biodiversity, agriculture, carbon 
sequestration   Water quality control, sediment retention, 
flood control   Ecological, hydrological and hydraulic  Aesthetic,  recreational value, cultural and 
medicinal value  Educational and research value 
 Hydro
suppl Source Home  Biodiv
balan Politi
aesthet Waste 
sink,  Educa
Modes of  CPR 
governance 
regimes 
 Hierarchical but decentralized to the 
lowest level  BoA is the main governmental agency to 
look after the fish resource and fishery 
sector in general 
 Usually, hierarchical but decentralized to 
the lowest level, in some cases community 
members may take parts to administer their 
wetland commons  Kebele and  district administrators, EPLUA 
experts are responsible to administer 
 Hierar Thou
power
their j
the Fed
Key management 
and governance 
concern 
 Uncontrolled and overfishing  Loss of endemic species  Poor knowledge of legislations, 
proclamations and their derivatives  Mandated agencies not discharging their 
responsibilities (BoA)  Introduction of illegal fishing technology. 
 Severe degradation  Loss of species   Unclear property rights and unplanned land 
use  Population pressure and land scarcity   Low level of awareness and stakeholders’ 
wrong perception about  wetlands 
 Exten Escalatin Serio Water
system Threa
of the 
Existing/proposed 
Legal/policy/Instit
utional 
framework 
 Fishery Development and Utilization 
Proclamation and Regulation (not  yet 
implemented and ineffective)  No directive to implement the rules 
 No specific policy for the wetlands   Environmental policy and other 
international treaties/conventions  The Ramsar Convention is not yet ratified  
 Water Envir Differ
Main 
Stakeholders 
groups interacting  
Local communities, Members of Fishery 
production and marketing cooperatives, BoA, 
BoEPLUA, FAO etc 
Local communities, Youths, Farmers, BoA, 
BoEPLUA, EWNRA, IBCR etc 
Farmers, Fi
BoEPLUA
Stakehold
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The aim of this chapter is to present the second part of the research findings. This chapter 
focuses on the attributes of the human sub-system, including socio economic conditions and 
perceptions of their own situations, particularly the drivers of change that affect the CPR use, 
management and governance, the actors involved and their relative interactions in the CPR 
governance process. The attributes of the human-sub system (‘attributes of resource users 
and other stakeholders’) is one of the pillars of the conceptual framework of this research. 
Hence, this chapter will address the questions of what are the drivers of change that affect 
CPR use, management and governance, who are the key players in the overall CPR 
governance system and decision making process, what are the underlying causes of conflict 
among stakeholders, and what are possible resolution mechanisms. 
 
Communities of users managing and governing common-pool resources (CPRs) such as 
forests or fisheries are excellent examples of complex systems. This complexity increases 
when social systems (the human sub-system discussed in this chapter) interact with natural 
systems (discussed in Chapter 4 of this research) that present similar analytical difficulties. 
Understanding these situations and identifying the actors involved is important given the 
increasing impact humans are having on the environment and the important role that 
communities and other stakeholders often play in natural resource management in diverse 
settings (Cox et al. 2010). The research technique applied here is a mixed method approach 
using both qualitative and quantitative data that makes it possible to better understand the 
interaction of actors in the action situation. The data analyzed and discussed in this chapter 
are therefore derived mainly from the household survey, stakeholder analysis and 
identification workshop and focus group discussions. Moreover, to substantiate data 
analyzed from primary sources, secondary sources were also used. 
5.2 Characteristics of the community residing around the sub-basin  
 
The socio economic conditions of residents in all sampled districts are characterized by low 
GDP per capita estimated to be 103.5 USD which is below the national average, 112.7 USD 
in 2003/2004 (BoFED, 2004). As reported by WME (2009), the illiteracy rate is very high 
with the urban population having better literacy rates than rural dwellers and males having 
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about twice the literacy rates of females. The household survey result also confirms that 50% 
of the sampled households are illiterate (among which 84.8% Female Heads are illiterate as 
compared to 42.2 % of Male headed respondents). 
 
Almost 67 % of the sample households are dependent on crop and livestock production as a 
primary livelihood source. More than 20 % of the respondents are engaged in integrated 
crop, livestock and off farm activities as a form of livelihood (see Figure 5.1). The other 
livelihood options include crop integrated with fishing, wood collection and charcoal 
production. A typical household in the study area owns an average of 5 livestock (excluding 
poultry).  Cultivable land is a critical problem in the study area. More than 70% and 58% of 
the respondents owned and cultivated less than 1 hectare of land respectively (see Table 5.1). 
Newly married couples have no access to cultivable land unless they are able to inherit land 
from their parents.       
 
Households in the study area are predominantly male headed (77%) with fewer than 23% 
female headed. More than 76% of the respondents are married while 23% are either divorced 
or widowed. Out of these (23%), the majority of female head are either divorced (30.4%) or 
widowed (45.7%). The remaining 23.9% of the female head are married or re-married 
women who have their own land and lead their family (see Table 5.2). The minimum and 
maximum number of family members in the household is 1 and 12 respectively.  
                              
          Figure 5.1: The primary livelihood source of the community (n=200)  
                          Source: Own survey result, 2011 
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Table 5.1: Amount of land owned and cultivated by the household (n=200) 
 
Holding in 
hectare 
Owned Cultivated 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
0- 1 ha 140 70% 115 57.5% 
1- 1.75 ha 46 23% 66 33% 
2- 2.75 ha 12 6% 15 7.5 
3+ ha 2 1% 4 2% 
Total 200 100% 200 100% 
Source: Own survey result, 2011 
 
The average household size is 5 persons per household slightly higher than the national and 
regional average, 4.7 and 4.3 persons per household respectively. The respondent’s age 
ranges from 20 to 87 years. The community is composed of a more or less a homogenous 
ethnic group. The predominant ethnic group (more than 96% of the respondents) within each 
of the five districts chosen for the household survey is Amhara. Even though they are small 
in numbers the Negede woyto community are also found in Bahir Dar and alongside Lake 
Tana shore. The Negede woyto community is considered to be an indigenous people around 
Bahir Dar, and on the southern tip of Lake Tana. The community elders claim that their 
descendants were originally from Egypt. Members of this community are also residing in the 
North and South Gondar zones adjacent to Lake Tana. According to the 1994 national 
census of Ethiopia, the population of the Negede woyto was estimated at 1,677 but for 
unknown reasons they are not mentioned in the preliminary report of the 2007 population 
census. Currently, they predominantly live in kebeles 03, 11(Abbay Mado), 13 and 16 of 
Bahir Dar city and are not provided basic social services. However, along with the 
establishment and continued expansions of the town, they have been evacuated from their 
original settlements and pushed to various areas of the town.  
 
Regarding their social status, they are considered as an inferior group in the society and the 
other groups look down on and exclude them. They claim themselves as Muslim but the 
Muslim community does not recognize and accept them as a member of the Muslim 
community proper. But they have their own mosque in one of the kebeles. In most cases, 
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their children are not attending formal schools but are engaged in simple informal activities 
like collecting garbage, firewood, street vending and shoe shining. Economically they are 
among the poorest section of the society. Traditionally, they were fisher and hunter men in 
and around Lake Tana (Care Ethiopia, 2011). They are endowed with traditional knowledge 
of hunting, fishing and construction of hand driven boats. Their livelihood is mainly 
depending on papyrus and fish. Mostly, they rely on papyrus reeds for much of their 
livelihood; using it to construct canoes for lake traders and other people who move around 
the lake by boat. They also use the reeds to make household utensils (such as baskets and 
mats) which they sell in local markets, both for utilitarian purposes and as tourist souvenirs 
(McCartney et al. 2010).  
  
They are known for their hand driven boats made of a dried stalk of papyrus, and attractive 
grass type native to the shores of the lake. At present they have engaged in unproductive 
informal activities to generate income for their subsistence. This includes fishery, shaping 
stone grinding mills, thatching (sifet), and collecting fire wood, collecting and disposing 
home produced garbage. All the home based handicrafts are made using traditional skills and 
tools passed from generation but they do not enable them to be competent and have secure 
enough income for a better life (Care Ethiopia, 2011). Research reports suggested that the 
current status of papyrus and fish resources is under severe pressure which ultimately affects 
the livelihoods of the community. 
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Table 5.2: Distribution of respondents personal characteristics (n=200) 
 
Description District where the respondent live All respondents 
Fogera Libokemkem Denbiya Achefer Bahir Dar Zuria 
No. of respondents  82 (41.0%) 54 (27.0%) 16 (8.0%) 23 (11.5%) 25 (12.5%) 200 (100.0)% 
    Sex       
       Male 61 (30.5%) 35 (17.5%) 15 (7.5%) 20 (10.0%) 23 (10.0%) 154 (77.0%) 
       Female 21 (10.5%) 19 (9.5%) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.5%) 2 (1.0) 46 (23.0%) 
   Level of Education       
       Illiterate, no schooling 42 (51.2%) 30 (55.6%) 8 (50.0%) 14 (60.9%) 10 (40.0%) 104 (52.0%) 
       Adult Education 31 (37.8%) 13 (24.1%) 5(31.3%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (32.0%) 57 (28.5%) 
       Grade 1-4 5 (6.1%) 5 (9.3%) 2 (12.5%) 6 (26.1%) 4 (16.0%) 22 (11.0%) 
       Grade 5-8 3 (3.7%) 5 (9.3%) 1 (6.3%) 1 (4.3%) 2 (8.0%) 12 (6.0%) 
       Grade 9-10 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (4.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.5%) 
       Other(Religious) 1 (1.2%) 1 (1.9%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (4.3%) 1 (4.0%) 4 (2.0%) 
   Ethnicity       
       Amhara 80 (97.6%) 51(94.4%) 15 (93.8%) 22 (95.7%) 23 (92.0%) 191 (95.5%) 
       Agew 1 (1.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.5%) 1 (4.0%) 2(1.0%) 
       Others 1(1.2%) 3 (5.6%) 1 (6.3%) 1 (4.3%) 1 (4.0%) 7 (3.5%) 
   Marital Status       
       Single 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%) 2 (1.0%) 
       Married 62 (31.0%) 41 (20.5%) 15 (7.5%) 17 (8.5%) 14 (7.0%) 152 (76.0%) 
       Divorced 8 (4.0%) 4 (2.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (2.5%) 4 (2.0%) 21 (10.5%) 
       Widowed 11 (5.5%) 9 (4.5) 1 (0.5%) 2 (1.0%) 1 (0.5%) 25 (12.5%) 
   Occupation       
       Farming 56 (28.0%) 37 (18.5%) 11 (5.5%) 14 (7.0%) 19 (9.5%) 137 (68.5%) 
       Farming and off-farm 11 (5.5%) 8 (4.0%) 4 (2.0%) 8 (4.0%) 3 (1.5%) 34 (17.0%) 
       Farming and Fishing 8 (4.0%) 6 (3.0%) 1 (0.5%) 1(0.5%) 1 (0.5%) 17 (8.5%) 
       Farming and  Non-farm 7 (3.5%) 3 (1.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.0%) 12 (6.0%) 
Source: Own survey result, 2011 
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5.3 Common vision, understanding and perception of resource users 
 
Driving forces are the underlying causes that influence and direct human activities. These 
forces, either directly or indirectly, result in changes in ecosystems, changes that can degrade 
ecosystem capability to provide goods and services. The roots of these forces can be 
economic, political, socio-cultural, and/or legal, and rarely occur in isolation, but rather act 
in conjunction with others (Zurlini, 2008). In order to understand the perception of resource 
users towards the drivers of changes, respondents were asked to identify and prioritize the 
most important drivers of change that affects the resource systems and the livelihoods of the 
local community. 
 
Before the actual implementation of the household survey a list of drivers of change were 
identified and prioritized in different group discussion sessions across each district. Then the 
most important drivers of change that affect the management and governance of CPRs in the 
sub-basin were incorporated in the final interview schedule to grasp the perception and 
attitudes of resource users.  
 
The household survey and focus group discussion results suggest that population pressure, 
unclear property rights, uncontrolled resource use pattern, new technologies, development 
pressure and new market opportunities for some commodities (i.e fish) are considered as the 
major driving forces that affect the trends of changes that are already occurring in Lake Tana 
sub-basin. More than 50% and 28% of the respondents agreed that population pressure and 
uncontrolled resource use pattern respectively are major drivers of change followed by 
unclear property rights (15%) that triggers the dynamics of CPR use, management and 
governance in the Lake sub-basin (see Table 5.3). Particularly unprecedented population 
growth in rural areas of the lake basin adds to the growing number of rural residents who are 
land short and landless. Every new family demands land for cultivation. However, unless 
they do inherit from their parents, it is not easy to access land.  
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Table 5.3: Drivers of changes in availability and access to CPR as prioritized by users 
                  
Drivers of changes Focus group Discussion 
Ranking 
Household survey 
(n=184) 
Wetland users Fishermen Frequency  % 
Population pressure 1st  2nd 91 45.5 
Unclear property rights 2nd  5th  30 15.0 
Uncontrolled resource use pattern 3rd  1st  55 27.5 
New technologies and 
development pressure 
4th  3rd  3 1.5 
New market opportunities 5th  4th  5 2.5 
Source: Own survey and focus group discussion result, 2011 
 
District experts and community elders witnessed that, in recent times (since the 1990s) the 
majority of people in the Lake Tana sub-basin have been  diversifying income generation 
activities as a means of reducing risks of livelihood insecurity. Shortage of arable land 
triggered the landless and youths to search for other livelihood options and they seek to 
adapt by taking on other supplementary livelihood options. Fishing, charcoal production, and 
serving as casual laborer both in rural and urban areas are the main supplementary forms of 
income generation. As a result with the advent of dramatic population growth, all land based 
resources and other life supporting resources scarcity have become a critical problem for the 
rural land tillers. Therefore, competition for these resources increases within the local 
community particularly between the well-off group and those who are poor and voiceless.  
 
According to key informants and household survey respondents, the property rights assigned 
to CPRs are not clear and often they are ambiguous (for more details see section 6.4 Table 
6.2). They further argued that though communal/common land issues are clearly defined in 
the revised ANRS rural land administration and use proclamation, as the property of the 
community residing near to the common pools, issues such as who is eligible to use the 
resources and how the appropriation of these resources can be  carried out are not clear. As a 
result, more often CPRs are subjected to overutilization and degradation leaving the majority 
of the poor vulnerable to seasonal crises and livelihood insecurity.  
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Without a clear property rights of users, the CPRs are changed from common property 
regimes where the group has the right to exclude non-members from the use of the resources 
to de facto open access that does not have any kind of ownership. Therefore, every potential 
user is tempted to harvest more which ultimately leads to competition over resources, 
conflict and ultimately a major decrease in the availability and accessing of CPRs. The 
majority (76%) of the respondents confirms that, in the past two decades there was a major 
decline in the availability and accessing of common-pool resources, and 12% of the 
respondents agreed that there is a minor declining trend of CPR access and availability (see 
Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4: Users’ perception on the degree of change in availability and access to CPRs 
                 
Trends Frequency (n=200) Percentage 
Decreasing Major decrease 152 76% 
Minor decrease 24 12% 
Increasing  Major increase 2 1% 
Minor increase 6 3% 
 No change 16 8% 
 Total 200 100% 
Source: Own survey result, 2011 
 
The household survey and focus group discussion results suggest that due to the impact of 
drivers of change such as population pressure, uncontrolled resource use pattern and new 
market opportunities, exclusion of marginalized groups (like Negede woyto, women and 
youths) and the rural poor from the CPR system has been increasing in the past two decades. 
The more powerful segment12 of the society particularly politically affiliated and well-off 
groups are benefiting more from the CPR system. For instance, youths and landless farmers 
in Fogera and Libokemkem districts were engaged in sand mining as an alternative 
livelihood. However, they were excluded systematically by issuing license to the wealthy 
groups who are able to pay tax and administration fees.  
  
                                                 
12
 Powerful segment of the society- means those who are endowed with a relatively strong social capital and political 
affiliation. Social capital of individuals is determined by their social status and the structure of relations between actors and 
among actors in his or her network, whereas politically affiliated individuals usually assume administration positions so that 
they can use power to persuade others. 
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The majority of the household survey respondents (85% and 88.5%) were also agreed that 
the exclusion from CPR use has been increasing as the volume of CPR units available to 
harvest has been decreasing from time to time leaving the majority of CPR dependent 
households vulnerable to seasonal shocks (see Table 5.5). This shows that the amounts of 
CPR units that can be harvested from the resource system are shrinking from time to time.  
 
Table 5.5: Users’ perception on exclusion from CPRs and volume of resource unit  
 
Trends in the 
past 10 years 
Exclusion from CPR Volume of CPR unit available to 
harvest 
Frequency (n=200) % Frequency (n=200) % 
      Increasing 170 85% 8 4.0% 
      Decreasing 9 4.5% 177 88.5% 
      No change 7 3.5% 7 3.5% 
      Unnoticed  14 7.0% 8 4.0% 
Total 200 100% 200 100% 
Source: Own survey result, 2011 
 
Despite the fish stock decline, in recent times, a new dry fish market opportunity to Sudan 
has opened up; coupled with a new fishing technology imported illegally from Sudan, this 
motivated fishermen to harvest more and fetch a good price and triggered other community 
members to be engaged in fishing. Every fisherman is tempted to overharvest and exploit the 
available fish species. They have no incentives to conserve the fishery because any fish they 
leave is just going to be picked by the next fisherman. As a result, endemic fish species are 
overexploited and decreased dramatically, livelihoods of fishermen are severely challenged, 
and fish production and marketing activities of fish cooperatives decreased drastically, and 
competition and conflict over fish resources increased.  According to key informants from 
the fishery cooperatives since the availability of fish stock is decreasing alarmingly, fishing 
in general is no longer considered as a productive or profitable enterprise, and most 
fishermen feel strongly that the fishery is not productive any longer unless protective 
measures are put in place. As reported by members of fishery cooperatives, fish and other 
aquatic resources are declining from over time. 
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Generally, analysis of data both from the secondary and primary sources indicated that the 
lake ecosystem is under severe challenges to support life in the sub-basin. The changes 
observed around Lake Tana are very dynamic. Particularly the development activities that 
are planned and implemented are huge. Despite its tremendous positive contribution towards 
the country’s drive to achieve economic growth and reach the middle income countries in 
2015, the development pressure on Lake Tana Ecosystem is casting doubt on the sustainable 
use value of the Lake Tana and its associated resources.  
 
Different opinions of key informants were elicited regarding the future of Lake Tana in the 
next few decades. Respondents were asked; ‘with the current development pressure and 
environmental degradation in and around Lake Tana sub-basin, what will be the probable 
fate of Lake Tana in the next few decades? Some examples of responses are presented here. 
 
‘It is well known that Lake Tana is under severe pressure both from the human induced 
and natural calamity. Since, Lake Tana is fed by at least four perennial tributary rivers; 
I have no pessimistic view towards the fate of Lake Tana. However, there should be a 
strong research evidence to estimate the probable future. My worry however is that the 
silt load that enters in to the lake from upstream sub-basin is probably one of the most 
threatening factors that may determine the fate of the Lake’. 
                                          Associate professor, Bahir Dar University, February, 2012 
                                                 
‘Every summer, we are witnessing the silt load that steps into the Lake. Unless an 
integrated watershed development intervention is taking place at the upstream sub-basin 
and the silt load to the bottom layer of the lake decreased significantly, Lake Tana will 
desiccate over the course of two decades’.  
                                                  Farmer, Libokemkem district, Kab Kebele, June, 2011 
 
‘If the major tributaries continue to feed the Lake, the fate of Lake Tana will sustain. 
However, if they are blocked at the upstream for irrigation purpose, Lake Tana will be 
dried in the next few decades’. Participant farmers in the group discussion, 2011 
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‘Lake Tana is not an infinite resource, therefore, if we do not use the Lake’s resource 
wisely and sustainably, the fate will be disappearance’.  Expert, in EPLAU, 2011 
 
It is clear that there is a difference in the views of stakeholders towards the likely future of 
the lake ecosystem. Most people hope that the probable future of Lake Tana will depend on 
the perennial tributary rivers that fed the lake from different directions. They believe that, so 
far as these rivers continue to feed Lake Tana nothing will happen to the lake ecosystem. 
The other view is if all planned development projects are finalized and the water that flows 
to the lake decreased significantly and the silt load problem persists, the fate of Lake Tana 
will be disastrous. 
5.4 Who has a ‘stake’ and ‘power’ over CPR use, management and governance?  
5.4.1 Introduction  
 
Although stakeholder-related considerations are receiving an increasing attention within 
development scenarios and in particular, policy making processes, the actual management of 
stakeholders' identification and phase-specific involvement has not been covered sufficiently 
(Gerald, 2008). Therefore, it is imperative to understand how different stakeholders interact 
to solve CPR problems and to reduce or eliminate externalities, who are the key players, 
what are their interests, power, agendas, characteristics, circumstances, the roles, existing 
pattern of interactions, involvement and responsibilities of stakeholders in the process of 
resource use, management, governance and policy making. 
 
Theoretically the interactive perspective on governance proposes that societies are made up 
of large numbers of governance stakeholders, who are constrained or enabled in their actions 
by structures. Stakeholders, in this perspective, are any social unit possessing a stake/agency 
or power of action. These include individuals, associations, leaders, firms, departments and 
international bodies. Structure refers to the frameworks within which these stakeholders 
operate; these limit or widen their action potentials and which they therefore must take into 
account. These frameworks include culture, law, agreements, material and technical 
possibilities (Kooiman et al. 2008). 
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In analyzing an institutional arrangement in CPR management and governance, one must 
investigate who is involved, what their stakes and resources are, and how they are linked to 
one another and to outcomes. Specifically, the types of actions that stakeholders can take, the 
type of information available to them, how actions lead to outcomes, and how rewards and 
punishments are allocated in light of the outcomes achieved and the actions taken all require 
identification (Ostrom, Schroeder et al. 1993).  
 
The understanding of stakeholders’ involvement in decision making processes is important 
in bringing them into governance, using their competencies and capacities as necessary, and 
ensuring they are heard and have influence (Bavink et al. 2005).  Moreover, natural resource 
management typically deals with conflicting interests of various stakeholders since they use 
the same resources for different purposes. It is therefore important to understand the different 
perspectives of the stakeholders involved (Reed et al. 2009).  
 
The overall objective of this section is to provide a preliminary description of actors’ interest 
in and influence over CPR use, management and governance, and interactions of 
actors/stakeholders in the process of resource use, management, governance and policy 
process. It depicts the stakeholders’ landscape based on focus group discussions, key 
informant interviews and the stakeholder identification and analysis workshop which was 
carried out by a multidisciplinary team of experts from different stakeholder groups 
(governmental, research, academic and NGOs). 
 
5.4.2 Identification of stakeholders and stakeholder groups 
 
Before the actual stakeholder identification and analysis, the stakeholder concept was pre-
presented and discussed with workshop participants to ensure that participants had an 
appropriate level of understanding of the term as deployed in this study and to make sure all 
individuals have common understanding of stakeholder concepts and related issues. Then 5 
broad stakeholder groups (see Table 5.6) consisting of 23 specific stakeholders and sub-
stakeholder groups (see Table 5.7) who have legitimate interest in and power over common-
pool resources in the sub-basin were identified. However, this identification cannot 
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guarantee the exhaustive lists of stakeholders in Lake Tana’s jurisdiction, because, 
stakeholders change over time, new stakeholders can enter a resource management and 
governance system, while others may lose their role or interest. Accordingly, in the wake of 
resource scarcity, undetermined demand for resources, dynamic institutional and structural 
adjustments; the nature of stakeholder’s mandate or interest, the bases of their stake, the 
stake value and the power level to take action can be also more dynamic. 
 
Once stakeholders were identified, it was necessary to do further analysis to better 
understand their relevance and the perspective they offer, to understand their relationship to 
the issue(s) and each other, and to prioritize based on their relative usefulness for CPR use, 
management and governance. A list of criteria to analyze each identified stakeholder was 
selected by the participants. These are; modes of participation, rights and responsibilities, 
their interest (stake value) and influence (power level), engagement in the process of CPR 
use, management and governance, and their legitimacy to claim for engagement and 
influence decision making. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.6 the role played by stakeholder groups and the source of their 
power to influence the CPRs management and governance system is diverse among 
stakeholders and stakeholder groups. For instance governmental organizations (spanning 
from Federal to Kebele level) are usually responsible to oversight the natural resource use, 
management and governance, to enact legislations, developing policies and ensuring the 
enforcement and implementation of Federal and Regional laws. The relative power of these 
stakeholders to influence the natural resource management and governance system mostly 
esteems from the formal law.   
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Table 5.6: CPR use, management and governance stakeholder groups 
Stakeholder groups Mode of participation, rights and responsibilities Relative power/influence 
determined by 
Governmental organizations  Law makers and executives  Policy makers and planners  Line ministries and authorities  
 Enacting legislations (proclamations, regulations and 
directives)  Planning and implementation of sectoral policies  Managing development plans 
 Legal hierarchy ( chain of 
command and resource flow)  Authority of leadership (formal 
and informal, political 
affiliations)  Control of strategic resources 
(like finance, or land)  Trusted by the central 
government  
 Academic and research institutes  Regional Bureaus   Municipalities   Corporations   District offices and kebele level 
administrations   
 Enforcement of Federal and Regional laws  Oversight of natural resource use, management and 
governance   Monitoring and evaluation   Administration of natural resources 
Local Communities   Local farmers   Local fishermen  Commercial fishermen  Youths and Women   Negede woyto 
 Livelihood diversification and security  Economic development  Management of natural resources 
 Socio-economic and political 
status of stakeholders (i.e. Well-
off groups are more influential 
than the poor and voiceless)  Social capital and informal 
influences within their group 
Private (investors and enterprises)  Transport enterprises  Market enterprises and Investors  Boat owners 
 Profit maximization   Enclosure of commons  Their financial capital  Political affiliations 
  
Non-Governmental Organizations   EWNRA  EOTC 
 Environmental protection and conservation  Public awareness creation and education  Capacity building (both for community members and 
experts)  Promote and encourage stakeholders participation and 
collaboration 
 programme compatibility with 
the Government plan and 
agenda  Their financial capital  Knowledge and expertise 
International Communities  FAO, GEF, RAMSAR, UNESCO  Technical and financial support  Compliance with international agreement and responses  Promoting policy improvement at national and 
international level 
 Their financial capital  Knowledge and expertise   Political capital (their 
recognition worldwide)  
Source: The outcome of the stakeholder identification and analysis workshop, 2011 
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5.4.3 Stakeholders’ participation in CPR management and governance  
 
 
Bottom up and inclusive stakeholder approaches for CPR use, management and governance 
are likely to enhance the credibility of the decision making process at different levels. Higher 
levels of stakeholder involvement usually imply that participants will have the opportunity to 
communicate their views, agendas and judgments in detail (OECD, 2004) so that there will 
be a consensus and common vision on CPR use, management and the governance decision 
making process. In reality however, most decisions regarding resource use, management and 
governance in Ethiopia emanate from above in a top down manner. In most cases natural 
resource policy makers followed a centralized approach in policy planning and development 
process. Relevant stakeholders were merely informed about any new policies, strategies but 
never engaged in its development and implementations. More often such policies and 
strategies failed to address real problems at grass root level and were at times in conflict with 
stakeholders’ interest.   
 
The stakeholder identification and analysis (see Table 5.7) clearly shows that there is low 
level of stakeholder involvement in key aspects of the CPR use, management and 
governance processes. From 23 stakeholders identified in the analysis, only 8 of them were 
participating in all forms of involvement (information, consultation, decision making and as 
a co-partner) in one way or another. Moreover, only few (less than 4) government-affiliated 
key stakeholders are active in all forms of involvements, particularly in decision making 
which needs power to persuade others (see Table 5.7). This clearly shows that government 
affiliated stakeholders spanning from the Federal to kebele level are more dominant in any 
key decision regarding resource use, management and governance. Whereas the majority of 
stakeholders identified are not fully involved in CPR use, management and governance 
processes. Particularly the participation of local users (local community, fishers, youth’s 
groups and women’s groups) who are supposed to be active participants in any decision 
regarding their commons are not well engaged in the process. 
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According to workshop participants stakeholders’ involvement is fundamental to effectively 
use, manage and govern CPRs in the region. They also assert that it is important to recognize 
the roles that can be played by potential stakeholders and appreciate the extent to which 
different perspectives are valued within the CPR use, management and governance process. 
However, in the absence of strong political will and inefficiency of executive organs of the 
government at different level (particularly at regional and district levels), the key challenge 
for the CPR governance system is how to integrate the different perspectives, and at which 
stage different types of stakeholders can play roles and the ways that each might be involved.                        
132 
 
Table 5.7: Stakeholders’ involvement in CPR use, management and governance  
Stakeholders Forms of involvement 
Information Consultation Decision 
making 
As a coordination 
partner13 
As cooperation 
partner 14 
As co-production 
partner15 
Bureau of Environmental Protection XX XX XX XX XX XX 
Bureau of Agriculture  XX XX XX XX XX XX 
Bureau of Water and Energy XX XX XX XX XX XX 
Administration (Local-Federal) XX X XX XX XX XX 
Local community X - - - X X 
Academic  and Research Institute  X X X - XX XX X 
Institute of Biodiversity   XX XX - XX XX XX 
Fishers X - - - - - 
Abbay Basin Authority X XX X XX XX XX 
International  Organization XX XX - XX X X 
Ethiopian Orthodox. Tewahido  Church X - - X X - 
Civic Societies X XX - X X X 
Ethio.Wild Life Conservation Authority X X - XX X X 
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation X X X X X X 
Investment  Bureau XX X X XX X X 
Youth’s group X - - - - - 
Women’s group X - - - - - 
Fish Prod. and Market. Enterprise X - - - -  
Bureau of Tourism and Culture X X - - X X 
Lake Tana Transport Enterprise X - - - - - 
Municipality XX XX X X X X 
Boat owners X - - - - - 
Private Investors  X - - - - - 
Source: The outcome of the stakeholder identification and analysis workshop, 2011 
X- Passive,    XX-Active, -, no or very minimal participation
                                                 
13
 Symmetrical exchange of information about intentions and plans  
14
 Continual exchange of information and use of complementary resources 
15
 Continual exchange of information and pooling of resources to achieve an agreed objective 
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5.4.4 The power and interests of stakeholders     
 
Policy analysts have long been aware of the importance of interest groups in the policy 
process, decision making procedures, and the need to characterize and categorize levels of 
interest and power which influence, and therefore impact on, particular policies (Brugha and 
Varvasvsky, 2000).  Power to influence policies or institutions stems from, the control of 
decisions with positive or negative effects. Stakeholder power can be understood as the 
extent to which stakeholders are able to persuade or coerce others into making decisions, and 
following certain courses of action. Power may derive from the nature of a stakeholder's 
organization, the political power of the leaders of the organization or their position in 
relation to other stakeholders (for example, line ministries which control budgets and other 
departments). Other forms of power may be more informal (for example, personal 
connections to ruling politicians) (IIED, 2005).  
  
According to Majchrzak (1984), the power of the stakeholders is explained by decision 
making, resources at hand, their ability to mobilize resources, and their accessibility to 
policy decision makers in relation to CPR use, management and governance.  It is the ability 
of the stakeholders to possess enough resources to make the outcomes they desire happen. 
Stakeholders exercise power based on physical, financial, and symbolic or social capital 
resources. Physical resources such as physical sanctions, forces and violence are ascribed as 
coercive power. Financial resources including material means, money, goods or services 
constitute useful power. Symbolic or social capital resources are normative symbols such as 
prestige, esteem and social symbols of acceptance (Mitchell et al. 1997). In CPR situations, 
interest can take many forms such as legal or moral rights, legal title, or ownership. The 
source of stakeholders’ interests may derive from a variety of reasons; livelihood 
dependence, cultural and historical association, economic interest, institutional mandate, 
social obligations, value commitment and political interest are among the most important. 
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Although all the powers and responsibilities to administer and govern all land based natural 
resources are vested to the Federal and Regional governments, the lions share goes to the 
Federal government and its line ministries and subsidiary administrative bodies at different 
level. And yet, other stakeholders that have an interest in and power over CPR management 
and governance were identified.  
 
As indicated in Table 5.8, a high score on both variables (stake value and power level) will 
make specific stakeholders a clear candidate for becoming involved in the natural resource 
governance decision-making process. Such stakeholders are likely to be the first to be 
consulted or represented. Variance in score among stakeholder groups may determine their 
relative influence and their formal status within the governing system. A low score on one 
attribute may be compensated by a high score on others. Thus, stakeholders may have less 
stake value and/or legitimate concerns, yet still enjoy a powerful governing position. Such a 
situation might easily challenge the participatory process and question the design of the 
governing system (Jentoft, 2007).  
 
The stake-value-power analysis reveals that stakeholders that have higher levels of stake and 
high power to secure their stake (e.g. the Bureau of Agriculture) are likely have an extreme 
impact on the management and governance of the CPR system. However, even when a 
stakeholder places a high value on their stake in a CPR management and governance system 
(whether positive or negative) but has a low power level to secure the stake in the resource 
the system may not serve their interests. (e.g. Youth’s group, see Table 5.8). Conversely, a 
more influential stakeholder with perhaps only a moderate interest in a particular outcome 
may still have greater power to secure this outcome (e.g. Institute of Biodiversity 
Conservation and Research, see Table 5.8). 
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Table 5.8: Stakeholder analysis of CPR management and governance 
Source: The outcome of the stakeholder identification and analysis workshop, 2011 
Note: Stake value ranges from 1 up to 5 and power level from 1 up to 6 were assigned for each stakeholder and the value of the stake to the stakeholder was multiplied by  
         the power  to take action, the result is an indication of the stakeholder’s likely impact on the common-pool resource  management and governance. The + and – sign   
         indicates whether the stakeholder affects the CPR system positively, negatively or both. 
 
         Stake Value -Critical=5, Essential=4, Necessary=3, Desirable=2, Non-essential=1                                                                                                                            
         Power level – Control-complete= 6, Very significant=5, Influence-significant=4, Moderate=3, Low=2, Appreciation-lowest=1                  
                                                 
16
  Administration- includes Federal and State representatives (such as Amhara Regional State Council, President office, Zone, district, kebele    
                              administrations, police, judiciary) excluding sector organizations  
No Stakeholder Nature of the stake Stake 
value 
Power 
level 
Total Impact on 
CPRs 
1 Bureau of Agriculture (BoA)                        Regulation/Administrative 5(+,-) 6 30 Higher 
2 Bureau of Water and Energy(BoWE)                                                       Regulation/Administrative 5(+,-) 5 25 Higher 
3 Administration16 (Local to Federal) Regulation/Administrative 4(+,-) 6 24 Higher 
4 Bureau of Env. Prot. Land Use and Administration (Bo-EPLUA)          Regulation/Administrative 5(+,-) 4 20 Higher 
5 Local Community                                                                       Livelihood/Cultural value 5(+,-) 3 15 Medium 
6 Fishers Livelihood/Cultural value 5(+,-) 3 15 Medium 
7 Academic and Research Institute Knowledge generation and transfer   3(+) 5 15 Medium 
8 Ethiopian Wild Life Dev. and Conservation Authority (EWDCA) Regulation/Administrative 3(+) 5 15 Medium 
9 Institute of Biodiversity Conservation and Research (IBCR) Conservation and protection 3(+) 4 12 Medium 
10 Abbay Basin Authority Regulation/Administrative 3(+,-) 4 12 Medium 
11 International Organization (FAO, UNESCO, RAMSAR etc)  Cultural Values and Conservation  3(+) 4 12 Medium 
12 Investment Bureau Regulation, Administrative 3(-) 4 12 Medium 
13 Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo)   Public Service/profit maximization  4 (-,+) 3 12 Medium 
14 Youth’s group Livelihood/Cultural value 5(+,-) 2 10 Medium 
15 Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church (EOTC) Livelihood/Religious value 3(+) 3 9 Low 
16 Fish Production and Marketing Enterprise (FPME) Economic/Profit  maximization 4(-,+) 2 8 Low 
17 Private Investors Economic/Profit  maximization 4(-) 2 8 Low 
18 Boat Owners Livelihood/Profit  maximization 4(+,-) 2 8 Low 
19 Lake Tana Transport Enterprise Economic/Profit  maximization 2(+,-) 3 6 Low 
20 Municipality  Administrative  3(-) 2 6 Low 
21 Civil Societies and Local NGOs Non-profit making 3(+) 2 6 Low 
22 Women’s group Livelihood/Cultural value 5(+,-) 1 5 Low 
23 Bureau of Tourism and Culture Administrative/Cultural value 2(+,-) 2 4 Low 
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Even though they possess high interest in and low power on CPR governance, local 
communities and fishers residing near to Lake Tana, who have the de jure and de facto rights 
or claims over using and managing the CPRs are the most important stakeholders in the 
resource system. Their interests in CPRs are mostly driven by economic incentives or 
livelihood security. Under the power vested on the 1995 Constitution of Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), Article 40(3) all ‘Ethiopian people and the State have exclusive 
right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, presumably 
including CPRs’.  
 
Therefore, their customary and ownership rights also help them to own and/or access these 
resources. According to key informants and group discussants however, they often have 
limited rights to use CPRs. Where they have gained ownership or secure access, they may be 
hampered by corrupted kebele and district administrators who are using CPRs for their self-
interest, inadequate levels of public investment, inappropriate policies, or competition from 
greedy private investors unrestrained by rules and regulation. In some cases, government 
agencies and other powerful interests like private investors often claim exclusive access to 
these resources and their benefits. 
 
Some stakeholders are interested because of administrative and social obligations to manage 
and govern the natural resource system. Power to take action and secure the outcomes could be 
vested politically or as a result of their social/financial capital. For example, the Bureau of 
Agriculture (BoA) has been vested a power by Federal government under Proclamation No. 
110/2007 and by Council of Amhara National Regional State to conserve fish biodiversity and 
its environment, cultivate fisheries resource with appropriate fishing equipment as well as 
prevent and control over exploitation of the fisheries resource.  
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The Amhara National Regional State, Fisheries Resource Development, Protection and 
Utilization Proclamation enforcement, Regulation No, 50/2007 Article 3 sub article 4 states 
that: 
‘The Bureau may particularly or fully cause the activity of fish production be terminated, 
as deemed necessary, at any water body whenever it believes that the potential of the 
fishery’s resource may be disturbed and thereby be extinct, the area is ascertained to be 
that of delivery and reproduction, especially during breeding seasons, or where there 
happens to be a dwindling of the species of fish thereof’. 
 
Generally at Federal level, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has both development and 
natural resource management responsibilities (vested under Proclamation No. 380/2004). 
Relating to natural resources management, MoA has the responsibility to prepare policy on 
land use and draft legislation on forestry and wildlife. Bureau of Agriculture is the key natural 
resource management institution at regional level, responsible for the management of land, 
forest, wildlife and biodiversity resources (Proclamation No. 110/2007). However in reality 
BoA is mainly focusing on crop production and promoting cultivation of more lands including 
wetlands which are important components for the fish reproduction and the kidney for the 
health of water bodies like Lake Tana.  
 
Conversely, international stakeholders such as FAO and UNESCO can affect CPR 
management and governance through their interests in issues like ecosystem and biodiversity 
conservation. Basically their power over CPRs is driven by their financial capital, international 
agreements and conventions that individual countries have ratified. 
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5.4.5 Classification of stakeholders  
 
Following Eden and Ackermann, (1998); De Lopez, (2001) cited in Reed et al. (2009) based 
on their power and interests, stakeholders who have the stake on the CPRs in and around Lake 
Tana ecosystem were classified into ‘Key players’, ‘Context setters’, ‘Subjects’ and ‘Crowd’. 
‘Key players’ are stakeholders who should be actively organized and engaged in key decisions, 
because they have high interest in and power over CPR management and governance. ‘Context 
setters’ are highly influential (powerful), but have little interest. Because of this, they may be a 
significant risk, and should be monitored and managed. ‘Subjects’ have high interest on 
resource use but low influence on management and governance decision making. By definition 
they are supportive; they lack the capacity to affect the resource governance system 
significantly, although they may become influential by forming alliances with other 
stakeholders. These are often the marginal stakeholders that development initiatives seek to 
empower. The ‘Crowds’ are stakeholders who have little interest in or influence over desired 
outcomes and there is little need to consider them in much detail or to engage with them in key 
decision making. However, precaution should be taken not to ignore their interests.  
 
Stakeholders can enter into and out of the system at different points in time, therefore interest 
and influence typically change over time and the impact of such change can be considered. 
The purposes of this classification are: to reveal the interests and influence of the stakeholders, 
to understand synergies and conflicts between the stakeholders, their demand for Lake Tana 
ecosystem functions and services delivered by CPRs. However, interest and power are not 
static, and as stakeholders change position, tensions arise when key players have conflicting 
interests (Reed et al. 2009).  
   
Stakeholders appearing in the key player’s category (Figure 5.2) have a high degree of 
influence/power on the management and governance of CPR systems and environmental 
decision-making processes, which are also of high importance/interest for the success or 
failure of technological and institutional innovations induced and/or created by government 
agencies, user groups and community members. This implies that natural resource 
management program and policy implementing organizations will need to construct good 
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working relationships with these stakeholders, to ensure an effective coalition of support for 
the resource management and governance. These are the stakeholders the resource governance 
system must fully engage and make the greatest efforts to understand and address their 
concerns.  
 
Stakeholders in the subject’s category are of higher stake value/importance to the success of 
the management and governance of the CPR system and environmental decision-making 
processes, but with low influence/power to take action. This entails that they will require 
particular initiatives if their interests are to be restricted. Despite their low power, such 
stakeholders could be valuable allies in important decisions regarding CPRs. Therefore, it is 
advisable to keep them informed about the issues they are interested in. The governance 
system should keep these people adequately informed, and talk to them to ensure that no major 
issues arise (De Colle, 2005). An example may be traditionally marginalized groups (e.g. 
Indigenous people like the Negede woyto community, youth’s group, and women’s groups), 
who might be solely dependent upon the resource system for their livelihood and beneficiaries 
of a new service, but who have little ‘voice’ in its development.  
 
Context setters are stakeholders with high influence/power, who can therefore affect the 
management and governance of CPR systems and environmental decision-making processes 
and outcomes, but whose interest/stake value is not necessarily aligned with the overall goals 
of the environmental decision-making processes. In a multiple use-multi-stakeholder scenarios 
of resource management and governance, the relationships with these stakeholders can be very 
complex to manage. Most of the time, they behave passively and show a low interest in key 
management and governance decisions. It is therefore necessary to analyse potential intentions 
and reactions of these groups in all major developments, and to involve them according to 
their interests (De Colle, 2005). They might be international organizations such as FAO, 
UNESCO, who can exercise considerable impact over funding disbursements and 
governmental organizations such as research and academic institutions who can exert valuable 
impact on the CPRs through their intellectual excellence. This conclusion implies that these 
stakeholders may be a source of significant risk in terms of financing environmental 
governance programmes and backing technical expertise, and they will need careful 
monitoring and management.  
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The stakeholders in the Crowd, with low power/influence on, or importance/stake value to the 
management and governance of the CPR system, may require limited monitoring or 
evaluation, but are of low priority. However it is advisable to monitor these stakeholder groups 
as they ability to influence and their interest could increase overtime (De Colle, 2005). 
 
As Bryson (2004) pointed out power versus interest grids (see Figure 5.2) typically help 
determine which players' interests and power bases must be taken into account in order to 
address the problem or issue at hand (in this case CPR use, management and governance 
issues in and around Lake Tana sub-basin). Therefore the interest-influence grid clearly shows 
that governmental organizations such as the Bureau of Agriculture, the Bureau of Water 
resource, the Bureau of Environmental Protection Land Use and Administration, and 
Administrations at different levels are key players with high power to secure their stake and 
have a significant impact on CPR use, management and governance issues in the sub-basin.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Interest-influence matrix of stakeholders  
                  P-     stands for power level,      
I- stands for interest level 
                 Source: Stakeholder identification and Analysis Workshop, 2011 
 
Crowd 
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5.4.6 The legitimacy of stakeholders  
 
Legitimacy in this research refers to the perceived validity of the stakeholders’ claim to a stake 
in CPR management and governance in the Lake Tana sub-basin. Based on the mandate and 
responsibilities given by the Law of the Land (The Ethiopian Constitution), international 
treaties and customary laws of specific communities in the jurisdiction of Lake Tana sub-
basin, stakeholders’ legitimacy with regard to CPR management and governance were 
assessed and evaluated against criteria. During the stakeholder identification and analysis 
workshop, parameters that denote the legitimacy of a stakeholder or stakeholder groups were 
derived. However, this assessment is subject to the qualification that under complex and very 
dynamic systems, stakeholders’ legitimacy may  changed at any point in time, so that the 
current assessment is only representing the existing scenario.    
 
Though based on the subjective evaluation of stakeholder identification and analysis workshop 
participants, the analysis reveals that Bureau of Environmental Protection Land Use and 
Administration, Bureau of Agriculture, Bureau of Water and Energy, Administration (from 
Federal to local level) and the local community had a particularly strong and legitimate claim 
to use, manage and govern the CPRs in Lake Tana sub-basin, because they ranked high on all 
the criteria, and totaled the highest score (see Table 5.9). This analysis can be particularly 
useful in the CPR management and governance planning process, especially as a way to 
convince other stakeholders that the legitimacy of these stakeholders has to be respected and 
integrated into the management and governance system. At the same time, these stakeholders 
are responsible for and accountable to the overall success and/or failure of the management 
and governance system of the study area. 
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Table 5.9: Stakeholders’ legitimacy to manage and govern CPRs 
 Criteria Score/Rank 
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Rank 
Bureau of Environmental Protection 4 3 5 5 5 3 4 4(+) 33 1st 
Bureau of Agriculture  5 4 4 3 3 3 3 5(+,-) 30 2nd  
Bureau of Water and Energy 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 5(+,-) 29 3rd  
Administration (Local-Federal) 5 3 3 2 4 3 4 4(+,-) 28 4th  
Local community 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 5(+,-) 28 4th 
Academic  and Research Institute  2 3 4 4 4 2 4 4(+) 27 6th  
Institute of Biodiversity   3 3 4 3 4 4 3 3(+) 27 6th 
Fishers 5 5 3 2 1 2 3 5(+,-) 26 8th  
Abbay Basin Authority 5 3 4 3 2 2 2 4(+,-) 25 9th  
International  Organization 2 1 5 4 4 3 3 3(+) 25 9th 
Ethiopian Orthodox. Tewahido  Church 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3(+) 24 11th 
Civic Societies 1 1 4 3 4 3 4 3(+) 23 12th  
Ethio.Wild Life Conservation Authority 2 1 4 4 3 2 3 3(+) 22 13th  
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 4(-,+) 21 14th  
Investment  Bureau 3 3 4 2 1 1 2 5(-) 21 14th  
Youth’s group 4 3 2 2 2 1 2 4(+,-) 20 16th 
Women’s group 4 3 2 2 2 1 2 3(+,-) 19 17th  
Fish Prod. and Market. Enterprise 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 3(+,-) 18 18th  
Bureau of Tourism and Culture 3 2 2 1 3 1 3 2(+) 17 19th  
Lake Tana Transport Enterprise 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 4(+,-) 16 20th  
Municipality 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3(-) 15 21st   
Boat owners 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3(+,-) 14 22nd  
Private Investors  1 1 1 2 1 1 1 5(-) 13 23rd  
Source: The outcome of the stakeholder identification and analysis workshop, 2011 
Note: Their right and responsibilities are evaluated as; 5=very high    4=high    3=Medium    2=Low   1=Very low 
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5.5   Chapter summary   
 
In summary, the outcome of the research questions reveals that communities residing around 
Lake Tana sub-basin derive their livelihood from agriculture particularly crop production. 
The majority is engaged in farming to secure their livelihood and is heavily dependent 
directly or indirectly on CPRs. However, CPRs are under severe threat in the study area. 
Access and availability of basic CPRs has been declining leaving the wider community 
vulnerable to resource scarcity and seasonal shocks. Development activities around Lake 
Tana, population pressure, agricultural intensification (crop land expansion at the expense of 
grazing/wetland), livelihood diversification, unclear property rights and ineffective often 
irresponsible resource governance system at the user level are considered as the major 
factors that affect the CPR management and governance. 
 
When the multi-purpose values of the whole Lake Tana sub-basin are considered, there are 
multiple stakeholders with diverse interest in and power over CPR use, management and 
governance. There are conflicts arising from different stakeholders exploiting the lake 
basin’s resources for various goals. Multiple use value of resources by different stakeholders 
often with divergent interest in and power over these resources has resulted in multi-
dimensional conflicting scenarios. In case of conflict over resources, the drivers of change 
(such as population pressure, uncontrolled resource use pattern and unclear property rights), 
lengthy and costly legal procedures coupled with weak executive powers of the judiciary 
further aggravate the CPR situation in Lake Tana sub-basin. 
 
Generally, the interaction of stakeholders in the process of resource use, management and 
governance is characterized by low or insufficient stakeholder participation in key decisions 
regarding CPRs. There are insufficient policy forums that facilitate collaboration, linkage 
and policy dialogue among relevant stakeholders at different levels. In most cases lack of 
joint policy planning and implementation lead to conflict of interest among stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
6. THE GOVERNING SYSTEM: ‘INSTITUTIONS’ AND THE GOVERNORS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the overall natural resource governance system of Ethiopia at 
different levels of hierarchy, namely the constitutional, collective and operational level. 
Governance is widely used to cover institutions, instruments and processes ranging from 
short term operational management to long term policy development and planning and from 
conventional forms of administration to modern forms of participative decision-making 
processes (FAO, 2005-2012). The governance system on the other hand refers to the totality 
of institutional arrangements, policy frameworks, stakeholders involved and the process of 
governance which deals with the diversity, complexity, dynamics and the varying scales of 
actions.  
 
The common-pool resource governance system in this research context refers to the range of 
political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to control and 
regulate CPR use, development and management at different scales (Federal, Regional and 
Local/user level). Therefore, understanding the governing system which comprises the 
governors and the rules in use is a key component of the identification and analysis of CPR 
governance problems and gaps discussed in the subsequent chapters which ultimately help to 
devise effective policy interventions.  
 
This chapter will answer the question of what are the existing institutional arrangements 
governing natural resources in general and CPRs in particular. It addresses the 
‘Institutions/Rules-in-use and Rules in form’ of the conceptual framework indicated in 
section 2.6 Figure 2.1. The data analysis and interpretations discussed in this chapter are 
derived mainly from secondary sources particularly documentary analysis of policy 
documents, national and international legislations. The documentary analysis is also 
supplemented by focus group discussions, household survey and stakeholder identification 
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and analysis. The chapter has three substantive sections, the first of which begins by 
describing instruments of the governance system. The objective of this section is to depict 
the overall natural resource management and governance framework in Ethiopia. The second 
section presents key governing actors involved at different levels who have legitimate stake 
and power over the management and governance of natural resources.  The third section 
highlights the modes of CPR management and governance and property rights issues in Lake 
Tana sub-basin. 
6.2 Instruments of the governance system: Institutions-in-use to govern CPRs 
 
 
Instruments link the governance system to the action where rules and regulations are applied. 
The range of instruments available to influence societal interactions is extremely wide 
(Kooiman et al. 2008). It ranges from peer pressure at individual levels in the community to 
the legal procedures at higher levels of governance. In the Ethiopian natural resource 
governance context, instruments are basically originated from the formal legal hierarchy and 
customary laws at the grass roots level.  
 
The documentary analysis reveals that policies, legal and institutional frameworks shaping 
the Ethiopian natural resource management and governance system are the main instruments 
to govern multiple often divergent interests of stakeholders. The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia Constitution (herein after called FDRE Constitution) is the supreme 
law of the land that governs all laws in Ethiopia. As a result, a number of proclamations, 
supporting regulations and policies have been made that contain provisions for the 
protection, management and governance of natural resources and the environment which 
reflect the principles of the constitution. A substantial body of policies and policy 
instruments are already in place with a direct or potential bearing on natural resource 
governance, watershed management and environment. Federal and State laws are the sources 
of almost all Ethiopian formal law from which other subsidiary laws are derived. Though 
they are considered as equal, practically Federal laws are more dominant and win over the 
State laws. In most cases State laws are derived based on the Federal laws. The Federal level 
has legislative power while the States are in charge of implementing laws, regulations and 
directives.   
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Figure 6.1: Sources of Ethiopian Law: own presentation  
 
6.2.1 The FDRE constitution (1995) 
 
The FDRE constitution was ratified in Addis Ababa by Constitutional Assembly on the 8th of 
December 1994, and took effect on 21st of August 1995. One of the fundamental principles 
of the constitution states that, the FDRE Constitution is the supreme law of the land, from 
which all Laws of the country derive their legal validity from the Constitution. The FDRE 
Constitution contains 106 provisions 29 of which are dedicated to the recognition of the 
fundamental political, economic, social, and cultural rights of citizens. It has primacy over 
all Federal as well as State laws. Article 9(1) of the FDRE Constitution proclaims that any 
law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state or public official, which 
contravenes the Constitution, shall have no effect.  
 
At the Federal level, international agreements and proclamations have the same status as 
they are issued by the Federal legislature. These are followed by Decrees, Regulations and 
Directives respectively. When a Decree is adopted by the House of Peoples Representatives 
(HPRs), it becomes a proclamation. The same order applies to State laws (Girmachew, 
2010). The FDRE Constitution has several provisions which have direct policy, legal and 
institutional significance for the management and governance of the natural resources of the 
country.  
State Laws Federal Laws 
International 
treaties 
Federal Decrees, 
Regulations and Directives 
State 
Constitutions 
State Decrees, Regulations 
and Directives 
Codified Laws 
and Statutes 
State 
Proclamations FDRE Constitution 
 
Ethiopian Law 
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The FDRE constitution further defines the powers and functions of the Federal government 
and Regional states respectively with respect to the country's resources management and 
administration. Accordingly, it is the Federal government that has the mandate to enact laws 
for the utilization and conservation of land and other natural resources including water, fish 
and wetland resources of the country (Article 51/5) while the Regional states have the 
mandate to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws 
(Article 52/2/d). This implies that Regional States have to abide by the laws of the Federal 
government in administering and managing the natural resources within their region. The 
Constitution specifies that the Federal government shall determine and administer the 
utilization of the waters or rivers or lakes linking two or more Regional states or crossing the 
boundaries of the national territorial jurisdiction (Article 51/11)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Hierarchy of the Ethiopian Law: own presentation 
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6.2.2 International legal instruments: Treaties, conventions and protocols 
 
The supremacy of the constitution as a fundamental principle states that all international 
agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land (Article 9/4). 
Therefore, Ethiopia has ratified and become a party to many of the environmental, 
biodiversity conservation, cultural and natural heritage, and related conventions and 
protocols to govern the global commons (see Appendix 3). All these treaties, conventions 
and protocols are non-self executing and frequently require the development of Federal 
legislations for implementation. Once ratified these instruments will be automatically parts 
of the country’s legal system. Though these arrangements have their own impact on the 
country’s environmental legislation and policy making process, the implementation process 
requires strong political will, commitment and devotion of multi-stakeholders.  
 
6.2.3 Natural resource related policies, proclamations, and regulations   
 
 
In this sub-section, the three pillars of Ethiopian natural resource policies, proclamations and 
regulations that have a fundamental impact on the overall land based resources are discussed. 
These pillars include land, water and environmental policies and their derivative 
proclamations and regulations. 
 
6.2.3.1 Land policy of Ethiopia 
 
 
Land and its associated resources (soils, water, forests, wetlands, fish etc) are not only the 
source of all wealth and life necessary for sustaining for human beings but also a crucial 
component of the governance system at all levels. Land and the administration of land have 
had a central and often contentious role in Ethiopia’s history. In many countries land 
ownership is not as such treated as a constitutional issue, but in Ethiopia, because of its 
socio-economic and political importance, land ownership goes beyond being a mere policy 
matter. Therefore, it is inserted in the FDRE Constitution and the issue of its ownership is 
considered as a completed subject (Ambaye, 2012). 
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 According to the FDRE Constitution, the right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well 
as all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the Ethiopian people (Article 
40(3), however, sale, exchange and mortgage of land are strongly prohibited. The FDRE 
Constitution (Article 40 (3 and 4) further states that, Ethiopian peasants and pastoralists have 
right to obtain free land for grazing and cultivation without payment and the protection 
against eviction from their possession. With regard to duration of rural land use right, the 
proclamation stipulates clearly that the rural land use right of peasant farmers, semi-
pastoralists and pastoralists has no time limit (Article 7/1/); whereas the duration of rural 
land use right of other holders (it is not clear who are these ‘other holders’) shall be 
determined by the rural land administration laws of regions (Article 7/2/).  
 
Conversely, the same proclamation stipulates that all holders of rural land could be evicted 
from their holding for the purpose of public use by Federal and Regional governments 
(Article 7/3/). The proclamation further states that land holders who will be evicted shall be 
given compensation proportional to the development he/she has made on the land and the 
property acquired or shall be given substitute land. In the name of development, all 
individual land holding with the exception of lease holding can be expropriated at any time 
the government needs.  
 
On one hand the Ethiopian government claims that the existing land policy that favors state 
ownership of land is the best mechanism to protect the peasants against market forces and is 
designed to protect the rural poor and land tillers from eviction by wealthy and urban elite. 
The government resists privatization because it fears that poor farmers will sell their lands 
and become landless. However, this land policy, the real source of power in imperial and 
contemporary Ethiopia, still remains at the center of a controversial policy debate (Crewett et 
al. 2008) among scholars, international organizations and opposition activists. They strongly 
argue that the absence of tenure security for land users provides little or no incentive to 
improve land productivity through long term investment; increases transaction costs because 
of land disputes; and hinders the emergence of a property market such as credit 
availability/land mortgage. They also fear that government may use land as a political 
weapon by giving and taking it away from holders (Ambaye, 2012). 
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There are national, regional and international studies (see for example Bezabeh et al. 2011; 
Fenske, 2011; Deininger et al. 2008; Deininger and Jin, 2006; Smith, 2004) that show 
insecurity of land tenure restricts rights in land, reduces incentives to productively invest in 
land, and limits transferability of land that ultimately poses significant constraints to 
agricultural growth and natural resource management. Land that is secure and easily 
transferable have long been identified as a key element to bring about higher levels of 
investment and access to credit, facilitate reallocation of production factors to maximize 
efficiency in resource use, and allow economic diversification and growth (Deininger and 
Jin, 2006). Since the 1990s the Ethiopian government has begun land registration and 
certification to provide tenure security to farmers and the government assumes that this 
certification may improve the holders’ perception of their holding right. This was launched 
at pilot level in a limited number of localities and has since been turned into a major program 
undertaken at an accelerated rate throughout the country.  
 
In recent times, however there are concerns and fears that the current land lease policy of the 
Federal government could go beyond the rights of local farmers in different Regions. As 
Butler (2010) reported, environmentalists and opposition activists claim that the current land 
grabbing by foreign investors from China, India and Saudi Arabia and local private investors 
has resulted in the displacement of local farmers from their ancestral land holding. 
Indigenous people are denied their rights to use and regulate access to their resources, to 
exercise their customary laws and to control decision making concerning their future. A 
number of arrests and killing of local farmers who opposed the grabbing were also reported 
in different Regions. Those who opposed the grabbing are often treated as ‘anti-
development’. On the other hand, the government stipulated that the land lease policy is 
aiming at lifting local people out of deprivation and that foreign investors will have to satisfy 
domestic food needs before they can export. 
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Federal and Regional land proclamations  
The Federal government enacted a Rural Land Administration and Use proclamation (Proc. 
No. 87/1997) that replaces the proclamation enacted by Derg in 1975 (Proc. No. 31/1975). 
After eight years, Proclamation No. 87/1997 was again repealed and replaced by a new 
Federal Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation (proc. 456/2005) in 2005. The 
new Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation acknowledges the right to hold and 
use rural land for peasant farmers, pastoralists who are engaged in agriculture, women and 
any citizens of country who are 18 years of age and above and want to engage in agriculture 
(Article 5(1)). By giving priority to peasant farmers/semi-pastoralists and pastoralists, 
private investors that engage in agricultural development activities have the right to use rural 
land in accordance with the Federal and Regional investment policies and laws (Article 5 (4-
a)). It further states that, Government and Non-Government organizations, social and 
economic institutions have the right to use rural land in line with their development 
objectives (Article 5 (4-b)). 
 
This proclamation entrusted Regional states with the power to ‘enact rural land 
administration and land use law’ consisting of detailed provisions necessary to implement 
this Proclamation (Proc. 456/2005) in order to implement the land administration law on 
Regional level (Article 17). Accordingly, the Amhara National Regional State Council 
enacted the Revised Regional Land Administration and Use Proclamation No.133/2006, by 
repealing and replacing the previous Rural Land Administration and Usage Determination 
Proclamation No. 46/2000. Like the Federal Rural Land Administration and Use 
proclamation, the ANRS revised proclamation confirms the principle of public ownership of 
land and State dominance, prohibiting its sale and mortgage. The rural land holder has the 
right to use the land but can also bequeath it and give it to dependants. Parcels may also be 
exchanged. Further land can be rented for up to 25 years and the contracts can be renewed. 
This provision is in practice used more or less as a transfer of the user right. Finally the right 
to land is dependent on residency in a rural area and engagement in agricultural pursuits. 
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6.2.3.2 Ethiopian Water Resources Management Policy (1999) 
 
Ethiopia is considered as a water tower of the Horn of Africa. The country is endowed with a 
substantial amount of water resource. It has 12 river basins with an annual runoff volume of 
122 billion m3 of water and an estimated 2.6 -6.5 billion m3 of ground water potential, which 
makes an average of 1575 m3 of physically available water per person per year, a relatively 
large volume. However, due to lack of water storage infrastructure and large spatial and 
temporal variation in rainfall, there is not enough water for most farmers to produce more 
than one crop per year (Awulachew et al. 2007). According to World Bank (2006) report the 
irrigation potential of Ethiopia is estimated to be 3.7 million hectares. However, less than 5% 
(approximately 200, 000 hectares) is currently under irrigation.  
 
A comprehensive and integrated Water Resource Management Policy was issued in June 
1999 (MoWR, 1999) and adopted in 2000. As with any policy, it is essentially an instrument 
for achieving the intended goals and objectives in a given sector. The policy recognizes that 
it is based on the constitutional provisions for water resources management and the overall 
macro-economic, social policies and development policies of Ethiopia. The Policy further 
declares that water is a common property of all Ethiopians.  
 
Some of the guiding principles are: i) recognition of water as a scarce and vital socio-
economic resource to be managed and planned strategically; ii) recognition of water as an 
economic good; iii) stakeholders to be involved in water resources management. Ethiopian 
Water Resources Management Policy states that water development should be based on rural 
centered, decentralized management and participatory approaches, through the participation 
of user communities and support for community’s own initiatives in water resources 
management. It also mandates community participation, as feasible, in the development and 
management of dams and reservoirs.  
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The Ethiopian Water Resources Management Proclamation No. 197/2000 
 
The Ethiopian Water Resources Management Proclamation No. 197/2000 was issued to put 
the water resources of Ethiopia to the highest social and economic benefit for its people 
through appropriate protection and due management. The proclamation is currently the basic 
legal instrument governing the management, planning, utilization and protection of water 
resources in the country. The purpose of the proclamation is to ensure that the water 
resources of the country are protected and utilized for the highest social and economic 
benefits of the people of Ethiopia, to follow up and supervise that they are duly conserved, 
ensure that harmful effects of water are prevented, and that the management of water 
resources is carried out properly (Article 3).  
 
The Federal government has also been given the mandate to delegate its powers and 
responsibilities to Regional states or other bodies for the proper management of the water 
resources of the country. Accordingly, the ANRS has issued a Regional water resources 
policy. A draft regulation for the management of water resources has also already been 
prepared by the Region. By and large, both the water resources policy and draft regulations 
for water resources management of the Regional state are in line with and similar in their 
content to those issued by the Federal government. This proclamation also defined the 
responsibilities and powers of the ministry and defined water permit and dispute resolution 
guidelines. MoWE is clearly identified as the supervising body in charge of enforcing the 
provisions of the proclamation. It is entrusted with broad powers of planning, management, 
utilization administration and protection of water resources. It shall also have the necessary 
power for the execution of its duties under the provisions of this proclamation (Article 8/1). 
 
The basic thrust of this proclamation is that the social and economic development 
programmes, investment plans and programmes and water resource management, 
development and administration activity of any person shall be based on the country’s water 
resources policy, the relevant Basin Master Plan Studies (BMPs) and the Water Resources 
Laws of the country (Article 6/2). The proclamation also states that management of the water 
resources of Ethiopia shall be in accordance with a permit system (Article 6/4) and domestic 
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use shall have priority over and above any other water uses (Article 7/1). The proclamation 
vested access rights to utilize water resources without holding a permit issued by the 
supervising body (MoWE) for the following purposes; dig water wells by hand or use water 
from hand-dug wells, use water for traditional irrigation, artisanal mining and for traditional 
animal rearing, as well as for water mills (Article 12/1). However, without prejudice to these 
exceptions, no person shall perform any construction on waterworks, supply water, transfer 
water, release or discharge waste into a water resource without having obtained a permit 
from the supervising body (Article 11/1). 
 
Water Resources Management regulation No. 115/2005 
These regulations are issued by the Council of Ministers in March 2005 to enforce the water 
resource management proclamation No. 197/2000. The purpose of the regulation was to 
provide detailed and specific provisions for the effective implementation of the Water 
Resource Management Proclamation. The regulations contain a further elaboration of the 
proclamation providing in detail the main requirements for the issuance of permits for 
different uses of water and the conditions for the issuance, as well as the level of water 
charge and procedure for licensing water operators. The regulation further elucidated the 
application process for permit, issuance, duties of the Supervising Body, discharge of water 
after use, and conditions for termination, suspension transfer or variation of water use 
permit. It also provides for the payment of fees and water charges for use to the Supervising 
Body.  
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6.2.3.3 Ethiopian Environmental Policy (1997)  
 
 
The Environmental Policy of Ethiopia was issued in 1997 to provide overall guidance in the 
conservation and sustainable utilization of the country’s environmental resources in general. 
The overall objective of the environmental policy is to promote the sustainable social and 
economic development of the country through sustainable management and utilization of the 
natural resources of the country. Among the specific objectives the environmental policy 
seeks to achieve are ensuring the conservation, development and sustainable use of essential 
ecological processes and life support systems, biological diversity and renewable natural 
resources and the empowerment and participation of the people in environmental 
management. 
 
In the last two decades, Ethiopia has shown bold political will to ensure environmental 
sustainability goals of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to meet the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the needs of future generations.  Though there are 
inefficiencies in implementation at grass root level, Ethiopia has shown its commitment to 
ensure environmental sustainability by establishing environmental protection agencies at the 
Federal level and in all Regional states. Several proclamations, including environmental 
impact assessment proclamation, pollution control proclamation and others have been 
formulated and are being implemented. In addition, Ethiopia is party to various 
environmental protection and conservation conventions at international level. 
 
The Environmental Impacts Assessment Proclamation No. 299/2002 
The Environmental Impacts Assessment (Proc. 299/2002) is used to predict and manage the 
environmental effects of a proposed development activity as a result of its design sitting, 
construction, operation, or of an ongoing one as a result of its modification or termination, 
entails and thus helps to bring about intended development, to assess the possible impacts of 
projects and development activities on the environment prior to their approval and 
implementation.  
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As general provisions, the proclamation states that, without authorization from the 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) or from the relevant Regional Environmental 
Agency, no person shall commence implementation of any project or development activities 
that require environmental impact assessment as determined in a directive (Article 3/1). 
Further it states that any licensing agency shall, prior to issuing an investment permit or a 
trade or an operating license for any project; ensure that the Authority or the relevant 
Regional environmental agency has authorized its implementation (Article 3/3). The EPA is 
given the legal mandate to assess the impact of any project or program that may threaten the 
health of the water and the aquatic biodiversity. 
 
With regard to jurisdiction of responsibility, when the project is subject to licensing, 
execution or supervision by a Federal agency or when it is likely to produce trans-regional 
impact the Authority is responsible for the evaluation of environmental impact study report 
and the monitoring of its implementation(Article 14/1). However, if it is unlikely to produce 
trans-regional impact and the project is not subject to licensing, execution and supervision by 
a Federal agency, the Regional Environmental Agency in each region is responsible for 
evaluation and authorization or any environmental impact study report and the monitoring of 
its implementation (Article 14/2). The proclamation insists on active public participation in 
the process of environmental impact assessment. The Authority or relevant Regional 
Environmental Agency are supposed to ensure that the environmental impact study report is 
accessible to the public and the comments made by the public and in particular by the 
communities likely to be affected by the implementation of a project are incorporated into 
the environmental impact study report as well as in its evaluation (Article 15).    
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6.2.4 User level rules of procedures, bylaws and local convention for CPRs 
 
Local communities in the sub-basin depend to a great extent on CPRs such as water, fish and 
wetlands. In earlier days, these resources were managed and governed collectively by local 
groups. These groups used to define the resource boundaries, access and withdrawal rights to 
these resources. Local leaders selected by the community members prepared draft rules and 
regulations which were approved by the community members as bylaws for the use of CPRs. 
However, in recent times the top down resource governance structure covered up the 
potential roles that could have been played by the local bylaws.  
 
The user level arena is a playing field where formal laws and regulations, informal 
customary laws and multiple stakeholders interact to come up with certain resource 
governance outcomes. Local by-laws are one potential means of enhancing trust through the 
development and official sanctioning of collective choice rules (German et al. 2010). Local 
conventions operate at the social baseline more so than the formal bylaws. Their legitimacy 
is, therefore, recognized by the stakeholders, and, in terms of peaceful enforcement, only this 
legitimacy matters (Alinon and Kalinganire, 2008). Local bylaws can facilitate and 
strengthen partnerships between the natural resource governing bodies and local resource 
users, connect the decentralized bodies to their constituents at the local level. They can also 
result from local processes that fill an institutional vacuum created by the absence or 
weakness of Federal or State laws regarding local resource use (Markelova and Swallow, 
2008). 
 
Community bylaws governing Common-Pool Resources  
 
The failure of top-down approaches in the regulation and administration of natural resources 
has increased attention on the role of decentralized administrative structures, user groups, 
and customary governance institutions. And yet, community by-laws are at the core of many 
governance structures that frame the access, use, and conflict resolution around CPRs across 
Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa (Markelova and Swallow, 2008).  
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Community bylaws in this research context stand for the binding rules and regulations 
enacted by the local community as ‘local convention’ or with the support of decentralized 
authority like kebele administrators. These bylaws are designed by the community members 
for the community itself. These conventions are the bases to bind the local community 
members for the management and governance of their commons. The drivers of community 
bylaws to exist are the need for social and economic integration as with traditional systems 
such as ‘Equb’ and ‘Edir’, and the need to handle disputes and conflict over natural 
resources.   
 
The household survey and focus group discussion results suggested that, in the study area 
different community bylaws such as fishery management and utilization bylaws that regulate 
CPR management and governance exist.  But they are not as effective as they were in the 
past. Resource scarcity, population pressure and lack of support from the formal governance 
structure are considered as the main factors that affect community bylaws. As population 
increases, competition over resources increases and resource users were tempted to break 
their own bylaws. Ultimately, trust and traditional moral values of community members start 
to decline and these traditional moral values that used to be vital to bind the society together 
are on the verge of losing ground. 
 
In recent times, customary laws that were common to the rural community to protect natural 
resources are now challenged by greedy individuals and those who are trying to secure 
livelihoods (landless and youths). For instance, the common customary laws that were used 
in Lake Tana sub-basin include: 
  It was forbidden to cut a big tree in their locality (like Common Assembly Areas) 
which serves as a shade for community gathering and livestock. In some areas 
community members consider the trees as sacred,  It was not allowed to graze the wetlands and communal grazing fields during rainy 
season, 
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According to key informants, those who did not abide by the local bylaws were judged by 
the customary courts. These courts are not established by law, despite their constitutional 
recognition. They are only recognized, not created, by law. The authority of these courts 
stems from tradition and local customs. These courts have evolved from traditional elder 
councils, which do not have legal authority, but carry moral force and still operate widely as 
primary decision-makers in rural areas throughout Ethiopia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box2: Community bylaws for wetland protection 
 
Conflict has detrimental, negative and destructive powers, but conflict can also be a key 
driver of change. In some cases, the outcome of conflicting situation over the use of wetland 
resources urged the local users to establish bylaws to protect and conserve their sub-
watershed. For instance, community members in Takusa district, Chemhera kebele 
developed community bylaws that allowed them to become legal entities in the eyes of the 
kebele council. They realized that they could not manage these challenges on their own and 
looked to engage other stakeholders such as the kebele council. Then the kebele council (ye 
kebele mikir bet) approved the bylaws and had started using bylaws for them to protect their 
unwise use of wetlands. They enacted rules that regulate access and use of CPRs and 
guarantee their peaceful utilization in their sub-watershed.  As a result rules have been made 
when to use, how to use, how much to use and sanctions for rule breaking etc. For instance 
the new rules prohibit free grazing during summer season instead they introduced the cut and 
carry system to feed their animals.  The process however was not very short. The process of 
bylaws formulation started at kebele (sub-watershed) level. A committee elected by the 
community and representing different villages in the sub-watershed drafted the proposed 
bylaws and they were discussed by the community members. After the draft was agreed by 
the sub-watershed community, it was forwarded to the kebele council and administration. At 
the beginning, the kebele administrators were reluctant towards the formulation and approval 
of the bylaws but the community members were very keen to have their own rules to protect 
their commons. Though not yet approved by the district court, the community members are 
using the bylaws to govern their commons. Eventually, other communities of the 6 adjacent 
sub-watersheds adopted their neighboring sub-watershed bylaws. 
                                                                                                               Source: Author, 2011 
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In Lake Tana sub-basin, customary/traditional courts are known as ‘shimgilina’ or ‘Ye 
akababi Dagna’. Community elders (locally called ‘Ye ager shimagiles’) are assigned to 
judge the cases within the community.  Mainly they are involved in conflict resolution 
related to land and land based resource disputes, and other social disputes in their respective 
community.  However, the co-existence of two sets of norms, customary and legal, has 
influenced the development and refinement of community by-laws, some that had existed for 
centuries and others that have been recently established. In some localities, customary 
institutions were outright pushed aside, while others have been successful in harmonizing 
customary and statutory laws (Markelova and Swallow, 2008). 
 
However, as community elders of all sampled districts agreed, local conventions endorsed by 
the community members were challenged and not fully accepted by some members of the 
community (particularly youths) as they were before. The reasons are firstly, there was no or 
minimal support from the government to approve as soon as possible and support the local 
conventions. Kebele administrators and district officials considered those who were self-
motivated groups to conserve their commons and opposed development pressures on CPRs 
as anti-development. As a result some of the greedy individuals were using this gap as an 
advantage to misuse the CPRs. Secondly younger generations who are mostly landless were 
not willing to comply with the local convention assumed to be devised by community elders.  
 
As a result, they are in continuous dispute with the community members. They are claiming 
the wetlands and other protected areas for cultivation. Thirdly, the existing community 
organizations were too weak to exercise their collective leadership over their CPRs. Weak 
community organizations and bylaws mean that local people are not knowledgeable about 
their CPRs and their right and they lack the capacity to devise sound community bylaws and 
norms for managing their CPRs; this resulted in inability to control illegal encroachment of 
the valuable resources in their locality.  
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6.3 The Governors: The Legislature, Executive Agencies and Authorities   
 
 
The Ethiopian governance structure is organized into Federal, Regional, Zonal, 
Wereda/District and Kebele structures (see Figure 6.3). The FDRE Constitution established 
the Federal structure based on nine ethnic Regional States and two City Administrations 
(Article 47). The constitution also established two representative bodies for the Federal 
government, namely, the House of Peoples' Representatives (HPRs) and the House of 
Federation (HF). The House of Peoples' Representatives has legislative and oversight 
functions while the House of Federation has a constitutional role to safeguard the interests of 
the nations and nationalities of Ethiopia. The Federal state is responsible for all powers not 
delegated to or shared with the regions (Article 51). The regional governments are 
responsible for formulating and implementing economic, social and development policies 
and for maintaining public order, including administrating a police force (Article 52).  
 
The governance structures at the Region, Zone, Wereda and the Kebele level follow the same 
tripartite structure which comprises of an elected head of administration, a council with an 
executive committee and a sector bureau. Zones are an active administrative institution in 
Amhara and Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) and oversee the Wereda 
functioning whereas in Oromia and Tigray regions they do not play a significant role. Below 
the Zones and Weredas are Kebeles with an average population of 5,000 and Kebeles are not 
budgetary units (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008). 
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    =The upward arrow indicates that accountability and feedback flow from the bottom up to the next  
        hierarchy where reporting is one of communication style.  
 
     = The downward arrow indicates the budget flow (except, kebeles do not receive financing from  
          Weredas), the rules of law and chain of command.  
 
Figure 6.3: The FDRE governance structure  
                   Source: own presentation 
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6.3.1 Third-order or meta-governance (Macro level)  
 
The House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPRs) is the highest authority of the Federal 
government (FDRE Constitution, Article 50/3). The House is responsible to the People. The 
State Council is the highest organ of State authority. The highest executive powers of the 
Federal government are vested in the Prime Minister (PM) and in the Council of Ministers. 
The PM and the Council of Ministers are responsible to the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives (HPRs). The role of the Federal institutions is relatively clear, more related 
to upstream policy and legal formulation, while that of Regional bureau agencies is more 
related practical on the ground implementation.  
 
The House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPRs) 
 
The highest legislative authority in all matters assigned by the constitution to Federal 
jurisdiction is vested in the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPRs) Article 55 (1), which 
is comparable to the first or lower chamber of a legislature, normally serving the interests of 
the people in the federation as a whole (Girmachew, 2010). With regard to natural resource 
governance, the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPRs) are given power to enact laws on 
the utilization of land and other natural resources, of rivers and lakes crossing the boundaries 
of the national territorial jurisdiction or linking two or more States (Article 55 (2) (a)). It has 
also been vested to approve general policies and strategies of economic, social and 
development of the country including all environmental and natural resource related policies 
(Article 55 (10)). 
 
The Federal government  
 
The Federal government vested the powers and functions to formulate and implement the 
country’s policies, strategies and plans in respect of overall economic, social and 
development matters, (Article 51 (2)), to enact laws for the utilization and conservation of 
land and other natural resources, historical sites and objects (Article 51 (5)). Besides, the 
Federal government is given power to determine and administer the utilization of the waters 
or rivers and lakes linking two or more States or crossing the boundaries of the national 
territorial jurisdiction (Article 51 (11)).   
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Council of Ministers (CM) 
 
The Council of Ministers comprises the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Ministers and other members as may be determined by law. With regard to the governance 
of natural resources, the Council of Ministers is vested power; to issue regulations necessary 
for the proper implementation of proclamations, laws and decisions and the observance of law 
and order adopted by the House of Peoples’ Representatives, to decide on the organizational 
structure of ministries and other organs of government responsible to it, to formulate and 
implement economic, social and development policies and strategies.  
 
The Regional States/government 
 
The FDRE Constitution, Article 52 (1) states that ‘all powers not given expressly to the 
Federal government alone, or concurrently to the Federal government and the States are 
reserved to the Regional States’. Accordingly, power is given to the Regional states to 
formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans of the 
state (Article 52/2/c)  and  to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with 
Federal laws (Article 52/2/d). The Regional government is involved in enacting state 
constitutions; establishing state administration; formulating and executing economic, social, 
and development policies; administering land and natural resources; levying and collecting 
taxes and duties; enacting and enforcing the state civil service; and establishing and 
administering the state police force. 
 
6.3.2 Second-order governance (Meso level) 
 
Second order governing actors focus on institutional arrangements within which first-order 
governing takes place. The arrangements include systems of agreements, rules, rights, laws, 
norms, beliefs, roles, procedures and organizations that are applied by first-order governors 
to make decisions. At this level authorities assigned to execute proclamations and 
regulations are responsible to issue directives and guidelines for the proper implementation 
of laws. At this level of governance, relevant governing bodies which are responsible to 
monitor and control the implementation of rules and regulations related to natural resource 
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management and governance enacted by the higher level governance structures are 
discussed.  
 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)  
 
The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) was first established under the proclamation 
No. 9/1995. This was considered as the most important step towards setting up the legal 
framework for regulation of Ethiopian environmental issues. Under this proclamation, the 
Authority was accountable to the council of ministers with the following important powers 
and duties (Article 6) to; prepare environmental protection policy and laws; and, upon 
approval, follow up their implementation,  prepare directives and systems necessary for 
evaluating the impact of social and economic development projects on the environment; 
follow up and supervise their implementation and to prepare standards that help in the 
protection of soil, water and air as well as the biological systems they support, and follow up 
their implementation.  
 
Organization of the Authority was based on an Environmental Protection Council 
comprising of different line ministries at Federal level. However, assigning responsibilities 
to separate organizations for environmental development and management activities on the 
one hand, and environmental protection, regulations and monitoring on the other, is 
instrumental for the sustainable use of environmental resources, thereby avoiding possible 
conflicts of interests and duplication of efforts. It has become necessary to establish a system 
that fosters coordinated but differentiated responsibilities among environmental protection 
agencies at Federal and Regional levels. As a result, EPA was again re-established under 
proclamation No. 295/2002 with more comprehensive powers and duties. In the previous 
proclamation the authority vested about 10 powers and duties; however the re-establishment 
proclamation added more than 16 powers and duties.  Under this proclamation the authority 
is accountable directly to the Prime Minister. 
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Major responsibilities for the protection of the environment in Ethiopia are vested on the 
EPA, which is a Federal government organ legally mandated to formulate policies, 
strategies, laws and standards, which foster social and economic development in a manner 
that enhances the welfare of humans and the safety of the sustainable environment, and to 
spearhead in ensuring the effectiveness of the process of their implementation. Its tasks 
include the administration of the main environmental issues such as environmental pollution 
control and environmental impact assessment.  
 
There are also other organs of the government with one or more responsibilities relevant to 
the protection and management of environment and natural resources. EPA is responsible to 
coordinate actions of other sectoral governmental bodies to ensure the implementation of 
basic environmental rights provided under the 1995 FDRE constitution and principles set out 
in the environmental policy of the country. EPA is responsible for the administration of 
environmental protection at the Federal level and deals exclusively with environment matters 
at national and international level. While EPA is the focal point and coordinator of the 
international conventions and agreements regarding environment and bio-diversity, the 
implementing institutions and major stakeholders are different institutions. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
 
Proclamation No. 4/1995 which defines the powers and duties of the executive organs of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia states that, Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has the 
powers and duties to: cause the expansion of agricultural development, prepare land use 
policy as well as draft laws on the conservation and utilization of the forest and the wildlife 
resources. In addition, a Proclamation No. 471/2005 that repealed the previous proclamation 
redefines the power of the ministry to devise and facilitate the implementation of a strategy 
for natural resources protection through sustained agricultural development. The Ministry of 
Agriculture has the responsibility to implement Rural Land Administration and Use 
Proclamation No 456/2005, by providing the necessary professional support and by 
coordinating the competent authorities.  
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Ministry of Water and Energy (MoWE) 
 
Proclamation No. 4/1995 established the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) as the 
Federal authority responsible for oversight of water development throughout the country. 
Under this proclamation, MoWR has the power and duty to initiate policies and laws, 
prepare plans and budget and, upon approval, implement same (Article 10/a); ensure the 
enforcement of laws, regulations and directives of the Federal government; to determine the 
conditions and methods required for the optimum allocation and utilization of the water that 
flows across or between more than one Regional government among various users, prepare 
draft laws concerning the protection and utilization of water resources, sign international 
agreements relating to trans-boundary Rivers in accordance with the Law.  
 
Proclamation No. 471/2005 that repealed the previous proclamation vested additional power 
to MoWR to administer dams and hydraulic structures constructed by Federal budget unless 
they are entrusted to the authority of other relevant bodies. Proclamation No. 471/2005 was 
again repealed by proclamation No. 691/2010 to re-structured MoWR into Ministry of Water 
and Energy (MoWE) to promote the development of water and energy and undertake studies 
concerning the development and utilization of energy and promote the growth and expansion 
of the country's supply of electric energy. 
 
Among MoWE’s duties are inventory of water resources, allocation of water resources, 
establishing standards for design and construction of waterworks, issuing guidelines and 
directives for the prevention of pollution of water resources as well as for water quality and 
health standards, establishing water users' associations, and settlement of disputes. Details of 
most of the provisions of the Proclamation are expected to be provided in Regulations to be 
issued in the future. Ministry of Water and Energy is also responsible and mandated to take 
in cooperation with the appropriate Federal, Regional and city Administrations organs 
actions necessary to implement water and energy related national proclamations and 
international conventions, treaties and protocols such as the Ethiopian Water Resources 
Management Proclamation (Proc. No. 197/2000) 
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Regional Level 
 
Regional Bureaus of Agriculture, Environmental Protection and Land Use and 
Administration, Water resource and Energy, have the power to manage and administer all 
land based resources based on the laws, policies and rules and regulations enacted by the 
HPRs, Council of Ministries and their respective ministries at the Federal level. Usually they 
act as a medium of translating, and implementing the rules of the game enacted at the 
constitutional level to the operational level. 
 
6.3.3 First-order governance (Micro level)  
 
First-order governing takes place at local governance level wherever people, and their 
organizations, interact in order to solve societal problems and create new opportunities. 
Local governance is defined as the formulation and execution of collective action at the local 
level. Thus, it encompasses the direct and indirect roles of formal institutions of local 
government and higher level government hierarchies, as well as the roles of informal norms, 
networks, community organizations, and neighborhood associations in pursuing collective 
action (Shah and Shah, 2009). The local level governance recognizes two important but 
different organizations. These are the local level zonal, district and kebele administrations 
acting as and part of the government, and the community governed by its own institutions 
(local rules and regulations) and organizations either formal or informal.  
 
Zones, District and Kebele level administrations 
 
According to the Amhara Regional State Constitution (herein after called ANRS 
Constitution), the Regional state is hierarchically structured in such a way as to comprise the 
Regional, District, and Kebele administrative units (Article 45/1). It also states that, the 
‘Regional council may establish other administrative hierarchies as deemed necessary’. 
Therefore, Zones are administrative units below the Regional state and above district 
administrative which were established to fulfill additional responsibilities. Zones are usually 
responsible for coordinating among districts and monitoring district level issues and are used 
as a bridge to connect Regional states to the lower levels (districts and kebeles).  
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Districts on the other hand are the 3rd level administrative divisions of Ethiopia below 
Regional and Zonal administrations. Though districts are not mentioned in the FDRE 
constitution as an administrative organ, they are indicated in the ANRS Constitution. The 
Constitution vested power, where districts are empowered ‘to prepare and decide on 
economic development and social service plans’ for its territorial area (Article 84/1). While 
districts are elected levels of government, they are also accountable for implementing 
directives from above (from the Regional state or the zones). Districts are in charge of 
implementing ‘policies, laws, regulations and directives issued by the regional state organs’. 
Moreover, ‘each and every district is a body hierarchically subordinate to the regional 
government’ (Article 84/2).  
 
In addition to Federal and Regional authorities, district/wereda and urban administrators are 
vested power to expropriate rural land holdings. Expropriation of Landholdings for Public 
Purposes and Payment of Compensation Proclamation No. 455/2005 Article 3(1) states that; 
 
‘Wereda or an urban administration shall, upon payment in advance of compensation in 
accordance with this Proclamation, have the power to expropriate rural or urban 
landholdings for public purpose where it believes that it should be used for a better 
development project to be carried out by public entities, private investors, cooperative 
societies or other organs, or where such expropriation has been decided by the 
appropriate higher Regional or Federal government organ for the same purpose’. 
 
The district council vested power to examine and approve the draft economic development 
social services, follow up basic agricultural development activities, conservation and care of 
natural resources (Article 86/2). Districts are managed by local governments. Since 2002, 
governance was devolved to district level. Decentralization was undertaken with the transfer 
of power and resources to districts. These districts are said to be more authoritative and 
autonomous in decision making regarding natural resource management and governance. 
However, with regard to staffing and budgeting, they are dependent on the Regional 
government. Still they have significant limitations in the degree of autonomy, accountability 
and capacity.  
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Kebeles are the lowest governmental administrative units serving as local-level institutions 
in both rural and urban areas. Along with elected local councils, the kebeles have executive 
cabinets which coordinate planning and administrative functions; these are selected by the 
members of the local councils. They respond to the districts’ directives, and rely upon the 
districts for their budgets (Tegegne and Kassahun, 2007). In the study area four sets of 
institutions have roles in natural resource management and governance at the local level: 
Kebele Administration, Land committee elected by the community members, Land 
Administration experts and traditional institutions (like Community elders) for dispute 
resolution.  
 
6.4 Modes of CPR governance and property rights in Lake Tana sub-basin 
 
Modes of CPR governance 
As mentioned in the earlier chapter (chapter 2 section 2.6), the three modes of governance 
recognized by the interactive governance framework; hierarchical, co-governance and self-
governance, are all possible, depending on the properties of the systems that are being 
governed, the capacity of the governing systems, the quality of their interactions (Kooiman 
et al. 2008) and the type of property rights regime at different periods. The modes of each 
CPR governance system in Lake Tana sub-basin however, are characterized by different 
modes of governance at different times. For instance, prior to the introduction of 
modern/commercial fishery in Lake Tana, traditional self governance (in which stakeholders 
take care of themselves, outside the purview of government) was the dominant governance 
mode. The Negede woyto community was the dominant fishing community where they used 
to govern the fishery sector traditionally. Management authority and decision-making power 
rested with the resource users. Still self governance may occur at user level particularly 
among members of fishery cooperatives, where they can use their bylaws and local 
agreements to settle disputes and conflict of interests among fishers.  
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After 1986, co-governance arrangements started, where organized fishery cooperatives and 
Bureau of Agriculture (BoA) share co-governance responsibilities. In the co-governance 
perspective, parties co-operate, co-ordinate and communicate ‘sideways’, without a central 
or dominating governing actor (Chuenpagdee, 2011). Various civil societies such as 
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church and two Dutch NGOs (ISE-Urk and ICCO-Zeist) 
were also involved in the governance system.  
 
However, since 2003 the government has been trying to change the governance mode and 
structure into a hierarchical one. Even though it is not implemented yet, they were trying to 
impose the Fishery Development and Utilization Proclamation and its regulation on to the 
fishery sector, so that BoA vested the power to control and monitor the overall fishery 
activities in Lake Tana jurisdiction and other water bodies of the region. According to the 
national Fishery Development and Utilization Proclamation No. 315/2003, the fishery 
inspector, who is going to be authorized by the Ministry of Agriculture or by the concerned 
Regional Authority has been vested the power to implement the proclamation, regulations 
and directives. Surprisingly, even after 10 years, the fishery inspector was not assigned and 
directives were not prepared, which resulted in the fishery sector being unprotected and 
uncontrolled.  
 
Very recently however, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) is trying to change the 
management and governance modes of the fishery sector into a co-management and 
governance system where different stakeholders can participate in the management and 
governance system. In 2009, MoA expressed to the ACP Fish II programme a desire for 
support to help introduce improved fisheries management and a more co-management style 
approach to the management of the country’s fisheries. Accordingly, in 2011 ACP Fish II 
Project conducted a 7 day training on Fisheries Management Planning for fishery officers 
and preparation of draft Fisheries Management Plans (FMP) for Lake Ziway and Lake 
Chamo which are seen as the most overexploited and yet commercially important Rift 
Valley Lakes. 
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The mode of governance with regard to wetland commons is said to be blurred. Though this 
research found that most (73%) of the community members believed that wetlands are 
governed by the government hierarchy, still there are ambiguities towards who is in charge 
of controlling and administering these resources (see Table 6.1). Despite the existence of 
ownership rights of the broad land based resources at the constitutional level, there is no 
ownership right vested to the local community at operational level. Outside the government 
structure, local and international NGOs such as Ethio-Wetland and Natural Resource 
Association (EWNRA), which promotes sustainable resource use, raises awareness and 
mobilizes the local community, are also taking part in the management and governance of 
natural resources. 
 
According to stakeholder workshop participants, with the exception of the water resource 
which is solely administered and governed by central government, the hierarchical mode of 
natural resource governance is often decentralized to the lowest level of governance without 
lower level capacity building and clear responsibilities has affected CPR management and 
governance in the sub-basin.  As a result, key management concerns such as uncontrolled 
resource use pattern, loss of species and serious environmental degradation casts doubt on 
the sustainable use value of CPRs in the sub-basin. 
 
As mentioned earlier, though the supreme Law vested power to the Federal government to 
determine and administer the utilization of the waters or rivers and lakes linking two or more 
States or crossing the boundaries of the national territorial jurisdiction, Lake Tana is 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of Amhara National Regional Sate. It doesn’t cross any 
Regional and national boundaries. In principle, the Regional state has to have its own stake, 
in controlling and administration of Lake Tana. However, by considering Lake Tana as a 
national and international common, administration and governance is dominated by a 
hierarchical mode of governance where characteristics of the interactions between the state 
and its citizens are a top down style of intervention (Bavinck et al. 2005).  
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Development planning decisions and implementation in Lake Tana sub-basin are solely 
determined by the central government hierarchy. In the name of international water resource, 
the Federal government has vested an exclusive power over the decision of Lake Tana 
development activities. As a result, the Regional government (ANRS) has no significant 
decision role or to administer and control major development interventions like hydropower, 
large irrigation dams etc.   
 
Generally, government hierarchy is the dominant mode of CPR governance in Lake Tana 
sub-basin. International studies on CPR also confirm that, the State has often been nominally 
responsible for managing many CPRs. According to Agrawal et al. (2008) 86% of forests 
and wooded areas across the world are owned by central governments which in turn affect 
the degree to which the State protects, manages use, restricts access or exploits CPRs also 
affects rural households that depend on CPR income for their livelihoods. 
 
The survey of resource users on who controls the CPR use, management and governance 
also confirmed that government is dominating control over the resources. The majority 
(73%) of the respondents replied that the government at different levels (kebele, district and 
regional level) of hierarchy is controlling the CPRs. Still 15% of the respondents believed 
that, though government is dominant there are situations where community members and 
government jointly control the CPRs (See Table 6.1).   
 
Table 6.1: Respondents perception of who control CPRs (n=200) 
Source: Own survey result, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Who has control over CPRs? (n=200) 
Frequency Percent 
The Government 146 73.0 
Community and Government jointly control 30 15.0 
The Community 10 5.0 
Private/individually 4 2.0 
It is not clear who controls 10 5.0 
Total 200 100.0 
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Property rights issues of CPRs 
 
 
Property rights consist of two components: the rule and its enforcement mechanism. The 
rules may derive from state law, customary law, user group rules, and other frameworks. 
Enforcement of statutory law is usually the responsibility of the state, which means that the 
rights are based on formal laws (Crewett et al. 2008). In Ethiopia, property rights are 
protected by law, though enforcement is weak. The Ethiopian government is following a 
public trust doctrine, a legal principle dating back to Roman law in which the state holds 
certain resources particularly land and other land based resources in trust for its citizens, 
prohibiting any transfer of those resources to private interests. Based on this premise the 
FDRE Constitution vested an exclusive power to the state and Ethiopian people. However, 
property rights issues of natural resources are still debatable. In 2011, Ethiopia scored 30 out 
of a possible total score of 100 on the property-protection index of the Heritage Foundation 
and was on a downward trend on the property-rights indicator of the 2011 Ibrahim 
Governance Index17 (AEO, 2012). 
 
Common-pool resources are defined in the Ethiopian context as ‘a resource system that is 
considered as non-exclusive recourse to which the rights of the use are distributed among a 
user group. Individuals are not entitled to use and own these resources privately. Though 
these descriptions are still ambiguous (see Table 6.2), CPRs in Lake Tana sub-basin thus 
include communal grazing lands, forests, wetlands, fisheries, rivers and Lake Tana itself. 
According to group discussants and key informants, there is still confusion with regard to 
rules for access, withdrawal and management of CPRs at local level. They further argued 
that this confusion might be as a result of unclear definitions of property rights, often 
misunderstood by the users and executive agencies.   
 
 
                                                 
17
 Ibrahim Governance Index- is Africa's leading assessment of governance, funded and led by an African 
institution compiles 86 indicators grouped into 14 sub-categories and four overarching categories to measure 
the effective delivery of public goods and services to African citizens. 
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For instance, the ANRS Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation No. 133/2006 
defined ‘communal’ land holding as if it is out of the ownership of the government or private 
holding and it is exclusively for communal use (see Table 6.2). However, the Federal Rural 
Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation No. 456/2005 portray as if it is given by 
the will of the government to the local residents. It doesn’t recognize the natural ownership 
rights of the community. As a result, CPR users are not confident that these commons belong 
to them. The Federal Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation No.456/2005, clearly 
shows that the Federal government may claim any CPR at any time as deemed necessary. 
 ‘Government being the owner of rural land, communal rural land holdings can be 
changed to private holdings as may be necessary’- Article 5(3). 
 
This confusion has been the center of disputes in different areas particularly when these 
communal lands are leased for investors and/or used by the government for the construction 
of social services such as school, health post and local administrative offices.    
 
 
Table 6.2: Definitions of land holding in Amhara Region and Ethiopia 
Source: Proclamation No. 133/2006 (Revised Amhara Regional) and 456/2005(Federal) 
Definition 
of holding 
Revised ANRS Rural Land 
Administration and Use Proclamation 
Federal Rural Land Administration and 
Land Use Proclamation 
Communal Rural land which is out of the ownership 
of the government or private holding and 
used by the local people in common for 
grazing, forestry and other social services 
(Article 2/5)   
Rural land which is given by the 
government to local residents for common 
grazing, forestry and other social services 
(Article 1/12) 
Common Holding of land by two or more persons in 
common having the holding right, and use 
without division, by sharing the output 
from the land (Article 2/10) 
Not mentioned  
State Rural land demarked and held by Federal 
or Regional Government for country and 
area development and growth, and it 
includes forest lands, wild life sanctuaries, 
mining lands and parks as well as lands 
around lakes and rivers (Article 2/7)  
Rural land demarcated and those lands to 
be demarcated in the future at Federal or 
Regional states holding; and includes 
forestlands, wildlife, protected areas, state 
farms, mining lands, lakes, rivers and other 
rural lands (Article 1/13) 
Private A land possessed by any farmer or other 
body vested with right to use it and existing 
under private holding having a certificate 
(Article 2/9)   
Minimum private holding means rural land 
in the holding of peasant, semi pastoralists 
and pastoralists and other bodies who are 
entitled by law to use rural land (Article 
1/11) 
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In order to understand the roots of and possible solutions to such conflicts and confusions, 
there needs to be rigorous and complete analysis of all interests when developing or revising 
a management regime. Property rights provide a clear theoretical basis for performing such 
an analysis. Property rights evaluation is a useful tool because it allows comparisons across 
different stakeholder groups (Yandle, 2007). As discussed in chapter 2 section 2.5.2.3 Table 
2.3 the concept of ‘bundles of rights’ as developed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) is useful 
for our purpose to analyze the existing distribution of rights among different user groups and 
between individuals under the current tenure regime in Lake Tana sub-basin.  
 
Access and withdrawal are operational-level property rights, whereby access is the right to 
enter a given CPR system, and withdrawal involves the permission to extract products from 
the resource system (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). An examination of the property rights 
issues of the CPRs in Lake Tana sub-basin shows that, the FDRE Constitution explicitly 
states the Ethiopian people and the state have exclusive right to ownership of the rural land 
and other natural resources presumably water, fish and wetlands. However, except access 
and withdrawal rights, local community members and other stakeholders have no full 
ownership right on CPRs, whereas the right to sell or lease, management and exclusion 
rights is solely vested to the State, particularly the Federal government (see Table 6.3).  
 
Table 6.3: Property rights issues for CPRs (fish, water and wetlands)  
Source: The outcome of Stakeholder analysis workshop and Focus group discussion, 2011 
Key 
√ -       Permitted  
√*-     Access and/or withdrawal of fish/water/wetland resources is allowed if and only if the stakeholders have a license   
           or a  particular permission   
√**-   Withdrawal of water and fish is permitted without license only for small scale irrigation and household  
          consumption up   to 3kg of fish per day, respectively.  
 ×? -   In some cases communities may have the right to exclude others (except the State) from their commons 
×*-    In some cases stakeholders may be involved in management process up on the request of the State and/or the Community 
×**-  Private investors may have the right to systematically exclude other users by enclosing the commons, if they are   
          allowed to do so. 
×-      Not permitted  
Level of 
right 
Property 
rights 
Stakeholder group 
The State Local community  Private  Others (such as 
NGOs) 
Operational Access √ √ √* √* 
Withdrawal √     √** √* √* 
Collective 
choice 
Management √ √  ×* ×* 
Exclusion √   ×? ×** × 
Alienation √ × × × 
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According to the existing FDRE Constitution, it is completely not allowed to sell land and 
use as a mortgage. Though the people and the State have vested an equal and exclusive right, 
land holders can lease their land for about 25 years while the State can lease the land for a 
long time (about 99 years). Local farmers and most of the key informants in the study area 
considered that leasing the land for almost 99 years by the State is equivalent to selling the 
land. Therefore, if they were not allowed to sell and lease their land for relatively longer 
period, the State has to be also restricted by law from such a prolonged leasing. However, in 
the name of ‘development’ and ‘attracting foreign investment’, the current scenario of 
leasing farmland and communal lands for local investors and ‘Land grabbing’ by foreign 
private investors and governments in Ethiopia demonstrated the exclusive power of the 
central government (particularly the Federal government) over land and land based natural 
resource ownership.  
 
For instance, around Bahir Dar, the so called floriculture investors were given land by 
expelling local farmers through an unproductive compensation scheme where some of the 
compensated farmers were not able to manage their money appropriately. However, for 
almost 3-4 years they did not start production and the lands were unused for these periods. 
On the other hand, companies and foreign governments have been leasing for long term (for 
about 99 years) large areas of land in different parts of Ethiopia. As reported by Dessalegn 
(2011) in 2011, about 3.5 million hectares were allocated to foreign investors, while the 
projected figure for 2015 is 7 million hectares.  
 
According to Ethiopian Press Agency (October 1, 2012), the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
has transferred 70 thousand hectare tracts of land to both domestic and foreign investors in 
2011/12. The MoA has also planned to transfer more than 100 thousand hectares of land to 
investors in 2012/2013. For this, it has prepared large fertile tracts of land in Gambella, 
Benshangul-Gumuz, Oromia and Amhara regional states to be offered to investors. Though 
the Ethiopian government proudly claims ‘Land grabs’ benefits the local community, still 
there are many concerns that poor villagers will be forced off their lands and the 
environment could also deteriorate.  
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6.5 Chapter summary   
 
In summary, this chapter sought to describe and analyze the institutional arrangements that 
govern Ethiopian natural resources at different levels. The outcome of the research questions 
shows that though there is no specific CPR governance system, the overall natural resources 
governance system in Ethiopia comprises of  a system of formal national and international 
laws, regulations, treaties and procedures, and informal conventions, customs, and norms, 
which broaden, mould, and restrain socio-economic activity and behavior of  multi-
stakeholders at different level of governance. Ethiopia is a signatory of multiple international 
treaties on environmental and resource governance. However in practice, neither the 
international treaties and conventions, nor the domestic rules and regulations were not well 
implemented as deemed to address the intended objectives or problems.  
 
Particularly, Lake Tana’s CPR governance system is composed of the formal Federal and 
State laws, informal customary laws and user group informal rules, and relationship between 
organizations stretching from the Federal level to the local kebele administrative level. While 
the core of state authority in the Lake Tana sub-basin currently lies at Federal level, 
Regional government, Bureau of Agriculture, Bureau of Water and Energy and Bureau of 
Environmental Protection Land Use and Administration exercise their limited power over 
controlling and monitoring natural resources in their jurisdiction.  
 
In summary, the broad natural resource management policy, legislations and strategies in 
Ethiopia seem adequate at a constitutional level. However, the enforcement of legislations 
and implementation of policy and strategies at grassroots level is not satisfactory. Despite the 
fact that there are plenty of top-down governance structures, they are not resulting in a 
coherent system of governance at the operational/local level. Particularly with regard to 
CPR, property rights issues, mandates of stakeholders who are supposed to administer 
resources are not clear. On the other hand traditional resource management and governance 
institutions in Ethiopia, specifically in the study area, are losing ground to effectively 
manage and govern local level resource systems.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
7. REALITIES ON THE ACTION SITUATION 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Action situation which comprises individual actors within the biophysical, social and 
institutional context is influenced by three categories of contextual factors: namely nature of 
the resource (physical condition), attributes of the community (social and cultural context) 
and rules in use (institutional arrangements) discussed in chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The 
action situation with which this study is primarily concerned is positioned on the local level 
CPR governance system. Accordingly Lake Tana sub-basin is addressed as local action 
arena. As discussed in chapter 5 section 5.4, the actors within the local action arena include 
all stakeholders who have an interest in and control over CPR use, management and 
governance. According to Stellmacher (2007), the structure of the action situation can be 
depicted as follows: actors/stakeholders make choices in the context of positions that are 
held by other actors/stakeholders. Each actor in this position has an array of potential actions 
available that he/she may take within a specific period of time. Some actors have only 
limited control over the actions they can take as their actions depend on the agreement of 
other actors. 
 
As the discussed in chapter 6 and explained by Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002), there is 
not one single or consistent set of rules governing the action arena. Rather, there is legal 
pluralism-the coexistence of multiple different types of rules: international, national, 
customary and local norms, and even voluntary guidelines or corporate social responsibility 
standards-each backed by a different institutional framework. Therefore, the aim of this 
chapter is to disclose the realities on the action situation where the attributes of the system 
to-be-governed (discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 5) interacts with the governance system 
(discussed in chapter 6). The governance system is evaluated from different perspectives and 
gaps are identified. The process inquires to what extent the actors involved in the governance 
system are interacting in the action situation to ensure sustainable common-pool resource 
use, management and governance.  
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7.2 Understanding patterns of multi-stakeholder interaction  
 
Patterns of interaction flow logically from the behaviour of actors in the action arena (Polski 
and Ostrom, 1999). Actors/stakeholders may differ in relation to types of actions that they 
are required, permitted, or forbidden to take in a certain action situation (Schlager and 
Blomquist, 1998). The differences designate pattern of interaction between the various 
actors/stakeholders which finally determine the outcome, in this research context, the way 
how stakeholder use, manage and govern the CPRs (Stellmacher, 2007). 
 
If a well managed and enabling environment is put in place, multi-stakeholder interactions 
facilitate stakeholders to work together, to solve societal and environmental problems. Multi-
stakeholder interactions may lead to understanding of different interests and perspectives of 
stakeholders in the process of CPR use, management and governance. In a very complex 
scenario like Lake Tana’s CPRs, however, the likelihood of positive outcomes from the 
multi-stakeholder interaction is rarely possible. Stakeholders make choices based on their 
own preferences, objectives or mandates (in the case of government agencies). These 
individual choices lead to aggregate patterns of interaction that affect user based CPR 
management and governance.  
 
Lake Tana sub-basin is an example of a constantly changing and very complex CPR system 
whose water resource, commercial fishery, surrounding wetlands and other associated 
resources are managed and governed by different property rights regimes, involving a wide 
range of issues and multiple stakeholders with diverse power over and interests in CPRs. 
Hence to better understand this scenario the patterns of multi-stakeholder interaction and 
their outcomes were evaluated based on stakeholder participation in legislation, planning, 
policy making and implementation processes, linkage and collaboration among relevant 
stakeholders, organizational capacity and commitment, managing CPR related externalities 
(such as conflict of interest).  
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Multi-stakeholder interaction SWOT analysis reveals that Lake Tana sub-basin’s CPR 
management and governance interaction is characterized by weak organizational capacity of 
key stakeholders, low organizational culture and commitment, overlapping mandates of 
stakeholders, weak linkage between informal institutions and formal governance structures, 
lengthy law making and implementation processes. As a result, these multi-stakeholder 
interactions lead to competition, overexploitation and degradation of CPRs that ultimately 
lead to conflict of interests among different stakeholders at different levels. 
 
7.3 The outcomes of the governance interaction 
 
The outcome of the action arena is what actually ‘happens’ to the resource governance 
system. It describes how human-nature interaction comes about under the prevailing 
circumstances influenced by the characteristics of actors and the action situation in the action 
arena as well as influencing exogenous variables discussed in the previous chapters 
(Stellmacher, 2007). What happens in the action arena leads to patterns of interaction and 
outcomes that can be judged on the basis of evaluative criteria (Ghorbani et al. 2010). 
 
7.3.1 The state and sustainability of the resource systems 
 
Lake Tana Ecosystem has a global significance on which huge livelihood, economic and 
socio-cultural groups are highly dependent. The ecosystem is a complex and multipurpose 
resource system whose water/river system, fishery, wetland and other associated resources 
are considered as key drivers for Ethiopia’s development endeavor. As a result, the 
catchment is selected by the Ethiopian government as a potential growth corridor for 
development and reducing food insecurity. Chapter 4 has shown that the natural sub-system 
(in this case Lake Tana ecosystem) is under serious pressure both from the natural calamities 
and human induced externalities. The outcome of the analysis suggests that, despite the 
positive impact on the country’s drive towards achieving food security, through the Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP), development activities that have been taking place in and 
around Lake Tana Ecosystem can be questioned in terms of sustainability. 
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Development pressure coupled with unprecedented population growth in the region is 
creating an ever increasing pressure on Lake Tana ecosystem. As a result of ineffective 
resource governance, population pressure, a one-sector (water) development approach by the 
government (discussed in chapter 6) and subsequent demand for livelihood security, there 
are frequent encroachments that result in widespread destruction of biodiversity and 
ecosystems in the sub-system. Fish stocks are declining leaving more people, who are 
dependent on the fish sector to secure their livelihood vulnerable to seasonal shocks. 
Populations of endemic fish species are also declining. Over the past two decades wetlands 
have been destroyed. Current ongoing and completed development activities, land use 
changes and scarcity of arable land within the Lake Tana development corridor threaten the 
ecological integrity and functioning of the highly dynamic wetland ecosystem. Yet, crop 
intensification (cultivation of rice at the cost of wetlands), retreat farming around the lake 
shore, unplanned or unsustainable lake shore investment and enclosure of the ‘commons’ are 
threatening the remaining wetland resources.    
 
Based on the evidence of this research , national and international studies, coupled with 
global climate change and environmental degradation, there is speculation that Lake Tana 
could shrink drastically in size within four or five decades. Then the system may no longer 
be able to support life and will have an adverse impact on the livelihood of the local people, 
which ultimately affects the country’s drive towards achieving sustainable development. 
Threats to Lake Tana and its sub-basin area will also have serious implications for 
environmental and human security in Ethiopia and other downstream riparian communities 
(Egypt and Sudan).  
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7.3.2 The politico-economic context and discourse 
 
 
The concern for environment in Ethiopia has undergone many stages and continuously 
evolved over the centuries. The use-oriented period represents the main features of 
legislations, which were led by human needs and capacity to exploit natural resources. While 
the resource-oriented period was more focused on the management of natural resources and 
recognized the fact that such natural resources could be depleted. The eco-system-oriented 
legislations, however, are characterized by a holistic and integrative approach, which is 
focusing on the complementarily of society’s development needs and that of ecological 
balance (Hailu, 2000). The concept of sustainable development and environmental rights are 
well-established in the Rights of Peoples in Ethiopia through Articles 43 and 44 of the FDRE 
constitution. As a result, the Environmental Policy of Ethiopia was issued in 1997 to provide 
overall guidance in the conservation and sustainable utilization of the country’s 
environmental resources in general. 
 
The politico-economic context is examined under a dynamic perspective to understand how 
power has been distributed among actors who take decisions and how political and economic 
interests have driven actors’ decisions in the process of CPR use, management and 
governance in the sub-basin. As discussed in Chapter 5 section 5.4.4, stakeholder’s power to 
take action and secure the outcomes could be vested politically or as a result of their 
social/financial capital.  In Ethiopian context however, all powers related to natural resource 
management and governance is vested by FDRE constitution. Accordingly, all the powers 
and responsibilities to administer and govern all land based natural resources are vested to 
the Federal and Regional governments where the lions share goes to the Federal government 
and its line ministries and subsidiary administrative bodies at different level.  
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For instance, at Federal level major responsibilities for the protection of the environment in 
Ethiopia are vested on the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). There are also other 
organs of the government with one or more responsibilities relevant to the protection and 
management of environment and natural resources. EPA is responsible to coordinate actions 
of other sectoral governmental bodies to ensure the implementation of basic environmental 
rights provided under the 1995 FDRE constitution and principles set out in the 
environmental policy of the country. 
 
Even among the government hierarchy the power to control and administer land and land 
based resources are determined by the social and political capital of the individuals who lead 
the organization. Their political attachment to a very influential person in the political 
system helped them to exercise their power to control and administer resources. This 
politico-economic structure affects local rules-in-use and local people’s decisions on 
environment in general, common pool resource use, management and governance in 
particular.  
 
More recently there has emerged a worldwide consensus that the environmental and 
ecological concerns represent one of the most critical factors related to socioeconomic 
development. The environmental discourse has gained increasing attention in almost all 
international forums on development, and the environment-development relationship is 
being seriously taken into account in practical policies and theoretical debates (Haque, 
2000). Particularly policy intervention in CPR use, management and governance appears to 
be a messy process which involves a complex discourses and series of interactions between 
the decision makers, producers and users of research. As clearly indicated by Adams et al. 
(2002) the definition of the policy ‘problem’ for key stakeholders may be contested and can 
be a source of conflict among stakeholders. What may be seen as a critical ‘problem’ by one 
group of resource users (such as official perceptions about the ‘illegal’ use of state forests for 
fuel wood by local villagers) may be interpreted by other stakeholders (such as non-
governmental organizations and advocacy groups working with such villagers) as a basic 
need or an inalienable right. 
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With regard to the issue of environmental management and protection in Ethiopia, 
government institutions and departments at different levels responsible for different aspects 
of the natural and human environment carried out their duties. This had led to fragmentation 
of environmental protection activities consequently to serious deterioration and damage to 
the environment. This is because the said government institutions were responsible for both 
sectoral development and environmental protection, which is inherently conflicting and 
source of discourse among stakeholders (Hailu, 2000).  
 
On the other hand, the problems of natural resource management and governance as 
perceived by government planners, policy makers, and researchers are quite different from 
the problems of primary concern to the users (community members) who are trying to secure 
access to sustainable livelihood options by optimizing the use of their CPRs. This is because 
decision makers, researchers and users inhabit different worlds (Caplan, 1979). They all act 
in pursuit of their own experience and contexts. While researchers may revere theories and 
concepts, decision makers want concrete evidence which is relevant and easy to understand; 
while researchers often take years to complete research studies, decision makers want 
answers quickly (Mitton et al. 2007). Each side also speaks its own, highly technical 
language (Choi et al. 2005). As discussed in the following sub-sections this discourse 
usually manifested in conflicting interests of actors in the action arena (for more details see 
Table 7.1). 
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7.3.3 Patterns of conflicting interaction among stakeholders  
 
There is no internationally accepted definition of what constitutes a natural resource conflict 
(Upreti, 2002). Yet, sharp differences in power and in stake values across interested 
stakeholders make conflict inherent in CPR management and governance. So far, long-term 
maintenance of ecosystem health is in conflict with the short-term interests of many 
stakeholders and policymakers (Dietz et al. 2003; Bavinck et al. 2005). Although conflict is 
a feature of many resource management regimes, it is often assumed to reflect differences in 
material interests between stakeholders (Adams et al. 2003). As Upreti (2002) defined, 
conflict in this research however, could refer to observable differences in opinion, 
misunderstandings, clashes of interest, disagreements, complaints in public, and protests by 
arguments and physical assault, antipathy filing cases with the local administration, police 
and courts related to CPRs (with a particular emphasis on water, fish and wetlands).  
 
As these commons evolve and are used for different purposes by different stakeholders and 
are governed under different management regimes, externalities such as competition, 
resource degradation and conflict amongst user groups are inevitable (Edwards and Steins, 
1999). In handling stakeholder interest over CPRs, it is exceptional that ‘win-win’ 
governance solutions can be found in key decisions that affect resource management and 
governance. Usually the decisions may not meet the needs and interests of every stakeholder 
and most decisions will end-up with ‘win-loss’ situations and in most cases, ‘the win-loss’ 
situation is against the interests of the poor and voiceless.  
 
The different stakeholders involved in the joint uses may act in the pursuit of various goals 
and private interests (e.g. commercial use, the strategic stance of a national and local 
authority) and choose their actions in order to satisfy those interests efficiently or the general 
public interest (e.g. Government and NGO with an objective of environmental concern). 
Furthermore, stakeholders can pursue local (within the boundary of the resource), regional, 
national or even global use interests (Knight, 1992; Gerber et al. 2009).  
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In most cases, the combination of environmental and demographic change, developmental 
and market pressures, multiple often divergent interests of different stakeholders that lead to 
natural resource competition and force local people to alter their livelihood strategies, are 
considered as the underlying causes for resource competition, both among community 
members, and between community groups and outside public and private organizations 
which ultimately leads to conflict (Warner 2000; Engel and Korf, 2005). Increased 
competition and demand for natural resources of all kinds is in turn leading to increased 
conflicts generated by overlapping resource claims between local users, large-scale resource 
users (private investors) and government officials (Darby, 2010). In some cases natural 
resource conflict could arise due to failure in governance (institutions, policies, laws) to 
resolve these tensions equitably that leads to specific groups being disadvantaged, and 
ultimately to conflict (Matthew et al. 2009). 
 
Common-pool resource conflict may arise at international, regional, national and local level. 
The causes and nature of conflict also depend on knowledge, perspective and context of 
stakeholders involved in CPR management and governance at these levels. However for this 
research, CPR conflict analysis focused on national/regional (higher level) and local level 
resource users conflicts with a special emphasis on resource users. The conflict situations in 
the sub-basin further illustrate how multiple actors influence pattern of interactions and 
outcomes. The following sub-sections answer the question of why do conflicts/disputes arise 
among stakeholders, and what are the underlying causes of conflict and resolution 
mechanisms. The common patterns of interactions in CPR conflict and conflict resolution 
mechanisms across communities and at higher level of governance are examined.  
 
7.3.3.1 Higher level conflict (Macro and Meso level) 
 
At higher management and governance level, there is a trade-off between environmental 
conservation and development policies. Conflict between natural resource conservation 
interests and utilization of natural resources for development activities is increasing among 
stakeholders. This trend is likely to continue as population and market pressure and demand 
for CPRs are increasing. Therefore policy makers dispute over devising appropriate policies 
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for effective natural resource utilization, management and governance. Policy conflict arises 
because of differences in knowledge and understanding between how stakeholders frame 
their perceptions of resource use problems as well as possible solutions to these problems 
(Adams et al. 2003). 
 
Law and policy makers, ministries and executive governmental agencies at the constitutional 
and collective level who are mainly involved in the formulation, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of natural resource management and governance are mostly confronted with 
conflicting objectives. Documentary analysis and key informant discussion results show that 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), Institute of Biodiversity Conservation and 
Research (IBCR), and Ethiopian Wild Life Development and Conservation Authority 
(EWDCA) with conservation and protective goals are striving to minimize the stress on Lake 
Tana ecosystem through proposing the delineation of buffer zones up to 5 km around the 
shore of the Lake and implementing integrated watershed management approaches in the 
sub-basin.  Particularly, the EPA and its regional office are striving to protect the health of 
Lake Tana’s environment from natural and human induced calamity, mainly from 
government led development endeavors and private investments. 
 
On the contrary, Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) with a broad objective of boosting 
production and marketing for food security, is trying to insist that farmers in Lake Tana sub-
basin  use improved agricultural technological packages and encourages double cropping 
using available water including draining wetlands. Particularly the office encourages the 
farming community to use fertilizers and pesticides without noticing, or ignoring, the 
potential pollution and adverse impact on Lake Tana ecosystem. On the other hand, Ministry 
of Water and Energy (MoWE) and Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo) are 
withdrawing water from the Lake for hydropower and irrigation purposes. Construction of 
irrigation dams at the major tributary rivers which could have a tremendous impact on the 
Lake Tana ecosystem and water level for navigation, are underway (see Chapter 4 section 
4.2 Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1).  
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In principle MoWE, with the mandate of executing water resource policies and strategies, 
has to strive to ensure that the control of environmental health hazards be a necessary 
condition in the design, construction and use of dams and irrigation systems in Lake Tana 
Growth Corridor. Therefore, MoWE has to recognize that natural ecosystems, particularly 
wetlands and upstream forests, are fundamental in regulating water quality and quantity and 
to integrate their rehabilitation and protection into the conservation, development and 
management of water resources. However, in practice the ministry and its line structures are 
only focused on water resource components of the broader Lake Tana ecosystem without 
considering other subsystems (for instance fish and wetlands).  
  
The Investment Bureau and Bahir Dar City municipality are also engaged in leasing 
wetlands around Lake Tana shore for private investors. Although they all claimed that 
development activities are based on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports, the 
reality is EIA was conducted just to fulfill the formality and it is often in favor of the 
government initiated development objectives and private investments rather than on 
environmental concerns and local community interests. All are in conflict with the 
environmental issues of the lake ecosystem where the Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) and other concerned bodies are responsible to monitor and control.   
 
These agencies have their own knowledge perspective, power and mandate to see and act 
accordingly towards managing and governing the Lake Tana ecosystem. Government 
officials are typically unaware themselves of the conflicts and confusion caused by the 
contradictory goals, regulations, procedures, and plans of their various agencies to manage 
natural resources. If they are aware of the conflicting interest, they will act on their own 
pursuit rather than negotiating with other party or parties.  
 
According to Grimble and Wellard (1997), conflicts can be categorized in terms of whether 
they occur at the micro-micro or in the micro-macro levels, i.e. among community groups or 
between community groups and government, private or civil society organizations. Cornroy 
et al. (1998) further categorized Micro-micro conflicts as taking place either within the 
group directly involved in a particular resource management regime (e.g. a forest user group 
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or ecotourism association), or between this group and those not directly involved. Macro-
macro conflicts may occur between different stakeholders at national level and between 
stakeholders at national and international levels. There may be policy differences between 
two government ministries over the scale and extent of permitted resource exploitation and 
incompatible international and national concerns. Micro-macro conflicts arise where the 
actions of local stakeholders conflict with those of macro-level stakeholders who may or 
may not represent the interests of wider society (Grimble and Wellard, 1997). 
 
However, as can be seen from Table 7.1, sometimes macro-micro classification of conflict 
might not be the only situation where conflict arises. For instance conflict could happen at 
micro-meso interface where user community and/or local administration are in conflict with 
the Regional and/or Federal level governmental agencies. There are also situations whereby 
regional level governmental agencies make an argument with that of higher/Federal level 
authorities at the meso-macro interface. 
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Table 7.1 Conflict of interest among stakeholders in Lake Tana sub-basin  
Source: Own survey, stakeholder identification and Analysis workshop and group discussion results, 2011
Level of conflict Stakeholders involved Causes of conflict  Dynamics of conflict Conflict Management 
options 
Micro-user level   
(within) 
 
 
Fishers, Local Farmers, Local 
experts, administrators, 
women’s group, Youth groups, 
Investors, Boat owners, Lake 
Tana Transport Enterprise, 
Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation etc. 
Competition for scarce resource (fish 
and wetlands) to secure livelihood 
and/or make a profit, theft of properties 
(eg. net for fishing), unclear boundary 
of resource system, absence of or 
unclear rules and regulations to govern 
the resources  etc. 
Increasing trends (both in 
frequency and type) 
Mainly negotiation 
between disputing parties, 
Mediation by neutral, 
independent person 
(traditional dispute 
resolution methods), courts 
as a last resort (formal 
method).   
Micro-Meso 
interface 
(Between) 
User  community and/or local 
administration   
             Vs 
Regional and/or Federal level 
governmental agencies 
Incompatibility of livelihood and 
property rights security, not 
compensated for loss of land or other 
properties  
                    Vs 
Development and/or conservation goals 
of each agency  
As development pressure 
on commons and leasing of 
communal lands for 
investors increases, the 
likelihood of conflict 
between the two parties will 
increase 
Economic compensation, 
negotiation to convince the 
local community, in case 
of disagreement appealing 
to the higher level. 
Meso-regional 
(within) 
 
Regional Bureaus of 
(Agriculture, Environmental 
protection, Investment, Water 
resource),  Municipalities  etc. 
Unclear mandate and responsibilities 
and duplication of efforts, multiple 
interest , lack of linkage and 
information flows, bypassing the 
mandates of others, uncoordinated 
planning and implementation 
Unless there is revision of 
mandates and 
responsibilities, there will 
be an increasing trend of 
conflict among stakeholders 
Policy review, stakeholder 
workshops. 
Meso-Macro 
interface  
(Between) 
Regional level governmental 
agencies 
                 Vs 
Higher/Federal level 
Authorities and ministries 
Information and knowledge gap, 
overlapping mandate , Higher level 
Authorities sometimes bypass the 
mandates of regional states/Authorities 
Rarely happened  Policy review, stakeholder 
workshops. 
Macro-National   
(within) 
 
Policymakers, Legislators, 
Ministry of (Agriculture, 
Water and Energy..), Institute 
of Biodiversity, International 
organizations (UNESCO, 
FAO) 
The paradox of conservation  verses 
development goals, policies imposed 
without local participation, 
uncoordinated policy planning and 
decision making 
On the wake of climate 
change,  there is an 
increasing trend 
environmental degradation 
and international pressure  
National consensus, 
International treaties, 
agreements, conventions 
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7.3.3.2  User’s level conflict (Micro level) 
 
In general, all common-pool resource users at all levels are confronted with the problem of 
how to reduce or eliminate externalities related to resource governance and management 
(Agrawal, 2001). Conflicts over natural resources at the community level have many causes 
and occur in different forms and levels of severity. Usually local level conflicts arise 
between different on-site stakeholders, such as settled farmers and migrant livestock herders, 
or between on-site and off-site stakeholders. Such Micro or local level conflicts frequently 
originate from breakdowns in systems of common property management, under pressure 
from population growth, economic activity and sometimes the incursion by outside interests 
(Grimble and Wellard, 1997; Grimble, 1998). At user level conflict is usually derived by 
scarcity of resources, striving for securing livelihood, unclear property rights and resource 
boundary, new market opportunities which gives an incentive for the users to increase their 
efforts to harvest more. For this study however, conflicts at user level were categorized into 
three broad levels: Community-level conflicts (opposing individuals and groups within local 
resource user communities); intercommunity conflicts (neighboring villages, kebeles and 
districts); and supra community (local communities vs. Regional/Federal level formal 
institutions or other non-local stakeholders like private investors) (Sanginga and Martin, 
2007).  
 
Community level conflicts   
 
At community level competition over declining CPRs has sparked internal conflicts between 
individuals, between groups, between individuals and groups. Community level conflicts 
over CPRs often start as local competition; if ignored or unresolved in a timely manner, such 
type of local CPR conflict often escalates with new stakeholders engaging and new topics 
being connected to it. In the worst case conflicts get politicized and become destructive and 
more violent.  The effect of CPR conflict at community level can be tangible (like 
destruction of farms, burning houses and in worst cases physical assault or killing of the 
rival) or intangible such as mistrust among community members and in government 
officials. 
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Violent conflict has usually resulted from competition over agricultural and grazing lands. In 
recent times however, competition over wetlands has been recorded as a driving force behind 
the majority of local confrontations in Lake Tana sub-basin. Then again, CPR conflict is 
usually driven by scarcity of resources, livelihood security, unclear property rights and 
resource boundary (at kebele and/or district level), new market opportunities, unregulated 
resource use and inefficient rules to govern the resources which give an incentive for the 
users to increase their efforts to capture or harvest more resource units from the CPR system.  
 
Intercommunity conflicts 
 
Intercommunity conflicts are usually occurring between neighboring or bordering villages, 
kebeles and districts. In rare cases however, other community members from far distant 
kebeles and districts could be involved in conflict situations of the local community. 
Particularly during dry season, herders move their animals in search for feed and water. For 
example, during winter time when animal feed shortage becomes critical, farmers from the 
highlands and low lands of Amhara region who have relatives in Lake Tana border move 
their herds to Fogera, Dembiya, Achefer and Libokemekem districts so that they can stay for 
at least two months. As a result there are many clashes between the residents and the 
outsiders over the use of wetlands and grazing lands. 
 
Unclear resource boundaries are the major sources of conflicts at intercommunity level 
whereas resource scarcity is another important source of conflict between neighboring 
villages, kebeles districts and beyond. The two case studies (see Box 3 and 4) demonstrate 
two intercommunity conflicts between bordering districts and kebeles respectively.  
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Box3: District-District level conflict: The Libo-Fogera conflict over Ribb River 
 
Ribb River is one of the major tributaries of Lake Tana. The river used to pass dividing both 
district and finally reach Lake Tana. Farmers residing in both districts were used to cultivating 
around the river bank of Ribb. By using water pumps, they used to irrigate their farms from the 
river. Through time, the course of the river has changed from its century old route that divides 
the two districts towards the Libokemkem district leaving Fogera behind. The causes of the 
route change might be a natural phenomenon; however, farmers in Fogera district are pointing 
their fingers towards their counter parts (Libokemekem farmers). They assumed that there was 
clearly a human intervention to change the direction of the river. In due course, this farmer to 
farmer conflict near to the river escalated into kebele to kebele, and then to district to district 
level conflict that involves officials and experts in both districts. This dispute was unresolved 
at the time when this study was conducted. However, recently construction of an irrigation 
dam has been carried out and Ribb River is going to be blocked at the upstream level. This 
might at least loosen the tension between the rival farmers of each district.   
 
       Source: Author, 2012 
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Box4: Conflict within kebeles and between kebeles: The ‘shesher’ wetland 
 
Shesher wetland is found on the Eastern side of Lake Tana in Fogera plain at coordinates of 
11056′21′′N and 370 37′6′′E and bordered by four kebele administrations. The wetland is a 
natural pond maintained by overflow of Ribb River during rainy season. It is one of the 
hotspots in Ethiopia which are considered as important bird areas. Community members in 
each kebele benefits from the wetland in the form of fishing for both household consumption 
and local market, grazing for cattle and small scale irrigation. Currently, this valuable wetland 
is under threat from overgrazing, drainage, water diversions for small irrigation and conversion 
into farmlands (Atnafu et al. 2011) and becomes one of the conflicting spots in the district. 
During dry season farmers from these four kebeles (namely Nabega-from West, Shaga- from 
East, Shina- from North, and Kidisthana- from South) who owned land adjoining the wetland 
follow the water retreat and cultivate until the land dries up completely. Even though there are 
no legal demarcations allotted to each farmer to follow the retreat water, individuals put their 
own arbitrary demarcation (Picture ‘a’) along the street side of their plot. Most often the ‘first-
to plough, first-to hold’ is applied to be entitled to hold use right. Then conflict of demarcation 
within each kebele will continue as the water retreats further. As every farmer from each kebele 
converges into the center (Picture ‘b’) of the sheher wetland, disputes and conflict increase to 
transcend from farmer-to-farmer within kebeles, to kebele-to-kebele conflict. Sometimes these 
conflicts escalate to involve many actors like kebele administrators, local experts and become 
fully fledged conflict that ultimately involves district officials and leads to district level courts.  
    
a) Stick and rope used as a demarcation      b)Cultivated wetland converged to the center 
Source: Author, 2012 
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Supra community conflicts 
 
Supra community conflicts usually happen when the interests of Regional/Federal level 
formal institutions and private investors stand against the will and wellbeing of local 
communities, particularly when it contradicts their collective interest and they were not 
convinced enough. In most cases development goals of the government and private investors 
are challenged by the local community interests (like keeping and preserving the wetlands). 
In such cases, conflict of interests between the local community and outsiders will be 
inevitable. Unless they are convinced, community members will resist any development 
activities in their CPRs.  
 
However, the issue of conserving the ‘commons’ has become politicized and some of the 
community members behind the scene, who had little sense of belonging and awareness of 
any need to preserve and conserve their CPRs, were considered as ‘those who are addicted 
with the status quo’, even some of the district officials considered them as ‘anti-
development’. As a result, local community members could not resist further keeping their 
commons from outsiders. Low participation of the local community in the planning and 
decision making process of development projects, environmental and conservation programs 
were considered as the main causes of supra community conflicts in the study area.   
  
7.3.3.3 The causes and dynamics of CPR conflict  
 
Conflict is an inescapable aspect of the CPR management and governance system. Due to 
multi-stakeholder interaction and diverse power over and interest in CPRs, the dynamics of 
conflict in Lake Tana sub-basin are complex. Therefore, understanding the nature, 
complexities and dynamics of conflict at local level will help to devise effective policy and 
conflict resolution mechanisms. 
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The household survey and focus group discussions’ result shows that the causes and nature 
of resource conflict in the study area are diverse in different localities; however, unclear 
property rights, unclear boundaries between land use (farm land, grazing land and wetland) 
and bordering kebeles and/or districts), scarcity of resources, multiple interest of users and 
poor resource governance were mentioned as the major causes of conflict over CPRs.  
 
Focus group discussion with CPR users also confirmed that scarcity of resources, unclear 
property rights and unclear boundaries (between land use and bordering kebeles and/or 
districts) ranked 1st, 2nd and 3rd respectively as the main causes of CPR conflict in the study 
area. From the survey results, 28%, 22% and 21% of respondents mentioned unclear 
property rights, unclear resource boundaries and scarcity of resources respectively as the 
major causes of CPR conflicts in their localities (see Table 7.2). The nature of resource 
scarcity (whether it is demand driven or structural scarcity e.g. due to distribution problem) 
and the nature of the resources under dispute are an important factor shaping the dynamics of 
a given conflict. The  nature  and  number  of parties to  a  conflict  also has  a  direct  
bearing  on  the  dynamics  of the  conflict and  its  potential  for  resolution (Ayling et al. 
1997).  
 
Table 7.2: Nature and causes of CPR conflicts as perceived and prioritized by users 
Source: Own Survey result and focus group discussion, 2011 
 
Hence, this study confirms that conflict over CPRs particularly water, wetlands and grazing 
lands were more prevalent than fish resource conflict and dispute. This is because of:  The easily accessible and fixed nature of wetlands and grazing lands as compared to 
the mobile and inaccessible nature of fish resources. 
Nature and Causes of Conflict (n=200) Focus Group 
Discussion Rank Frequency % 
Unclear property rights 56 28.0 2nd 
Unclear boundaries  44 22.0 3rd 
Scarcity of resource and competition  42 21.0 1st 
Poor resource  governance 18 9.0 4th  
Multiple interest of stakeholders/users  11 5.5 5th  
All are potential sources of conflict 29 14.5 - 
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 The demand for water, wetland and grazing lands is increasing from time to time and 
involved many stakeholders with diverse interests.   
 
Usually, due to unclear boundaries between individual farms and CPRs (grazing lands, 
lakeshore wetlands and seasonal/permanent ponds like shesher and Welela) neighboring 
farmers were tempted to stretch their farms little by little into the commons. Although it 
reinforced a sense of insecurity among the farming communities, the 1997 land redistribution 
which took place in Amhara region clearly identified and delineated CPRs (such as forest 
land, grazing land and wetlands) and no one was allowed to use these resources privately.  
 
In 2005, with the objective of improving tenure security, registration of land holdings and 
granting land use certificates to holders was undertaken. In due course, communal lands, 
forest and grazing areas were also supposed to be delineated, registered and certified. 
However, during the registration process, many cases of illegal encroachment into wetlands, 
common grazing fields, forest and marginal areas were disclosed. Even though the law states 
that such illegally held plots will be taken away and given to landless people or returned to 
the commons, those cultivating these encroachments oppose such decisions (Berhanu and 
Fayera, 2005).  
 
According to focus group discussion participants most of the land registration and 
certification activities around Lake Tana (particularly in Fogera and Libokemekem districts) 
were suspended for quite some time. In due course, most of the greedy and corrupted kebele 
officials who have land holding adjacent to the common pools included and registered 
communal lands and wetlands into their holding through illegal land grabbing. As a result 
the most powerful groups (wealthy and/or politically motivated individuals) owned common 
wetlands illegally with legal land certificates. Since then private land holding and communal 
holding became a source of conflict. 
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According to key informants, police and militia reports, CPR conflicts between members of 
local community have become increasingly common in each kebele and district. The 
majority of legal cases examined in each district court were either land or other natural 
resource related disputes typically wetland and grazing land.  More than 78 % of the 
respondents mentioned that resource conflicts are more prevalent than earlier (two or three 
decades), and with advent of population pressure, resource scarcity and other socioeconomic 
factors, conflict over CPRs will likely increase in the coming decades as well. The majority 
(70%) of the respondents mentioned that over the last 10 years conflict had been occurring 
more frequently whenever resource users are coming together to use their CPRs (see Table 
7.3).  
 
Table 7.3: The prevalence of conflict over CPR in Lake Tana sub-basin  
Source: own survey result, 2011        
 
7.3.3.4 CPR conflict management and resolution mechanisms   
 
Conflict is inevitable, and has steadily increased, but so too has human effort to explain and 
manage it (Bartos and Wehr, 2002). Conflict has to be managed and resolved as early as 
possible, otherwise, if it escalates and involves many stakeholders it is difficult to manage. 
As mentioned by Scheffran (2006), stakeholders can negotiate to find a solution to the 
conflict themselves through negotiation and discussion between two parties working toward 
reaching agreement without assistance, or with the help of a mediator. Mediation is a 
voluntary part of the negotiation process which aims for a common ground, with a neutral, 
independent person or groups who monitors and manages the process and assists the 
disputing parties to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. Arbitration is one of the conflict 
resolution mechanisms where disputing parties resolved their argument using an independent 
Items Response Frequency (n=200) Percentage 
Were conflicts over CPR more 
prevalent in the past 10 years? 
Yes 157 78.5 
No 43 21.5 
How frequently has conflict 
among resource users arisen? 
Always 140 70.0 
Seldom 53 26.5 
Never happened 3 1.5 
I don’t know 4 2.0 
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third party. In this case, the third party determines a binding settlement. Stakeholders can 
also use the formal means of conflict resolution methods by using the justice system with 
judge and/or jury.  
 
In the study area, selection of the conflict management approaches depends on the extent to 
which the conflict situation is escalated and at what level (local and higher) conflict has 
risen. If it is simple, not difficult to handle and occurred at a very local level (example; 
within villages, and/or kebeles), both conflicting parties may find a solution by themselves 
through negotiation or using traditional approaches mediated by a third party. However, if 
conflicts are complicated and lead to violence, multiple stakeholders such as kebele militia, 
local administrators, experts, police, and district administrators will be involved and the 
cases could be directed to arbitration or the formal justice system. Higher level CPR 
conflicts usually comprise incompatibility of conservation and development goals and 
overlapping mandates and responsibilities among relevant stakeholders. These types of 
conflicts are resolved through policy revision, stakeholder workshops to negotiate over the 
situation and to reach a national and regional consensus. However, this is done very rarely as 
an ad-hoc measure and does not involve lower level stakeholders.  
 
At community level a range of traditional or non-formal methods were used to manage or 
solve CPR related conflict. Traditionally community members used to manage conflicts by 
devising local level customary laws and courts. As reported by Pankhurst and Getachew 
(2008), most of the customary institutions of conflict resolution in the study area take place 
on an ad hoc basis. They were usually assigned as conflict erupted, dispute and tensions over 
resources increased. Traditional institutions of conflict resolution play a very significant role 
in the day-to-day lives of rural people in the study area and elsewhere in Ethiopia. They 
serve as alternative institutions of conflict resolution in a country where the formal legal 
system is failing to fully meet the judiciary needs of the nation (Zeleke, 2010).  
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In the study area mostly known traditional CPR conflict management and resolution 
mechanisms or institutions are called ‘Ye giligil shimgilina’ and ‘Dem Adirk’ or Ye dem Irk). 
The judges or the arbiters are called ‘shimagiles’. These are customary approaches designed 
by the community for the community. Then again, terminologies of these traditional forms 
of out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms are still blurred in the eyes of formal justice 
system and different people use a variety of terminologies in different localities. However, in 
almost all the Amharic versions of legal texts in Ethiopia (such as civil, commercial and 
family codes and proclamations) the English term arbitration is translated as either ‘Yezemed 
dangninet’, or ‘Shimglina’, or ‘Giligil’ or less frequently, Irq (Fekadu, 2009). After a critical 
analysis of the alternative words, Fekadu (2009) concludes that, although none of these 
words hit the nail on its head with due precision, ‘giligil dangninet’ seems to be preferable 
for it has gained better acceptance among the legal community, and owing to its wider use in 
recent legislations.  
 
‘Ye giligil dagninet’ or ‘shimgilina’-‘የግልግል’ዳኝነት’ወይም’ሽምግልና’ 
 
‘Shimglina’, which literally means elderliness, is the most rooted system in the Ethiopian 
traditional dispute resolution scheme. It is a practice that combines a hybrid of what a 
modern lawyer calls mediation, conciliation, compromise and arbitration proper (Fekadu, 
2009). The judges or the mediators are called ‘Shimageles’. These are elder’s council called 
‘Ye giligil Shimagiles’ who are playing key roles in solving minor disputes and bringing 
more serious ones to formal social courts. The members of the ‘ye giligil shimagiles’ 
comprise well respected elders of the community. Being elder by itself may not be 
considered as criterion to be selected as a ‘ye giligil shimagilies’, rather they have to be well 
respected and recognized by the community members. Elderly doesn’t merely signify age; it 
rather refers to the wisdom and social status of a person as valued by the community in 
question including, of course age and experience (Fekadu, 2009). They are autonomous in 
their decision. Both conflicting parties respect and accept any decision made by the elders.   
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‘Dem adirk’/’ ye Dem irk’ shimgilina-‘የደም’እርቅ’ሽምግልና’  
 
According to key informants (both district experts and community elders), land based 
resource conflicts, particularly conflict over farm land, wetland and grazing land, are 
common in the study area. The worst case in these conflicting situations is when conflict 
becomes fully fledged violence and claims human life. ‘Dem Adirk’ or ‘ye dem irk’ is a 
traditional way of conflict resolution method where respected community elders were 
selected to handle severe conflicts like physical assault and death among individuals and 
groups. Sometimes religious leaders could be included as a member of ‘Dem adirk’. These 
are usually applied when the conflicting situation has escalated and took some one’s life to 
death. This is just to protect family members of the offender against the revenge by the 
victim’s family member. Usually, the offender will be judged by the formal court as per the 
Ethiopian penal Code and other rules. However, the offender’s family members and relatives 
will send those elders (Dem adirk) to the victim’s family for apology and compensation.   
 
The key informants further argued that, in recent time however, these traditional (non-
formal) conflict management and resolution methods have been weakened by distrust among 
community members and insufficient support from local government. They strongly believe 
that government’s decentralization program that ignores the local contexts affects the 
informal institutions. Formal legal reforms have essentially destroyed or paralyzed many of 
these traditional conflict resolution methods such that due to growing population pressure 
and mistrust among community members they often prefer the formal methods of conflict 
resolution and management. Most people have sought to settle disputes by directing cases to 
the local courts rather than relying on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, but still 
local people were not happy with the formal courts. Cases were resolved very slowly, 
sometimes taking more than a year and judgments were implicitly biased towards the better-
off groups, politically affiliated or connected personalities and those who can afford to give 
‘Gubbo18’ to higher officials including judges and police. 
 
                                                 
18
 ‘Gubbo’-is a local Amharic term to mean ‘a gift for someone, in exchange for doing something  
                 special’ equivalent to English word’ corruption’ or ‘bribery’ 
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7.4 Evaluation of the outcomes of the governance interaction 
 
7.4.1 Introduction  
 
When we analyze and evaluate outcomes of the governance interaction, we are really 
analyzing the performance of the natural resource management and governance system. 
Hence, we need some kind of objective standard or principle for comparison (Polski and 
Ostrom, 1999). Performance reflects the outcomes produced by the patterns of interactions 
of different actors responsible for common pool resource use, management and governance 
in terms of benefits, participation in key decision making processes. 
 
SWOT analysis is used to assess the overall governance interaction in the sub-basin. The 
data sources for SWOT analysis are mainly drawn from stakeholder analysis workshop 
participants and a series of focus group discussions across the sampled districts. During the 
interactive workshop and focus group discussions, participants were asked to identify 
internal factors (the strengths and weaknesses) of the overall CPR governance system and 
explore the external factors (opportunities and threats) that affect the governance system. 
Therefore the outcomes of the governance interaction was evaluated based on internal and 
external factors affecting the governance system, organizational capacity of actors, central 
and local governance linkage, rulemaking and enforcement process and the application of 
procedural principles and values of the governance system. As seen from Table 7.4, the 
results of the SWOT analysis help to see the reality of the CPR governance system in Lake 
Tana sub-basin. The analysis highlights the possibilities for innovative efforts or solutions to 
problems. It will also give a list of action points for intervention. 
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Table 7.4: SWOT matrix of the CPR management and governance system 
 
    Source: Stakeholder Identification and analysis workshop and group discussion (2011)
STRENGTHS  Sound environmental policy framework at 
Federal/Constitutional  level  Availability of governance structure (from Federal 
to kebele level)  Increasing environmental knowledge and 
awareness of stakeholders  
WEAKNESSES  Lack of effective, timely rule making and enforcement mechanisms  Lack of directives and guidelines to enforce the existing laws on 
resource and environmental governance  Poor horizontal and vertical linkage  among stakeholders   Poor grassroots level stakeholder participation (eg. Local community) 
in policy planning, law and decision making process  Bypassing the mandates of stakeholders  Overlapping mandates between stakeholders  Poor organizational capacity and environmental management skills of 
stakeholders  Inadequate stakeholder culture and commitment   Lack of multi-stakeholder interaction forums at grassroots level to 
dialogue over CPR management and governance   Lack of incentive for resource users (community groups and private 
investors) to prevent environmental degradation and CPR exploitation 
OPPORTUNITIES  Emergence of international and national level 
multi-stakeholder forums/initiatives (eg. like Nile 
Basin Initiative)  Growing public concern over environmental issues  The presence of proclamations and regulations at 
constitutional level to protect the environment  
THREATS  Frequent organizational structural changes and staff turnover  Multi-dimensional and often divergent interests of stakeholders over 
CPRs  High resource demand driven by high population pressure and 
absence of binding rules  Escalating conflict over resources 
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7.4.2 Organizational capacity of actors in the action arena 
 
Organizational capacity has been defined here as ‘a set of attributes that help or enable an 
organization to fulfill its missions’ (Eisinger, 2002). Attributes commonly associated with 
high organizational capacity are governance and leadership, mission, vision, and strategy; 
common values, program and strategic relationships; resource development; internal 
operations and management.  In addition, for effective organizational capacity, networking, 
political power, skill of leaders, trust and unity among stakeholders within the organization 
are essential parameters. These interdependent factors all contribute to high performance of 
the organization to fulfill its missions. On the other hand, institutional instability is best 
understood as a pattern in which, given a common environment (i.e., exogenous shocks like 
changes in power), a particular institutional arrangement changes with greater frequency 
than other similarly designed ones (Levitsky, 2009). 
 
The SWOT analysis (Table 7.4) confirms that most key stakeholders (particularly formal 
organizations) in the study area who are involved in resource management and governance 
are characterized by lack of organizational capacity and institutional instability. According to 
workshop participants, institutional instability caused by frequent changes in organizational 
structures is one of the crucial factors that negatively affect the CPR management and 
governance system.  Due to these changes, personnel find themselves working for agencies 
or jobs for which they are not properly qualified. Instability of the institutional structure 
creates a dynamics of power shift in decision making on CPR management and governance 
from one key stakeholder to another. Institutional instability in terms of the incongruence 
between formal rules and informal norms also affects CPR management and governance.  
 
The documentary analysis of proclamations and regulations shows that frequent and often 
unplanned organizational re-structuring and institutional changes are quite common in 
Ethiopia particularly at ministry level. For instance, initially the FDRE Proclamation No. 
4/1995 that defined the powers and duties of the executive organs established 15 ministries. 
After 10 years, Proclamation No. 471/2005 that repealed the previous proclamation re-
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structured the executive organs and 20 ministries were approved. Again after 5 years 
proclamation No. 471/2005 was repealed by proclamation No. 691/2010 and almost all 
(except 5 ministries that remain untouched) executive organs and ministries were merged, re-
structured and re-organized with different and/or additional mandates. This implies that in 
the past 15 years, different ministries were separated, merged and/or dissolved to redefined 
mandates and responsibilities. In due course, institutional arrangements are changed and 
revised overtime.  
 
As reported by Vaughan (2004), regular separation, reemerging, and re-separation of 
ministries and sector offices like those dealing with agriculture, natural resource 
management, and environmental protection has occurred. As a result, institutional instability 
impinges on institutional capacity and development. This is characterized by overlapping 
mandates and responsibilities of agencies, as well as frequent changes in mandates.  A 
typical example here is the Ministry of Agriculture which has been changing its structure for 
the last 3 or 4 decades. Even very recently, it has been changed from Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (MoARD) and retains its former name Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA).  
 
Frequent changes and often unplanned organizational re-structuring become detrimental to 
the attainment of the mission and goals of individual organizations and disruptive to the 
sustainability of linkages, collaborations and coordination of institutions among different 
stakeholders. With the advent of very dynamic organizational and institutional changes, it 
becomes hard to monitor the roles, responsibilities, and accountability of stakeholders in the 
process of CPR management and governance. Based on these assumptions it was 
hypothesized that stakeholders are characterized by a weak organizational capacity and 
institutional stability to effectively manage and govern CPRs in the study area.  
 
Therefore following the power and interest level analysis, workshop participants identified 8 
criteria to evaluate the organizational capacity of the most dominant and influential 
stakeholders of Lake Tana CPR management and governance. After a brainstorming session 
two prominent stakeholders were selected and evaluated by the participants as important 
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cases. As mentioned in chapter 5 (Table 5.8) of this research, BoA and Bo-EPLUA are 
considered as two of the influential stakeholders with the highest power and interest level 
who have the potential to exert a substantial impact on CPR management and governance. 
Therefore the strength and organizational capacity of these stakeholders were evaluated 
using spider diagrams.  
 
The spider diagrams (Figures 7.1 and 7.2) help to analyze and provide a visual summary of 
institutional capacity of selected key players of CPR management and governance at the 
regional level. The tool assesses the organizational capacity of stakeholders based on; a) 
technical competency of experts to execute policies and enforce proclamations,  rules and 
regulations; b) client focused planning and decision making; c) linkage and collaboration 
with other relevant stakeholders; d) stakeholder participation and engagement in planning, 
policy and law making processes; e) transparency and accountability in natural resource 
management and governance; f) environmental concern and understanding of the CPRs 
context; g) knowledge and values integration with other stakeholders; and h) leadership and 
commitment. The spider diagram illustrates the level of strengths as well as the overall 
balance of the organizational capacity of key stakeholders in CPR management and 
governance. The tool also helps to identify key areas of improvements in the organization. 
 
Figure (7.1) indicates that Bureau of Agriculture (BoA) has critical shortcomings in almost 
all criteria listed above. Concerning Lake Tana and its surrounding wetlands, BoA has a very 
low environmental concern and understanding of the CPR context. Regardless of the broader 
natural resource conservation strategies that took place at the upstream of the Lake Tana 
watersheds, BoA was not able to play its pivotal role as supposed to protect the Lake 
ecosystem.  
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Figure 7.1: Spider diagram of organizational capacity- Bureau of Agriculture (BoA) 
                     Source: Stakeholder Identification and analysis workshop, 2011  
                  
Figure 7.2: Spider diagram of organizational capacity- (Bo-EPLUA)  
                     Source: Stakeholder Identification and analysis workshop, 2011  
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The Ministry at the Federal level vested powers and duties to devise and facilitate the 
implementation of a strategy for natural resources protection through sustained agricultural 
development (Proclamation No. 471/2005 Article 16/d and Proclamation No.691/2010 
Article 19/1/e), whereas experts and local administrators encourage expansion of agricultural 
development, for example rice cultivation in Fogera and Denbiya plain at the expense of 
wetland ecosystems. This might be due to its ambitious mission and strategies for boosting 
agricultural production for food security as a priority agenda that compromises the 
sustainable production and conservation of natural resources particularly common-pool 
resources.  
 
Despite its organizational structure that spans from the Federal to kebele level, BoA has 
weak knowledge and value integration with other relevant stakeholders.  Natural resource 
development planning and decision making processes are characterized by a top down 
approach where stakeholder participation and engagement were very minimal. As a result 
policies, strategies, rules and regulations that were enacted at the constitutional level were 
not transparent enough to the local community including grassroots level experts. It is not 
client focused but rather serves the interest of higher officials. Notably, technical 
competency of district experts and Development Agents (DAs), awareness and commitment 
of senior managements and experts to implement natural resource policies and strategies, 
proclamations, rules and regulations need to be significantly improved.  
 
Unlike the Bureau of Agriculture, Bureau of Environmental Protection Land Use and 
Administration (Bo-EPLUA) has relatively satisfactory technical competency of experts, 
environmental concern and understanding of CPR context, leadership and commitment (see 
Figure 7.2). However, the Bureau has a poor situation in terms of its relationship with other 
stakeholders and with its clients, knowledge and values integration, participation and 
engagement with other stakeholders. With regard to transparency and accountability, Bo-
EPLUA has critical shortcomings. This suggests that the critical constraints of Bo-EPLUA 
capacity to address the CPRs problems and other related environmental issues are therefore 
related more to stakeholder participation, engagement, accountability and transparency than 
to either technical skills or basic management competencies.  
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A typical example here is the way in which decisions are reached in Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) of projects and investment licenses around Lake Tana sub-basin. As noted 
by Sadler (1996), EIA decision-making requires striking a balance between economic, 
environmental, social and other criteria. Therefore it is a political process involving trade-
offs between conservation and development goals rather than purely scientific undertakings. 
This trade-off process takes place largely behind ‘closed doors’ and is not transparent to the 
public. However, all decisions about natural resource governance priorities and investments 
should be accessible to all stakeholders who potentially are affected by the decision. 
Transparency is required in who has made a decision; the means by which it has been 
reached; and its justification (Lockwood et al. 2010).  
 
Figure 7.3 illustrates two contrasting scenarios of investment and environmental protection 
activities around the southern tip of Lake Tana shore. The first scenario (picture ‘a’) depicts 
where wetland is protected by a group of users organized by Bo-EPLUA. Wetland users are 
benefiting from the wetland while they are protecting the resources from degradation. They 
had devised and use their own bylaws to manage and govern the wetland in a sustainable 
manner. Conversely, within one kilometer radius(picture ‘b’), a wetland is subjected to 
destruction where private investors were allowed to fill the wetlands with gravels and 
changed wetlands into ‘bare lands’ whereby investors destroyed the flora and fauna of the 
ecosystem for construction of resorts, harbor and other recreational sites. This is the result of 
unintended outcomes of the investment policies in the region where environmental concerns 
have not been integrated into development activities.  
 
With the mandate of ensuring the implementation of the regional land and environmental 
laws and policies, designing and implementing land registration program, drafting policy and 
legal instruments having to do with land administration and environmental protection, and 
establish systems for effective environmental impact assessment, Bo-EPLUA is directly or 
indirectly involved in both scenarios.  
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As discussed in chapter 6, section 6.2.3.3 of this research, Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) Proclamation No. 299/2002, Article 3, sub article 1 and 3 states that: 
 
‘No person shall commence implementation of any project or development activities that 
require EIA. Any licensing agency (in this case, ANRS Investment Bureau and/or Bahir 
Dar City Municipality) shall, prior to issuing an investment permit or a trade or an 
operating license for any project; ensure that the Authority (EPA) or the relevant 
regional environmental agency (Bo-EPLUA) has authorized its implementation’. 
Therefore, had there been a clear and transparent decision making process among each units 
in Bo-EPLUA (for example EIA section and Land Use and Administration) and between 
other relevant stakeholders, there might not be such contradictory scenarios within one 
kilometer radius. 
    
 
(a)                                                                             (b) 
Figure 7.3: Comparison of protected (a) and unprotected wetlands (b)  
Location: Near to Bahir Dar Fishery and Aquatic Life Research Center (BDFLARC) 
Source: The Author (2011) 
 
Coupled with poor organizational capacity and institutional instability, very poor stakeholder 
coordination, linkage and lack of joint planning and implementation negatively affect CPR 
management and governance. Even if almost all executive organs established under the 
Ethiopian proclamation are obliged to cooperate with other concerned bodies, there were no 
multi-stakeholder interaction forums at collective choice and grassroots level to cooperate, 
negotiate and dialogue over CPR management and governance. Instead of making linkage 
 Within a  
1 km radius 
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and collaboration, each stakeholder preferred to create its own jurisdictions and act based 
upon their own knowledge perspective. Stakeholders make choices and decisions based on 
their own preferences, objectives or mandates.  
 
The documentary analysis of proclamations shows that with regard to administration and 
management of natural resources, there are sometimes ambiguities regarding power and 
responsibilities. Roles, responsibilities and accountabilities are not clearly defined leading to 
an overlap in the mandates of the key institutions and organizations managing and governing 
natural resources. While all stakeholders have the same overall goal of protecting the natural 
resources, they have very different knowledge, approaches and perspectives in terms of 
sustainable management and governance. Even they are operating in various contexts and 
institutional environment. This might create some confusion and conflict in resource 
management and governance at different levels. 
7.4.3 Central-local incongruence: Central and local government linkage 
  
Effective natural resource management and governance requires democratic and mutually 
supportive central and local governance institutions (Lockwood et al. 2010). The role of 
local institutions such as local government units (kebele and district administrations), both 
formal and informal local organizations like cooperatives, traditional and culture groups 
(Mahber, senbete, and Edir), and NGOs, is becoming more important for successful CPR 
management and governance. Common-pool resource management and governance is a 
function of the formal and informal institutions that govern and oversee access to and 
withdrawal of the resource (Ostrom, 1990). These units facilitate knowledge exchange, 
information flow and enforcement of formal rules at grassroots level. However, as discussed 
in chapters 5 and 6, stakeholders involved in the governing system (the executive agencies at 
a collective and constitutional level) were not able to understand the local context where 
local level governing systems interact with the system to be governed at the operational 
level. There was also an inadequate understanding of how local communities shape not only 
the organizations and the resource management and governance outcomes at user level, but 
even the context and environment in which they operate. 
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Due to this incongruence, government technical agencies and local level governance 
structures have been ineffective in managing and governing CPRs; it seems they are neither 
able to replace many of the resource management and governance functions previously 
provided by indigenous cultural and communal institutions nor complement the informal 
institutions. There are concerns that some local institutional arrangements are breaking down 
due to a lack of support from local administrative structures, despite the process of 
decentralization, and this has major implications for the sustainable use of CPRs and food 
security throughout the region (Maconachie et al. 2008). The formal rule making and 
implementation process is characterized by lengthy, non-participatory and often poor 
political commitment of concerned governmental bodies to enforce the rules and regulations 
at different level (see Table 7.5 and Box 5). Local government units, formal and informal 
organizations were not consulted in policy planning and governance issues. 
7.4.4 Rule making and enforcement process  
 
Passing a new law or writing a new regulation is not the equivalent of establishing a new 
rule. Laws and regulations must be enforced at user level to become rules (Ostrom V. 1991; 
Hodgson and Calatrava, 2006). Once enacted, rules and regulations have to be enforced as 
early as possible to meet their intended objectives. And yet, to be effective they must be 
accepted as legitimate by resource users and complement their local bylaws and conventions. 
However, the documentary analysis of this research reveals that, in Ethiopia the process of 
rule making and enforcement of the rules is very lengthy.  
 
Domestically, the national legal systems have no limitation to enact legislations, protocols 
and other procedures at constitutional level but the problem to enforce and implement the 
rules and regulations at the operational level lies with the executive bodies. The legislators 
are concentrated on developing new laws and creating new institutions, rather than building 
capacity for ensuring compliance with existing rules and working on enforcement 
mechanisms. In most cases, lack of political will, commitment and technical capacity of the 
implementing agencies at the grassroots level, weak institutional structure, linkage and 
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collaborations among relevant stakeholders are considered as main factors affecting 
successful implementation of national and international laws related to natural resources and 
environmental protection.  
 
Table 7.5 shows a summary of rule making processes in Ethiopian natural resources 
management and environmental contexts. The analysis clearly shows that there is a very long 
time elapse between policy formulation and proclamation/regulation enactment. For 
instance, the environmental policy of Ethiopia was endorsed in 1997. After 5 years of delay, 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Pollution Control proclamations were enacted 
in 2002. Even after 16 years of environmental policy, there is no specific regulation that 
clearly defines and enforces the EIA proclamation. 
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Table 7.5: Lengthy law making process in resource management and governance 
 
Issue Policy issued or 
adopted 
Proclamation enacted/revised  Regulation enacted  No. of years took to enact 
proclamation/regulation  
Land resources 1995 
(inserted in FDRE 
Constitution) 
1997/2005 (Rural land 
Administration-Federal) 
No specific regulation 2 years (for the 1997 Proc.) 
10 years (for the revised Proc.)  
2005 (Expropriation of 
Landholding) 
2007 10/12 years 
2000/2006 (Rural land 
administration- ANRS) 
-2004 (for 2000 proclamation) 
-No specific regulation for 2006 
revised proclamation so far 
5 years (for the 2000 Proc.) 
11 years (for the revised Proc.) 
Water resources 1999 
 
2000 2005 1/6 years  
Fish resources No specific policy 
so far 
2003  
( Federal and Regional) 
2007 (ANRS) 4 years 
Wetlands 
resources 
No specific policy No specific proclamation  No specific regulation  - 
Environmental 
issues 
1997 2002 (EIA Proc.) No specific regulation so far 
Draft guideline19 (2003) 
 
5/16 years 
2002 (Pollution control Proc.) 2008 (Prevention of Industrial 
Pollution Regulation) 
5/11 years 
2007 (Solid waste management 
Proc.) 
No specific regulation so far 10 years 
Source: Review of policy documents, proclamation and regulations own presentation, 2012 
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 Procedural Guidelines and Review Guidelines, which have been finalized in 2003. 
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Box5: The lengthy law making process and its impact on fish resource governance 
 
Although Ethiopia has not yet formulated a specific policy for fishery, the enactment of the 
Fishery Development and Utilization Proclamations and legislations in 2003 at Federal and 
Regional level was considered as a breakthrough to protect fish and other aquatic resources 
in Lake Tana sub-basin. However, it took 4 years to endorse the Regional regulation in 2007. 
After delay for 3 years, the Regional Parliament approved the Regional Fisheries Guideline.  
In 2011 guidelines were developed at Federal level and submitted to the council of Ministers. 
It is surprising that it is still not endorsed at Federal level where it affected the timely 
development of the Amhara Region Guideline. According to the regional Fishery Regulation 
for commercial fishing, every fisherman has to have a fishing license to access and harvest 
fish resources. Any fish harvester shall, having acquired a lawful license, have the right to 
harvest fish either permanently or temporarily, in an individual, group or associational 
capacity (Regulation No. 50/2007, Article 6/2). Besides, the license will incorporate the type 
and amount of fishing gear, the boat number and size and the number of days someone 
should fish on the Lake. And yet, there was no implementation directive to enforce the rules 
and regulations at user level and it was 10 years (in 2012) since the proclamations were 
enacted. However, the Bureau of Agriculture which has been given the responsibility to 
handle the overall governance of the fishery sector has not finalized preparation to start 
licensing of fishers and management of the resource. Despite the existence of the rules of the 
game at the constitutional level, there is no restriction on access and harvesting of the 
resources to protect illegal fishing at the user level. As a result fish resource access and 
harvesting rights are not restricted to protect illegal fishing in Lake Tana jurisdiction. 
Therefore, every potential fishermen can access and harvest at any time, using any type of 
fishing gear, as he/she wish. In recent times, the non-excludability characteristic of the fish 
resource entitlement also gives incentives for many youths entering into the fishing sector as 
an option for their livelihood. In due course, the fish resource has been overharvested, 
endemic species are depleted and conflict over fish resources is increasing. If there is no rule, 
obviously every fisherman will be tempted to harvest more, because there is no incentive to 
conserve the fish stock, as a result the fish he/she left will be picked up by another.  
Source: Author, 2011 
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7.4.5 Procedural principles and values of the governing system 
 
As proposed by an interactive governance perspective, procedural principles and values 
guide the process of decision making and interaction with a governance system (Bavinck et 
al. 2005; Kooiman et al. 2008). However, principles and values of the governance system 
can only become the foundation of governance systems if all the stakeholders agree and 
accept them, explicitly (Kooiman et al. 2008). The application of such principles is 
therefore to ensure that all stakeholders involved are treated as equals and have full access 
to the process of formulation of natural resource management and governance (Bavinck et 
al. 2005). It also helps to evaluate and criticize current governance systems and suggest 
reforms (Kooiman et al. 2008). 
 
After a brainstorming session, during the stakeholder identification and analysis workshop, 
Lake Tana’s CPR management and governance system was evaluated and criticized based 
on the seven procedural principles suggested by Hobley and Shields (2000). The key 
purpose of the governance system assessment based on the procedural principles is to 
understand what is going on in the management and governance process with the intention 
of identifying the gaps and develop appropriate interventions in the long run. The seven 
procedural principles are presented in Box 6.  
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Principally, legitimate stakeholders who have interest in and power over CPRs in Lake 
Tana sub-basin should be part and parcel of any decision making process in their 
respective jurisdiction. Issues of representation, inclusiveness and transparency will be 
critical to building the necessary trust for each stakeholder’s legitimacy. Additionally, 
legitimacy depends on the ability of the process to engage the stakeholders in a meaningful 
dialogue in which they feel ownership and the possibility to derive benefits. This requires 
full transparency, openness and respect (Vallejo and Hauselmann, 2004).  
 
 
 
Box6: Procedural principles of governance system 
 
A governing system is said to be; 
 
Transparent- If everyone sees how decisions are made and who makes them. 
 
Accountable- If decision-makers (both local and governmental) are procedurally and 
periodically answerable to those they represent 
 
Comprehensive- If all interest groups are consulted from the outset in defining the nature of 
the problem or opportunity prior to any decisions about management being taken. 
 
Inclusive- If all those who have a legitimate interest (in particular CPR livelihood 
dependent groups) are involved. 
 
Representative- If decision-makers are representative of all interest groups. 
 
Informed- If all interest groups understand the objectives of the participatory process, have 
adequate and timely access to relevant information. 
 
Empowered- If all interest groups (youths, women and men), are capable of actively 
participating in decision making in a non-dominated environment.  
                                                                                             
  
 Source: Hobley and Shields, (2000) 
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According to Lockwood et al. (2010), transparency refers to the visibility of decision-
making processes; the clarity with which the reasoning behind decisions is communicated; 
and the ready availability of relevant information about governance and performance in an 
organization. Transparency is the basis for accountability in a natural resource governance 
system. It increases stakeholders’ and public confidences, improves the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government policies and strategies. For the governance system to be 
transparent it requires the provision of reliable information on the overall socio-ecological, 
socioeconomic and political milieu for all relevant stakeholders. Transparency and 
accountability in natural resource governance is therefore essential (Darby, 2010). 
 
Therefore, the question of whose views and interests are articulated in institutional regimes 
becomes crucial if CPR management and governance are at stake. Stakeholders who have a 
legitimate interest in and power over CPRs were supposed to be empowered and involved 
in the decision making processes that affect their resource use patterns and livelihood. 
However, in practice, legitimate stakeholders, particularly the voiceless stakeholders such 
as women, youths and local community, were not consulted and involved in the natural 
resource management and governance-related decision making process. As a result, 
powerful stakeholders, such as state authorities spanning from Federal to Regional level, 
rent-seeking private investors (local and international), and corrupted local kebele and 
district leaders might try to shape institutions in their favor. Hence, institutions are shaped 
by power relations among stakeholders and politics (Darby, 2010) rather than by 
participation and negotiation among stakeholders. Power relations within social, economic, 
legal, political and institutional spheres are fundamental to governance in natural resource. 
The involvement of the state through bureaucratic institutions is clearly visible in natural 
resources management (Khan, 2012). 
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This study confirms that current formal institutions are often defined in top-down 
processes (at constitutional and collective choice level) and do not take account of local 
social structures and of existing traditional community bylaws and institutions in a specific 
context. Institutions that govern CPRs were enacted and imposed upon users in a top down 
manner. As a result, they fail to include marginalized (for example, the Negede woyto 
community, women and youths) and less powerful stakeholders (local community) in an 
equitable way. Although property rights and formal rules that govern the use of CPRs 
exist, they are not credible in the eyes of local people and ignored stakeholders. Therefore, 
these groups are not committed to compliance with the existing rules and regulations. As a 
result conflicts are likely to emerge among stakeholders. It also undermines the 
transparency and accountability of how CPR concessions are allocated, who are involved 
in the allocation process and how the benefits of major investments in Lake Tana sub-
basin are distributed between investors, regional and national governments and local 
communities.  
 
Although it is based on subjective evaluation of analysts, the spider diagram (Figure 7.5) 
illustrates that the overall CPR management and governance system of Lake Tana sub-
basin needs to dramatically improve the procedural principles of the governance system. 
Almost all the basic principles were falling inside the red (inner) circle of undesirable 
circumstances that need a dramatic improvement.   
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Figure 7.4: Spider diagram of evaluation of the CPR governance system 
                Source: Stakeholder Identification and analysis workshop, 2011  
 
 
Governance rules and regulations must be clear in nature and seen as appropriate by local 
stakeholders (Fisher et al. 2010) and must be in accordance with the overarching concerns 
and standards of all stakeholders (Bavinck et al. 2005). Stakeholders can only be confident 
about the reliability of the resource governance process if they know what is going on in 
their commons. Decisions which govern the use of CPRs should be societal and 
participatory where viewpoints from multiple stakeholders are balanced against potential 
costs and benefits of various resource uses (Scrimgeour and Wicklum, 1996). However, if 
the rules are seen to come from another stakeholder group (or from ‘above’) in a top down 
approach then the legitimacy of the rules, regulations and compliance by local stakeholders 
is greatly compromised (Marshall, 2005). 
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In a participatory approach, management decisions are more easily embraced by those who 
have been part of the decision-making process, and greater attention is paid to the needs 
and expectations of all stakeholders (Ostrom et al. 1993). Empirical research studies in the 
highlands of Eastern African countries also show that when communities are fully 
involved in the process of natural resource management, bylaw formulation and 
enforcement and both conventional and indigenous bylaw enforcement mechanisms have 
been adopted and incidences of conflict, overexploitation, and abuse of natural resources 
were drastically reduced. The participation of stakeholders at different stages of the 
resource management and governance is also often seen as a key in mediating conflicts and 
relationships between government agencies, civil societies, resource users and the private 
sector. The engagement of relevant stakeholders in decision-making leads to collectively 
and socially desirable outcomes, as stakeholders share risk and responsibility in the process 
of natural resource management and governance (Khan, 2012). 
 
A typical example here is that, the village bylaws in Southern Tigray regional state 
mitigated forest degradation by facilitating users to have common goals in the management 
of enclosures, and resolved the conflicts among users by using monetary sanctions (Yami 
et al. 2013). In addition, Persha et al. (2011) also confirmed that forest systems across the 
globe are more likely to have sustainable outcomes (above average tree species richness 
and subsistence livelihoods) when local forest users participate in forest rulemaking, 
whereas unsustainable forest system outcomes are more likely when users do not 
participate in rulemaking. 
 
However, in the case of Lake Tana sub-basin, the majority of stakeholders were not 
involved in the decision making process regarding resource management and governance. 
Particularly resource users are not well informed about and aware of the proclamations and 
regulations enacted at the constitutional level. For instance, at the user level almost 95% of 
the sampled respondents do not know the existence of the Fishery Development and 
Utilization Proclamation and/or Regulations. On the other hand, from the sampled experts 
at district level, who are expected to enforce the rules and regulations, more than 87% were 
not even aware of these proclamations and regulations (see Table 7.6). This implies that, 
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once the rules and regulations were enacted at a higher level, either there was poor 
communication to the lower level to enforce the rules, or the process of rule making (the 
way rules come into existence) is not participatory to involve all parties in the fishery 
governance system.  
 
Table 7.6: Respondents’ knowledge about proclamation and regulation 
Source: Own survey result, 2011 
 
Community members were also asked to evaluate how well the existing institutional 
arrangements (property rights of land and other resources) are clear and open to all 
resource users. The general perception is that institutional arrangements that are currently 
in place are not clear and open to all users. The majority (80%) of the respondents who are 
considered as the primary users of the CPRs agreed that the current institutional 
arrangements were poor/very poor to govern the CPRs and more than 65 percent of the 
respondents considered the existing rules and regulations as inefficient and not transparent 
for all users (see Figure 7.6). The rules and regulations were not effective in meeting the 
high expectations of users in equitable, fair and sustainable CPR use and management. 
 
 
 
 Knowledge of fishery 
legislation 
District experts (n=15) User level (n=200) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Yes  2 13.3 11 5.5 
No 13 86.7 189 94.5 
Total 15 100 200 100 
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Figure 7.5: Resource users’ perception of existing institutional arrangements (n=200)  
                   Source: Own survey result, 2011 
 
 
According to key informants of Fogera, Libokemekem and Dembiya districts, there are 
cases where rules and regulations are applied appropriately to administer natural resources. 
In some areas there were occasional arrests and detention of local farmers for wetland and 
grazing land encroachments. First they are judged by the community and local 
administrations. If they undertake not to repeat the offence, they will be freed with 
warning.  However, sometimes cases will be directed to social courts and those who are 
found guilty will be penalized by imprisonment or money. Conversely, within the same 
kebeles or districts people who have a strong affiliation with kebele administrators were 
allowed to cultivate common wetlands, even they were not given warnings to stop their 
wrong doings. As a result, community members were confused about the administration 
procedures and for whom these rules and regulations are applied or not applied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
7.5 Chapter summary  
 
In summary, CPR governance interaction between the systems to-be-governed and 
governing system takes place at different levels of the governance hierarchy spanning from 
the constitutional to the operational level. The systems to be governed (natural and human 
sub-systems) are dynamic; hence governance too must be flexible and open to change 
(Bavinck et al. 2005). A very good governance system demands that all relevant 
stakeholders’ interests, values and power are identified, reconciled and appropriate 
relationships established and maintained. Moreover the governing bodies have 
responsibilities to have a clear understanding of the context of the system to-be-governed 
and stakeholders involved.  
 
The outcome of the research questions highlights that an assessment of the relationship 
between the conditions under which policy and legal instruments are devised at 
constitutional level, and institutional contexts within which they are applied at operational 
level, reveals that a top down governing structure, a non-participatory policy and 
rulemaking process hindered a smooth relationship and plausible communication between 
the governors and the system to-be-governed. The existing institutional arrangements are 
not clear and open to all stakeholders. They are also inefficient and not transparent in 
meeting the high expectations of users in equitable, fair and sustainable CPR use and 
management.  
 
Central-local incongruence has created a gap to harmonize the formal and informal rules in 
CPR contexts. Formal laws were enacted without considering the local context where 
community bylaws operated and even without the consent and consciousness of resource 
users and other relevant stakeholders. Potential stakeholders were not part of the policy and 
rulemaking process. They were not even consulted on issues of the CPR management and 
governance in their jurisdiction.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The study set out to explore the current state and dynamics of CPRs, overall institutional 
environment, common-pool resource governance system and multi-stakeholder 
interactions in the context of sustainability and environmental changes. The study sought 
to address the following research questions: (1) what are the current states and dynamics of 
CPRs and its policy implication for livelihood security and sustainable CPR use, 
management and governance? (2) What are the drivers of change that affect CPR use, 
management and governance? (3) Who are the key players in the process of CPR use, 
management and governance and what are their interests and power over CPRs? (4) Why 
do conflicts arise among stakeholders and what are the underlying causes of conflict and 
resolution mechanisms? (5) What are the existing institutional arrangements that govern 
the behavior of CPR users and what are the factors influencing the effectiveness of CPR 
management and governance system? 
 
The broad aim was to contextualize and better understand the complex socio-ecological 
interactions of CPR management and governance system in the Lake Tana sub-basin using 
an integrated Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) and Interactive Governance 
(IG) framework. The reasons for applying an integrated approach were, firstly, the Lake 
Tana ecosystem comprises of very complex, dynamic and sensitive social-ecological 
systems that require a broad perspective to understand the real problems from different 
point of view. Secondly, to exploit the advantages both frameworks offer (both 
complement each other to maximize their strengths and minimize the weaknesses).  
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Generalization of findings has always been a sensitive issue for all case based research 
findings. However by considering Lake Tana sub-basin as a broad case that comprises the 
Lake Tana (water), fish and wetland commons sub-cases, this research has come up with 
relevant conclusions and recommendations specifically for Lake Tana sub-basin and that 
could also have relevance in similar contexts beyond the sub-basin. The following sub-
sections address the conclusion of major findings of this study, the theoretical and policy 
implications followed by recommendations and proposal for future research in the sub-
basin.   
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8.2 Conclusions from the study 
 
The outcome of the first research question addressing the current states and dynamics of 
CPRs and its policy implication clearly shows that, Lake Tana Ecosystem has a national 
and global significance on which huge livelihood, economic and socio-cultural systems are 
highly dependent. It is considered as one of the key growth corridors selected by the 
Ethiopian government for development.  As a result Lake Tana ecosystem is under severe 
threats of development pressure and resource degradation. A number of development 
activities with potential negative externalities have been taking place in and around Lake 
Tana. As a result, CPRs are being over exploited and degraded beyond their harvestable 
limit. Research reports also show that there are loss of some fish species and extinction of 
endemic labeobarbs. For the last two decades there has been a dramatic loss of wetlands in 
Lake Tana sub-basin. The Lake water is being polluted due to industrial waste, agricultural 
practices and poor municipal sewerage system.  All these development pressures coupled 
with global environmental changes have cast doubt on the sustainability of the use value of 
Lake Tana in general and other CPRs in particular. 
 
The second research question regarding the drivers of change that affect CPR use, 
management and governance reveals that, due to dramatic population and development 
pressure, unclear property rights, uncontrolled resource use pattern and subsequent 
resource demand, natural resources are increasingly subject to intense competition and 
overexploitation in Ethiopia and Lake Tana sub-basin in particular. The problem is 
worsening in cases of CPRs where property rights issues and rules governing these 
resources are unclear and it is difficult to exclude potential users from the resource system. 
As a result, resource user groups and other stakeholders with diverse interests in and power 
over CPRs (water, fish and wetlands) are confronted with a broad array of resource use, 
management and governance problems in the past two decades.  
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The outcome of the third research question that depicts the key players in the process of 
CPR use, management and governance highlights the existence of multi-stakeholders in 
the sub-basin. When the multi-purpose values of the whole Lake Tana sub-basin are 
considered, there are multiple stakeholders with diverse interest in and power over CPR 
use, management and governance. The stakeholder identification and analysis reveals that 
the Bureau of Environmental Protection Land Use and Administration, the Bureau of 
Agriculture, the Bureau of Water and Energy, Administration (from Federal to local level), 
and Local Communities had a particularly strong and legitimate claim to manage and 
govern CPRs in the study area.  
 
The fourth research question addresses the reasons why conflict arise and the underlying 
causes of conflict and resolution mechanisms. The outcome clearly shows that access and 
availability of basic CPRs has been declining leaving the wider community vulnerable to 
resource scarcity and seasonal shocks. At community level competition over declining 
CPRs has sparked internal conflicts between individuals, between groups, between 
individuals and groups. Intercommunity conflicts are occurring between neighboring or 
bordering villages and districts. Due to unclear property rights, unclear boundaries between 
land use and bordering kebeles and/or districts, incompatible interests of stakeholders and 
scarcity of resources, conflict over CPRs in Lake Tana sub-basin is increasing. Based on 
the type and severity of conflicting scenarios, both formal (court/justice system) and 
informal ways of conflict resolution mechanisms are practiced in the area. Although they 
are not effective as before and weakened by distrust among community members and 
insufficient support from local government, a range of traditional or non-formal methods 
were used to manage or solve CPR-related conflict at community and intercommunity 
level. 
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At higher levels there are divergent and often conflicting interests of stakeholders, an 
overlap of mandates over CPR use, management and governance. Those mandates are not 
clear and usually overlap under the broad umbrella of natural resource management and 
governance. Despite this overlap, in the Ethiopian natural resource management and 
governance context, the executive powers of stakeholders are usually determined by the 
political powers of individuals leading the organizations at different levels of governance. 
Though vested with different powers to administer and control natural resources, the real 
powers of the executive agencies both at Federal and Regional level are manifested in the 
political power of individuals who lead the agencies or ministries. To be accepted by other 
stakeholders as a legitimate decision maker on CPR issues, the power given to the 
executive agencies by the Law of the land has to be in line with the political capital of the 
leaders.   
 
The last research question that addresses the performance of existing institutional 
arrangements to govern the behavior of CPR users and the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of CPR use, management and governance shows that the current natural 
resource governance structures are not effective in managing and governing CPRs. Ideally, 
the governance interaction between the governance system (institutions and the governor) 
and the system-to-be governed (the natural and human sub-systems) has to come up with a 
positive outcome (such as efficiency in resource use, equity in distributional outcomes, 
stakeholder participation, accountability and adaptability of the system etc.) in order to 
guarantee sustainable natural resource use, management and governance in Lake Tana sub-
basin. However, if one has to ask whether the present-day natural resource governance 
system of Ethiopia is effective and appropriate for the current and anticipated future 
developments in Lake Tana sub-basin or not, the likely answer is ‘no’. While there are 
natural resource policies, laws and regulations enacted at constitutional and in the 
collective choice arena, implementation and enforcement of these policies and laws at user 
level is not satisfactory.  
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Besides, a top-down and non-participatory policy formulation, law and decision making 
process overlooks the local context (local knowledge and informal institutions) and fails to 
understand the dynamic, complex and sensitive nature of the natural and human sub-
systems. This seriously affects the CPR use, management and governance system in the 
region. The natural resource management and governance system has failed to attain basic 
procedural principles (such as transparency, accountability, comprehensiveness, inclusive, 
representativeness, informed and empowerment of all interest groups). The management 
and governance of natural resources is not well devolved to the lowest possible level with 
technical and financial capability. As a result legitimate stakeholders were not consulted 
and involved in the natural resource management and governance-related decision making 
process. 
 
At a constitutional level, the government’s existing policy and institutional framework for 
natural-resource management and the environment seems adequate and sound. Policies are 
mainstreamed in sectoral programmes which are implemented at the Federal, Regional and 
district (wereda) levels. The problem however lies in the effective implementation of 
policies and enforcement of proclamations, laws, rules and regulations at operational level. 
Though rules and regulations that govern CPRs are enacted at the highest level of 
hierarchy, they are not implemented effectively at the user level. Due to central-local 
incongruence, government technical agencies and local level governance structures have 
been ineffective in managing and governing CPRs. It seems they are neither able to replace 
many of the resource management and governance functions previously provided by 
indigenous cultural and communal institutions nor complement the informal institutions. 
 
That means there is a communication and/or implementation gap between the governing 
system (policy/law making and executive agencies at constitutional/collective choice level) 
and the system to be governed (particularly the social subsystem in which the human 
element is the crucial component). This reveals that community participation in the rule 
making process is very minimal. Relevant stakeholders at the user level were not involved 
in the policy/law making process. As well as non-involvement in the process, once the 
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rules and regulations were enacted they were not well informed about the rules of the 
game, to better practice the rules and regulations that govern their behavior in relation to 
CPR use, management and governance.  
 
Generally management and governance problems of the Lake Tana ecosystem are 
expected to worsen in the coming years as population, hydropower and irrigation demands, 
and other development activities continue to increase. Researchers and environmental 
activists have sounded alarm bells concerning the threats to Lake Tana and recommended 
more policy intervention and action research to protect the Lake ecosystem from the 
serious challenges that it faces.  In addition, there is global and regional research evidence 
that indicates the current threats possibly will have unprecedented impact on the region’s 
social, economic and environmental conditions. Unless timely, protective policy 
intervention measures are put in place and awareness is created among potential 
stakeholders, there might be serious environmental degradation which ultimately ends up 
with a complete collapse of the whole ecosystem.  
 
The following section depicts the theoretical and policy implication of this research.   
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8.3 Theoretical and policy implications  
 
 
Most governance analyses focus on static descriptions and embrace only a part of the 
processes of importance from a disciplinary perspective (Pahl-Wostl & Toonen, 2009). 
Young (2008) also noted that knowledge regarding the nature of change in the institutional 
dimensions of socio-ecological systems remains relatively underdeveloped. He further 
highlighted the need for an integrative approach towards analysing governance processes 
in social-ecological systems from a broad perspective. Complex and dynamic socio-
economic and environmental systems are difficult to be represented and explained by a 
single theory or framework. Therefore this research contributes towards integrating 
different theories (such as governance theory and CPR theory). It also provides further 
insights into how Institutional Analysis and Development and Interactive Governance 
frameworks can be integrated to understand complex, dynamic and sensitive systems. 
Besides, the study is interdisciplinary in nature drawing on different theories and 
approaches that link different fields such as institutional economics, governance, 
management, ecology, politics and system thinking among others.  
 
This study confirms that degradation of common-pool resources due to human and 
economic development activities in and around Lake Tana coupled with climate change 
has been considered as one of the critical challenges faced by local community and other 
stakeholders. This is mainly due to lack of a clear resource governance system, 
comprehensive policies, or integrated environmental and development goals. There are 
sectoral policies (such as water management policy) but there is a lack of coherence among 
policies and there is no holistic approach to mitigate the environmental degradation in the 
sub-basin.  
 
Evidence from several studies, including Hailu (2005) and this thesis seems to point to the 
fact that a one sector-few stakeholder policy, management and governance approach such 
as a water-only policy framework, top down rule making and enforcement strategies could 
not  address the problems of other CPRs (i.e fish, wetland) in the sub-basin. Therefore, this 
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study has used empirical findings to show that the current natural resource management 
policy framework (such as water resource management, land  and environmental policies) 
is not comprehensive enough to incorporate the knowledge and interests of all potential 
stakeholders, and fails to engage relevant and/or grass root level stakeholders in the 
process of policy formulation and implementation.  
 
Integrated and multi-stakeholder approaches are usually put in place only on paper rather 
than implemented at the grassroots level. Policies have not been comprehensive enough to 
address specific resource systems like fish and wetlands, rule and policy making processes 
were not participatory to address multi-stakeholder interests. Overall, the Ethiopian natural 
resource governance system lacks coherent policy and governance structures that depict 
the degree to which policy, program, and institutional arrangements agree in intent, are 
consistent and logically connected to the operational level. As a result, the policy 
framework failed to take into account local social structures and existing traditional 
community bylaws and institutions in a specific context.  
 
A multi-stakeholder perspective to CPR use, management and governance suggests the 
need to look beyond the traditional one-sector-single stakeholder approach to recognize 
and explore the complex socioeconomic, cultural relationships and interactions through 
which local community, private investors, governmental, non-governmental, national and 
international stakeholders are engaged in the process and interact to come up with an 
innovative solution.  
 
The theoretical implications of this study suggests the need for bottom-up and inclusive 
policy planning, management and governance approaches, where grassroots level 
stakeholders are involved at all stages of policy planning, implementation and decision 
making. The outcome of this research supports the shift from the government to a new 
governance approach and interactive governance theory whereby policy making 
procedures have become more communicative and more participatory, concerned with the 
exercise and distribution of power and responsibilities, the ways in which decisions are 
taken, and the participatory practices used to ensure those stakeholders affected by 
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decision-making are able to have an input in the process of resource management and 
governance (Edelenbos, 2005; Kooiman et al. 2008; Lockwood et al. 2010). Hence, 
devolved and collaborative governance arrangements are needed to provide more co-
ordinated approaches to the challenges presented by complex problems, and attempt to 
integrate activities of diverse stakeholders, instruments and institutions (Howlett & Rayner 
2006).  
 
In complex situations such as the Lake Tana sub-basin where the State is undermining the 
roles of local community and local institutions co-management approach is essential. Co-
management is a hybrid regime combining centralized and decentralized, state and 
community institutions in which several degrees of power and responsibilities are shared 
between State regulations and self-governing local level institutions for the management 
and governance of CPRs (Feeny et al. 1990; Singleton, 2000).  
 
Singleton (2000) indicated that co-management has the potential to succeed where both 
States and communities alone have failed. It opens up new possibilities for constructive 
engagement between state and communities. She further explained that the basic rationale 
for co-management is grounded in both efficiency and legitimacy. The efficiency argument 
is twofold: first, both higher quality and less costly information is available in a co-
management process because local knowledge about the functioning of a particular 
ecosystem (such as Lake Tana ecosystem) can be combined with scientific knowledge 
produced by state agency scientists (from research institutes and higher institutions), to 
produce a more complete, finely-tuned set of information upon which to base management 
and governance decisions; and second, monitoring and enforcement of rules and 
regulations can be more effective by virtue of being local, while oversight by state 
regulators interjects some measure of accountability to the larger collectively. The 
legitimacy of the system is enhanced by involvement of resource user-groups community 
members and other relevant stakeholders, which may result in people being more willing 
to comply voluntarily with and even exceed the requirements placed upon them. 
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From the natural systems point of view, Lake Tana ecosystem demands the governing 
system endeavor to realize a holistic approach and understand the whole system rather than 
its components. It operates as a system, and has its own dynamics and characteristics, and 
not merely as a collection of individual components such as water, fish and wetlands. Lake 
Tana comprises of mutually interrelated components of river system, water, wetlands, fish 
and other aquatic resources characterized by a continuous state of evolution and change, 
spanning many sectors as well as international, national, regional and local spheres of 
government. 
 
This implies that a one component or sub-system approach like water-only policy 
framework may not address the problems of other CPRs such as fish and wetlands. Water 
policies and strategies alone may not be effective to protect or conserve the aquatic 
ecosystems, rather they have to be integrated with other policies like land use and forestry 
policy (IBC, 2012). A systems thinking approach to problem solving sees each problem of 
the Lake Tana ecosystem as part of the overall system and recognizes that if one part of the 
system is changed to solve one problem, the nature of the overall system is likely to be 
changed as well. Hence Lake Tana ecosystem has to be seen as part of a complex web of 
interconnected and interacting systems and sub-systems, rather than in a narrower sense 
such as a water/fish only approach towards its management and governance. This equally 
forces attention on the bigger picture in terms of wider processes of change at Lake Tana 
sub-basin level, rather than concentrating on discrete sub-systems.  
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8.4 Recommendation 
 
For controlled sustainable development and proper management and governance of the 
Lake Tana ecosystem, enacting legislation at the constitutional level is not a panacea to 
protect resource depletion and minimize conflict among resource users; rather the process 
of rule making should be participatory, it has to be communicated with stakeholders in the 
action situation (where rules interact with stakeholders to reach certain outcomes) and the 
legislation has to be enforced at the user level. Rules and regulations should be integrated 
with the local institutions and have to be devolved to the lowest level of governance where 
community and key stakeholders’ participation is vital for the success of sustainable 
resource use, management and governance. Legitimate stakeholders should be responsible 
and accountable for the overall Lake Tana resource governance system.  
 
Therefore devolution of power to the lowest level is imperative to reconcile the complex 
CPR problems in the sub-basin. Devolution of power to manage and govern CPRs, if it is 
to be effective and equitable, needs to take into accounts the multiple functions and 
heterogeneity of users of CPRs (Williams, 1998). Thus stakeholders have to devise 
innovative ways that reconcile the needs of each stakeholder who has a legitimate stake in 
Lake Tana sub-basin. There should be synergies between agriculture, aquaculture, 
biodiversity, hydropower generation, tourism, wetlands and water resources management. 
Conservation of natural resources through sustainable ecosystem management and planned 
development is the key to secure Lake Tana’s future.  
 
There is also a need to integrate ecosystems conservation and development to ensure 
sustainable resource use and livelihood security for the wider community in the sub-basin 
and beyond (including the downstream riparian countries). Policy-makers need to develop 
policies and practices that distinguish between situations where conservation and 
development goals are compatible and situations where there may be conflicts. In order to 
jointly achieve sustainable production, ecosystem/biodiversity, and rural livelihood goals, 
it requires building bridges between often divergent views and interests among stake-
holders. Therefore, the management and governance of complex systems like Lake Tana 
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ecosystem needs to be seen not just from the eyes of the government or resource users but 
also from the points of views of its multiple stakeholders. 
 
The Federal government is the vested power to determine and administer the utilization of 
the waters or rivers and lakes linking two or more Regional states or crossing the 
boundaries of the national territorial jurisdiction (FDRE Constitution, Article 51/11); 
whereas the Regional states are vested power to administer land and other natural 
resources (presumably water bodies in its jurisdiction) in accordance with Federal laws 
(Article 52/2/d). Though Lake Tana is the source of the Blue Nile and involves multi-
stakeholders, it is not shared by any other Regional state. This implies that the Regional 
government has a constitutional right and mandate to administer the Lake ecosystem. On 
the other hand, the struggle for Nile water utilization among riparian countries has 
witnessed tensions in recent times. This scenario will have strong and uncertain 
repercussions on Lake Tana sub-basin resource utilization and development (particularly 
water resource development).    
 
Therefore, there should be a strong and legitimate Lake Tana ecosystem management and 
governance system. The establishment of a Lake Tana ecosystem governance structure 
and/or authority, by the Council of Amhara National Regional State is recommended for 
the sustainable development in and around Lake Tana Growth Corridor. The governance 
structure and/or authority must be able to set direction and priorities, exercise clear and 
accountable leadership, address conflicting mandates among stakeholders, and facilitate 
decisions across Federal, State and Local authorities and interests in its jurisdiction. The 
most appropriate level and governance structure for the Lake Tana ecosystem may be 
negotiated among relevant stakeholders. It could be structured at subsystem level (fishery, 
wetlands and other resources) under the umbrella of the Lake Tana ecosystem governance. 
Informal CPR institutions at user level are considered as a gate for formal institutions to 
penetrate into the community. Therefore, the governance structure has to be in line with 
and support community based CPR institutional arrangements. 
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In summary, there is no single ‘magic bullet’ solution for CPR use, management and 
governance problems of Lake Tana sub-basin; yet a single stakeholder cannot bring a 
decisive positive change to improve the existing scenario in the region. As Eshete D. 
(2008), pointed out and this research confirmed, Lake Tana ecosystem is a multipurpose 
resource system which could be a source of conflict among stakeholders at different scales 
(local, regional, national and international). Despite some recent initiatives like ‘The Nile 
Basin Initiative’ at sub-regional level (higher level), there are no prominent forums or 
platforms, in the jurisdiction of Lake Tana sub-basin that facilitate the formulation of 
efficient policy frameworks and a governance system. There is no forum that brings 
different stakeholders together. Dialogue is needed to help all stakeholders to understand 
and adopt the principles that will guide their governance system (Bavinck et al. 2005). 
Therefore, it is imperative to organize multi-stakeholder platforms at these levels that 
could facilitate the interaction of stakeholders towards a better outcome in CPR use, and in 
the management and governance system. These platforms will create a conducive 
environment for stakeholders to discuss, negotiate and devise a mechanism to combat 
problems in the process of CPR use, management and governance.  
 
As described by Buck and Scherr (2009), platforms are forums for discussion, debate, 
learning, negotiation, and decision making about a particular issue (such as policy), 
problem, or development strategy. Platforms emphasize vertical communication and 
learning patterns, bringing together diverse stakeholders associated with a particular issue 
including policymakers, scientists, development educators/advisors, local community 
leaders, and local level resource user groups. In addition as Rory and Tina (2011) 
described, multi-stakeholder platforms are decision-making bodies with the mandate of 
allowing stakeholders to bargain over the generation of policy. They are frequently 
employed to address the complex issues involved in managing common-pool resources, 
allowing for representation of indigenous populations (like the Negede woyto community), 
government officials, and private sectors. Behavioral requirements for a platform include 
political will and commitment, openness, accessibility, representation, transparency, and 
fairness.  
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Development is a necessary condition for the survival of developing countries like 
Ethiopia. However, development should not be unsustainable to worsen the existing 
conditions. It has to be planned and implemented without affecting the sustainability of the 
natural resource base, livelihood of the local community and the long-term economic 
growth and the country’s drive towards attaining food security. More importantly, the 
recent environmental catastrophe of the Aral Sea (in Asia, by 2007 it had declined to 10% 
of its original size); Lake Chad (in Africa) and Lake Haromaya (in Ethiopia) should be a 
lesson and a guideline for any development activities around Lake Tana growth corridor in 
general and water resources development in particular. It is not only the presence of 
development that results environmental crises in the form of environmental degradation 
and resources depletion but also the absence of development within the sub-basin can also 
lead to environmental stress (Diong and Allard, 2004). The objective of this research 
conclusion therefore, is not against ‘development’, rather it is recommending ‘wise use of 
resources’ and systemic ways of seeing the Lake Tana ecosystem as a whole for 
sustainable development. 
 
Seeking innovative ways of saving the Lake Tana ecosystem from the serious challenges 
that it faces is imperative for those who have a stake in the Lake Tana sub-basin. 
Particularly, the Amhara National Regional State Council in collaboration with the Federal 
government is responsible to lead the initiative and oversee the Lake ecosystem.  So as to 
better understand the complex scenario of CPRs and come up with comprehensive policy 
options that govern Lake Tana ecosystem, a system thinking approach is recommended in 
the process of policy dialogue, formulation and implementation, and should contribute to 
saving the Lake ecosystem from the foreseeable threats and speculations. It is essential to 
see the Lake ecosystem from its broader perspective than from its parts separately (such as 
water, fish, or wetlands). 
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Finally, keeping the health of Lake Tana ecosystem for sustainable resource utilization and 
socioeconomic development of the local community and the wider population beyond the 
sub-system should be the priority agenda. There is also the Amharic proverb that says that 
‘ታሞ ከመማቀቅ-አስቀድሞ መጠንቀቅ̃; ‘Tamo kememakek-askedimo metenkek’ literally equivalent 
to a notable quote of Benjamin Franklin, ‘an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of 
cure’. This proverb would imply urgent protective measures should be put in place that 
does not compromise a safe and sustainable environmental and socio-economic 
development for the Lake Tana ecosystem. The earlier we protect and conserve the system, 
the better we can save the Lake ecosystem from its current threats.  
 
Given such conditions, simply putting an attractive article in the proclamations, 
legislations and regulations or adding catching words and statements in a contract 
document (like land certificate or leasing documents) about tenure security, Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) and environmental protection is not enough to protect the Lake 
Tana ecosystem. Rather we need genuine political commitment and readiness from the top 
level governance structure to the lower level for the realistic implementation of 
environmental policies, rules, regulations and other protective measures. It is well known 
that there is often a tradeoff between development and conservation goals; however, 
stakeholders have to devise innovative governance systems that result in a ‘win-win’ rather 
than ‘win-lose’ situation. Otherwise, ultimately they might end up with a ‘lose-lose’ 
scenario.   
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8.5 The way Forward: Limitations and Implications for Future Research  
 
Proper research evidence is necessary on the performance and effectiveness of the resource 
governance system particularly at the middle and lower level structure of the system. The 
results and discussions of this research should be supplemented by research conducted so 
far in identifying and defining the major CPR management and governance problems, 
challenges, gaps and alternative solutions in Lake Tana sub-basin. However, due to time, 
financial and other logistical constraints, this study could not address all aspects and the 
big picture of Lake Tana sub-basin. Respondents (both resource users and other key 
informants) may not disclose the realities with regard to sensitive issues like land policy, 
administration and good governance problems. The stakeholders analyzed and presented, 
and CPR cases selected in this research may not be fully comprehensive; rather they are 
intended to provide an initial springboard for further research and participatory law and 
policy making processes. Therefore in some cases the research results presented here are 
considered as indicative (needing further research and evidence) rather than definitive. 
More importantly, the results should ‘sound an alarm bell’ for those who have a ‘stake’ in 
Lake Tana so that they will act together to save the Lake ecosystem from the serious 
challenges that it faces. 
 
This research addressed more observational types of questions (what, who or which) than 
analytical (why or how much) questions regarding CPR use, management and governance 
problems in Lake Tana sub-basin. It is based on an integrated exploratory20 and 
descriptive21 research framework. Therefore, the output of this research is expected to 
facilitate future research (providing more detailed explanations of variables) focusing on 
explaining why different stakeholders pursue goals only based on their interests in the 
process of CPR management and governance? And how and why local or traditional 
conventions are losing ground in governing and managing CPRs at different field settings?. 
 
                                                 
20
 Which is broad in focus and rarely provides definite answers to specific issues. 
21
 which seek to provide an accurate description of observations of a phenomenon. 
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Hence, further research on detailed cause and effect relationships between pertinent 
variables, particularly population growth, new market opportunities, introduction of new 
farming systems (like rice farming), versus status and sustainability of CPRs is 
recommended. In addition this research output could also be used as a precursor for action 
research and policy interventions to delineate a buffer zone around Lake Tana and define 
boundaries between farmlands, wetlands, and grazing lands in Lake Tana sub-basin. 
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Councils of Ministers Regulation No. 151/2008. Negarit Gazeta. Year 14, No. 30. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive  
Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No.  
691/2010. Negarit Gazeta. Year 17, No. 1. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive  
Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 
471/2005. Negarit Gazeta. Year 12, No. 1. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive  
Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No.  
465/2005. Negarit Gazeta. Year 11, No. 55. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation  
No. 299/2002. Negarit Gazeta. Year 9, No. 11. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Environmental Protection Organs Establishment  
Proclamation No. 295/2002. Negarit Gazeta. Year 9, No. 7. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopian Water Resources Managemnt.  
Councils of Ministers Regulation No. 115/2005. Negarit Gazeta. Year 11, No. 27. 
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Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopian Water Resources Management  
Proclamation No. 197/2000. Negarit Gazeta. Year 6, No. 25. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopian Wildlife Development Conservation  
Authority Establishment Proclamation No. 575/2008. Negarit Gazeta. Year 14, No. 
31. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Expropriation of Landholdings for Public  
Purposes and Payment of Compensation Proclamation No. 455/2005. Negarit 
Gazeta. Year 11, No.43. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Fisheries Development and Utilization   
Proclamation No. 315/2003. Negarit Gazeta. Year 9, No. 32. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Forest Development, Conservation and  
Utilization Proclamation No. 542/2007. Negarit Gazeta. Year 13, No. 56. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Institute of Biodiversity Conservation  
Establishment Proclamation No. 120/1998. Negarit Gazeta. Year 4, No. 49. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Payment of Compensation for property situated  
on landholding expropriated for public purposes. Council of Ministers Regulation 
No. 135/2007. Negarit Gazeta.Year13, No.36. 
 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. River Basin Councils and Authorities  
Proclamation No. 534/2007. Negarit Gazeta. Year 13, No. 40. 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Rural Land Administration and Land Use  
Proclamation, Proclamation No. 456/2005. Negarit Gazeta. Year 11, No. 44. 
 
The Revised Amhara National Regional State Rural Land Administration and Use  
Proclamation, Proclamation No. 133/2006. In Zikre Hig: Year 11, No.18. 
 
The Revised Constitution of the Amhara National Regional State, Proclamation No.  
59/2001. Zikre Hig. Year 7, No. 2. 
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10. APPENDICIES  
 
Appendix 1: Participant of stakeholder identification and analysis workshop 
                   Wereta, 2011. 
No Participant’s Name Organization Profession E-mail address/  
Phone number 
1 Addis Minahal (F*)  Bahir Dar University Rural Development addismin2010@yahoo.com  
2 Aklog Tegen Fogera district 
EPLUA 
Environmental resource 
valuation  
aklogtegen@gmail.com 
0918088173 
3 Babiyew Sibhat Libokemkem district 
EPLUA 
Environmental resource 
valuation 
sbabiyew@yahoo.com 
0913258930 
4 Berhanu Moges EWNRA, Fogera Field technician  0918024097 
5 Daniel Nigussie Wereta ATVET 
College 
Agricultural Extension/ 
Educational Planning  
any_266@yahoo.com  
0918768707 
6 Goraw Goshu BDFALRC Environmental Science gorawha@yahoo.com 
0918779854 
7 Keffie Minale EWNRA, Fogera Field office coordinator  mkeffe@yahoo.com 
 0918706794 
8 Melkie Achenef Wereta ATVET 
College 
Forestry  0918700196 
9 Mengistie Taye Bahir Dar University Animal production mengistietaye@yahoo.com 
0918768619 
10 Solomon Addisu Bahir Dar University Natural resource 
management 
soladd2000@yahoo.com 
0911041030 
11 Teklu Damtie Regional EPLUA Ecology  tekludamtie@yaoo.com 
0918706811 
12 Tesfaye Melak Bahir Dar University Fisheries & Aquatic 
Science  
tesfayemelak@yahoo.com 
0911990091 
13 Woldegebrel 
G/Kidan 
Regional EPLUA Environmentalist  wgerekidan@yaoo.com 
0918780444 
14 Yibeltal Ayenachew Bureau of Agriculture 
(Regional) 
Agriculturalist  0918819088 
* F-Female  
Appendix 2: Characteristics of Lake Tana 
 
Source: Compiled from LakeNet, 2012. http://www.worldlakes.org/lakedetails.asp?lakeid=8568 
Characteristics Description 
Location North Western Ethiopia: Latitude (m):12o 10΄0΄΄: Longitude:37o 20΄0΄΄ 
Altitude 1830m 
Volume 28.00Km3  
Surface Area 3,600.00Km3  
Depth Mean depth:9.0m: Maximum depth:14.0m 
Residence Time 1.5 years (Kebede et al. 2009 reported 3 years) 
Origin Volcanic  
Trophic State Mesotrophic 
Type Fresh, permanent, natural 
Catchment Catchment area:16,500.00km3, Catchment/surface area ratio: 5:1 
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Appendix 3: Environmental treaties and conventions ratified by Ethiopia (as of 2012) 
 
 
* But has not ratified the London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Viena (1995), and Beijing (1999) Amendments  
     Year in bracket indicates the year when the treaty first adopted 
 
S.No Treaty/convention/agreement/protocols Date signed/ ratified Proclamation  
1 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1992) 10 June 1992/31 May 1994 No 98/1994 
2 Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety (2000) 24 May, 2000 No 362/2003 
3 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
(1972) 
6 July 1977 - 
4 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(1973) 
5 April 1989 No 14/1970 
5 The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) (1994)  15 October, 1994/27 June 1997 No 80/1997 
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* (1994) 1992 /31 May 1994 No 97/1994 
7  Kyoto protocol on the reduction of greenhouse gases (1997) 1 February 2005 No.439/2005 
8 Convention of the Migratory Species of Wild Animals (1979) 4 June 2009 No. 634/2009 
9 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) 11October 1994 - 
10 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) 11 October 1994/ 25 November 2009  - 
11 The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (2001) 3 November, 2001 No 330/2003 
12 The Basel Convention Amendment  on trans-boundary movement of hazardous waste 
(1995) and Basel protocol  
3 July 2003  No 356/2003/ 
No. 357/2003 
13 The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001) 17 May 2002 / 9 January  2003  No 279/2002 
14 Bamako Convention (1991) 3 July 2003 No. 355/2003 
15 The Rotterdam Convention  on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998) 
2 July, 2002 
 
No 278/2002 
16 Climate Change-The Kyoto Protocol, (1997) 13 July, 2005 No 439/2005 
17 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 10 December 1982/ 8 June 2012 No 742/2012 
18 International Plant protection convention (1951) 2 October 2005 - 
19 Agreement for the Conservation of African Eurasian Migratory Water Birds (1995) 4 June 2009 No. 635/2009 
20 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (1968) 15 September, 1968/not yet ratified - 
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Appendix 4: Interview schedule for the household survey 
 
 
 
General Information  
Name of Respondent: ____________________________________ 
Wereda/district:_________________________________________ 
Ethinicity:_____________________________________________ 
Religion:______________________________________________ 
Kebele/Peasant Association (PA):__________________________ 
Name of Village: ________________________________________ 
Date of interview: _______________________________________ 
Name of enumerator:__________________ Signature:__________ 
Questionnaire code:______________________________________ 
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1. Demographic characteristics of sample of respondents  
No 1.1 Name of HH 
Members  
 
(use the first name only 
and start with the HHH) 
1.2 Sex 
 
Male=1 
Female= 2 
1.3 Age 
 
-----years 
  
1.4 Marital 
Status 
 
Single =1 
Married =2 
Divorced =3 
Widowed  =4  
Never married =5  
1.5 Education Level 
 
Illiterate, no schooling =1  
Adult Education =2  
Grade 1-4 =3  
Grade 5-8 =.4  
Grade 9-10 =5  
Preparatory(11&12) =6  
Other(Religion) =7 
1.6 Occupation  
 
Farming =1 
Farming+off-farm=2 
Farming+Fishing=3 
Farming+Non-farm =4  
 
01       
02       
03       
04       
05       
HH- Household; HHH- Household Head 
NB: please specify those nonfarm and off-farm activities that sample HH engaged in it. 
Off-farm- means the participation of individuals in remunerative work away from a “home plot” of land   
               related to Agriculture. 
Non-farm- means activities that individuals engaged in non-Agricultural activities 
 
 
2. What best describes your role in the community? (Multiple responses possible. Please tick the 
appropriate box(es). 
 
1. Religious leader  
 
 
2.  PA (village) administrator  
 
 
3. Committee member of ----(If any)  
 
 
4. “Militia”  
 
 
5.  Member of kebele/wereda/zone/regional  Cabinet  
 
 
6. An ordinary resident   
 
 
7. Others (specify)……………… 
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3.  Scoring and ranking of livelihood activities 
 
Please give a score of 0 to 5 for each livelihood activities listed below 
 
Activity Income Food Other subsistence 
products 
Total 
Score 
Overall 
Rank 
Crop production 
     
Animal husbandry 
     
Fishery 
     
Wetland grass (Papyrus) collection 
and selling 
     
Wage labor (non-agriculture) 
     
Scoring is on a scale of 0 to 5 (maximum) 
 
 
6. Common pool resource use pattern and management system 
 
A.  Resource use pattern 
6.1 Who determine, who can live in an area and access local resources, and how much of each 
resource different households are allowed to use? Multiple responses possible. Please tick the 
appropriate box(es). 
Decision Makers Who 
can live 
Who can 
access 
How much resource 
allowed to use 
1. Village leaders/kebele administrator     
    
2. Village level natural resource officers 
(DAs) 
   
    
3. Spiritual leaders    
    
4. No one (everybody can live, access and 
use) 
   
    
5. Any other, please specify   -----------------
-- 
   
4. Amount of land owned by the HH in hectares   Owned cultivated 
0-1   
1-1.75   
2-2.75   
3+   
  
 
5. Number of livestock owned in numbers Cattle  
 
Sheep 
 
Goat 
 
Equine  
 
Others (specify)………….. 
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6.2 Who owns and control Common pool resources (Fish & wetlands) in your Locality (multiple 
responses possible. Please tick the appropriate box(es). 
 
Who owns and/or control Owns Control 
1. The community                                                    
   
2. The Government                                                  
   
3. Community & Gov. jointly own and control     
 
  
4. Private/individually                        
 
  
5. It is not clear who own/control       
 
  
6. I do not know   
 
  
7. Other (s) specify ---------   
 
6.3  Do you and your family have access to fish resource in this area? 
1. Yes                2. No       3. We never think of the resource  
6.4  Do you and your family have access to wetlands resources in this area? 
2. Yes                2. No      3. We never think of the resource   
6.5  If the Answers for Question No 6.3 and/or 6.4 is no, what are the reasons behind? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6.6  Which are the problems that you and your family have experienced with respect to the 
CPRs? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
B. Conflict over resource 
 
6.7  From working in other areas, we have seen that conflicts can be very common between 
people living in the same area about the use of CPRs. In your locality, how frequently 
conflict among resource users aroused?  
1. Always         2. Seldom           3 Never happened       4. I don’t know  
6.8 Could you perhaps give some examples of such conflicts in this area? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
6.9  Are conflicts over resource more prevalent in the past 10 years?   
 
1. Yes     2. No  3. I don’t know  
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6.10 In your opinion, what are the nature and sources/causes of Conflict? Multiple responses 
possible.  Please tick the appropriate box(es). 
 
 1. Scarcity of resource and competition due to population growth  
  
 
 2. unclear property rights  
  
 
 3. Unclear boundaries (between land use and bordering kebeles and/or districts)   
  
 
 4. Multiple interest of stakeholders (including Government offices like 
BoARD and EPLUA) 
 
  
 
 5. Poor resource  governance  
   
 6. Any other, please specify   ------------------- 
 
 
6.11 Were you involved in any conflicting issues in relation to CPRs (fish & Wetland)?  
1. Yes       2. No       3.  I don’t remember  
6.12 If yes, what were the causes of the conflict? And how did you manage these conflicts? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
C. Management of conflict 
6.13  Generally in conflicting situations related to CPRs, How the communities resolve these 
situations? Through; Multiple responses possible. Please tick the appropriate box (es). 
 
1. Negotiation1       
 
 
1. Mediation2    
 
 
2.  Arbitration3    
 
 
3. Adjudication4    
 
 
4. Not resolved    
 
 
5. “other” (specify)  
Note: 
 1. Discussion between two parties, working toward reaching agreement, without assistance 
 2. A voluntary process with an impartial third party helping disputing parties to reach a mutually beneficial   
      agreement  
 3.  Using an independent third party to settle a dispute; third party determines a binding settlement 
 4.  Conflict is resolved using the justice system with judge &/or jury  
      (Here, the interviewer has to probe how, when, by whom these situation is resolved and the outcome of the    
       situation) 
6.14 On what conditions do communities use these tool(s) to solve these problems? (hint for 
the interviewer, like the level of conflict whether it is escalated/more of violated or simple dispute among 
users 
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2. Trends in Common-pool resource use and management 
 
6.15  Going back over the past 10 years, Can you recall any changes in general availability 
(supply) of the CP resource system for the community? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
6.16 How do you see the degree of change in availability and your access to these resources? 
1. Major increase                               4. Minor increase   
2. Major decrease                               5. Minor decrease  
3. No change                  
 
6.17 If your answer for Question No 6.16 is major / minor decrease, what are the drivers of 
change (Multiple responses possible. Please tick the appropriate box(es). 
1. Population pressure   
 
 
2. Unclear property rights  
 
 
3. Uncontrolled resource use pattern  
 
 
4. The existence of new market opportunities  
 
 
5. New technologies and development pressure  
 
6.18 Due to the impact of drivers of changes(population, Market etc) in the resource system; 
6.18.1  exclusion from common-pool 
resources; 
1. Increase           3.  No change       
2. Decrease          4. Un noticed       
  
6.18.2 In the volume or rate of use of 
common-pool resources; 
1. Increase            3. No change       
2. Decrease           4. Un noticed      
  
6.18.3 In the supply of common-pool 
resources given the level of demand 
1. Increase             3.No change       
2. Decrease            4. Un noticed     
 
3. Fish resource related  
 
6.19 Do you or your family member engaged in fishing activities? 
 
1. Yes                       2. No     
 
6.20 If yes, how frequently perform fishing per month? 
 
1. Daily     2. 2-3 days/week    3. Once a week     4. Once a month    
5. Sometimes during summer  
 
6.21   For what purpose do you fishing? For; Multiple responses possible. Please tick the appropriate 
box (s). 
 
 
 
288 
 
1. Subsistence (Home consumption)  
  
2. Commercial (Marketing)  
  
3. Recreational  
  
6.22 Around Lake Tana, in which places do you perform your fishing activities? 
 
1. Around rivers and river mouths  
  
2. Near to the Lake boarder  
  
3. In the Lake  
  
4. Others (specify)……..  
 
6.23 What type of Instruments do you use for fishing? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.24 In a catch per unit effort, did you find what you are looking for in the fishing ground?    
       1. Yes         2. No    3. I don’t know    
6.25 If no, what is happening with the fish stocks? Are they, 
1. Increasing              2. Stable           3.Decreasing  
6.26    If decreasing, what are the causes? Multiple responses possible. Please tick the appropriate box 
(s). 
1. Too many fishermen  
 
 
2. Overharvesting of fish  
 
 
3. Uncontrolled fishing gears and Instruments  
 
 
4. Uncontrolled fishing places, season seriously affected the juvenile   
 
 
5. Others (specify)………………………………. 
 
6.27 As compared to the previous times, are returns from the fishery;     
       1. Increasing            2.Stable               3. Decreasing  
6.28 Which of these categories best describes your opinion to the statement,” fish resource is 
being   distributed equitably among the users” 
1. Strongly Disagree      2.  Disagree   3.  Neutral      4.  Agree         5. Strongly Agree  
                                                                                                           
6.29 If the answer to Q(6.28) is 1 & 2, what are the reasons for your disagreement? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6.30 Comparing with the previous years, is the quality of life of the fishers and their families;  
1. Improving                 2. Stable              3. Worsening  
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4.  Knowledge and perception of the legislation, rules and regulation on fishery  
 
6.31 Do you know whether there is fisheries Development, Prevention and utilization 
proclamation and Regulation or not?                  1. Yes       2. No  
6.32 How do you perceive the existence of this proclamation?  
 
1.  Positive  4. None of the above  
 
 
 
 
2.  Negative  5. No effect         
 
 
 
 
 3. Both Negative & positive  6. I don’t know  
 
6.33 Are there any written bylaws (rules and regulations) that limit access to the resource 
system? Eg. Rules that limit the amount, timing and technology used to withdraw resource 
units 
 
1. Yes                 2. No              3.  I don’t know   
6.34 If the answer for Question No  6.33 is  yes, How do you see the acceptance of these 
rules and regulations by the community 
1. High             2. Medium                  3. Low              4. I don’t know    
6.35 If the answer for Question No  6.33 is  yes, which of these categories best describes 
your opinion on the rules and regulations of resource use and management 
 
1. I strongly support it                       4. I somewhat oppose it                                    
  
2. I somewhat support it                    5. I strongly oppose it                  
  
3. I do not support nor oppose it        
  
6.36 If the answer to Q (6.35) is 1 & 2, in what manner would you demonstrate this support? 
Under what conditions would you choose NOT to support? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
6.37 If the answer to Q (6.35) is 4 & 5, in what manner would you demonstrate this 
opposition? Under what conditions would you come to support? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.38  I consider these Rules and regulations to be efficient and transparent in managing CPRs 
 
1. Strongly Disagree 2.  Disagree     3.  Neutral        4.  Agree         5. Strongly Agree  
                                                                                                            
6.39   Please rate how well the institutional arrangements (rules and regulations) are clear & 
open to all users 
 
1. Very poor             2. Poor               3. Medium             4. Good              5. Very good 
                                                                                                                
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5. Wetland resource related 
I.  Farmers perception towards wetlands 
What do you feel about the Wetlands in your localities?  
6.40 I feel, wetlands should be used for cattle grazing to produce milk.     
1.    Strongly Disagree      2.  Disagree   3.  Neutral      4.  Agree         5. Strongly Agree  
                                                                                                                              
 
6.41 I feel, wetlands were not very useful except for the provision of materials for 
thatching and   making crafts 
1. Strongly Disagree      2.  Disagree    3.  Neutral        4.  Agree         5. Strongly Agree  
                                                                                                         
 
6.42 wetlands played a vital role in groundwater regulation, flood control and other 
related benefits    
1. Strongly Disagree      2.  Disagree    3.  Neutral        4.  Agree         5. Strongly Agree  
                                                                                                                             
 
6.43 All wetlands should be conserved and gazette so that they could be protected by law.      
1. Strongly Disagree      2.  Disagree    3.  Neutral        4.  Agree         5. Strongly Agree  
                                                                                                         
 
6.44 Wetlands are wastelands which could be put to better use.            
1. Strongly Disagree      2.  Disagree    3.  Neutral        4.  Agree         5. Strongly Agree  
                                                                                                                                             
 
6.45 Wetlands are the sources of Malaria, so that they should be drained and used for 
other 
1. Strongly Disagree      2.  Disagree    3.  Neutral        4.  Agree         5. Strongly Agree  
                                                                                                                                                
6.46 Do community members in your locality started to cultivate Wetlands (particularly for 
crop production)? 
1. Yes                              2.  No   
6.47 If yes, when & how was the community members started cultivating/particularly for 
crop production/ the wetlands? 
II. Management and governance of wetlands  
6.48   Who is in charge of managing and governing these wetlands? Multiple responses possible. 
Please tick the appropriate box (s). 
1. Kebele and Wereda Administrators/ leaders at grassroots level  
 
 
2. Office of Agriculture and RD and Environmental Authority & Land Admin  
 
 
3. Elected Community members  
 
 
4. Some Powerful group (The wealthy group)  
 
 
5. No one is in charge  
 
 
6. Others (specify)…………  
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6.49 Do you think that, the present management and governance regime is fair, efficient and 
promote sustainable use of wetland resources?   1. Yes    2. No   3. I don’t know      
6.50  If your answer to Question No 6.49 is No, in your opinion, who should manage and 
govern the wetlands to promote sustainable use? 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
6.51 Is there any written and unwritten by-laws restricting agricultural use of wetlands in 
your localities?   
1. Yes        2.  No           3. I don’t know  
6.52  If yes, who is in charge of enforcing these bylaws? Multiple responses possible. Please tick the 
appropriate box (s). 
1. Kebele and wereda leaders/administrators  at grassroots level  
 
 
2. Government officials at different hierarchy (Office of 
Agriculture &RD and Environmental Authority & Land Admin) 
 
 
 
3. Justice at different level of Administration  
 
 
4. Police or “Militia”  
 
 
5. Elected Community members  
 
 
6. Religious leaders  
 
 
7. No one is in charge  
6.53  Is there any, customary laws, practices, tenure systems and institutions of indigenous 
and local communities, which promote sustainable use of wetland resources?  
1. Yes      2. Yes they were but they didn’t exist today  3. No    4.  I don’t know   
6.54 If your answer for the above Question is 1 & 2 Please describe in details 
______________________________________________________ 
6.55 Are wetlands in your locality converted into other forms?  
2. Yes                         2. No                    3. I don’t know   
6.56  If yes, which human activity is most threatening to the wetland ecosystem?  
 
1. Drainage related to health        4. Construction              
  
2. Conversion to crop land           5. Excessive grazing      
  
3. Unplanned investment             6.. others (specify--------- 
6.57 Finally, in order to use, protect and govern CPRs sustainably, what should be done? 
What should be the roles of the Government, Community and other stakeholders? 
 
Thank you for your patience!!! 
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Appendix 5: Focus group discussion and key informant interview checklist 
 
 
 
The following checklists were used for group discussion and key informant interview. 
Discussion questions asked of group discussant and key informants are listed below. Due to the 
flow of discussion or time limitations, all questions might not have been asked in each and 
every discussion and new issues that come out from the discussion were also discussed.  
 
A. Overall assessment of CPR use, management and governance  What are the major threats of CPRs (particularly Lake Tana, fishery and wetlands) in 
your locality?  What are the major driving forces that affect the trends and dynamics of CPRs in the 
sub-basin?  Are members of the community competing with one another to maximize their 
individual 'take' from the commons? Who else is involved in resource capture?  Do resource users face a high level of uncertainty over CPR access and availability and 
are they highly dependent upon the resource with limited livelihood options which 
would provide an incentive for low compliance with rules and non-conforming 
behavior?  Have total catches been falling over time?  Is catch per unit effort increasing or decreasing?  What is happening with the fish stocks?   Are they increasing, stable or decreasing?   Are returns from the fishery increasing, stable or decreasing?   Are they being distributed equitably among the users?   Is the quality of life of the fishers and their families improving, stable or worsening 
from previous years?  Are there geographical boundaries for the fishery? How are they defined?  Are there restrictions on who can enter the fishery? How are they defined?  Are there any other boundaries relevant to the exploitation of fishery? What are they? 
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B. Conflict assessment  What conflicts exist at present in relation to CPRs?  What conflicts are not yet visible, but might arise in the future?   What are possible reasons for conflicts over resource use, management and 
governance? 
     If a conflict has been identified in certain localities:  How did the conflict arise?  What issues/interests does the conflict concern?   How long has it been going on?  Is conflict increasing or decreasing in the past 10 years?  Who is involved in these conflicts?  What are their interests in the conflict?  What kind of official and/or traditional power do they have?  What are historical relationships between conflicting groups in the sub-basin/districts or 
kebeles?  Can the groups work together at all?  Why or why not?  Can the problem be solved internally or amongst groups without external assistance?   Are outsiders tolerated?  How can an outsider be involved to (re)solve the conflict?  What kind of outsider?  How can solutions/resolutions be made sustainable?  Are written agreements sufficient?  Are there also other optional ‘solutions’?  How frequently conflict among resource users aroused?  Are conflicts over CPR more prevalent in the past 10 years?   In conflicting situations related to CPRs, How the communities resolve these situations 
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C. Institutional arrangement and resource governance  
  Who owns and control common-pool resources (Lake Tana/water, Fish & wetlands)?  What is the role of local government on CPR management and governance?   Who is eligible to make decisions in CPR use, management and governance issues?   What actions are allowed or constrained? And what procedures must be followed?  what payoffs will be assigned to affected individuals  What are the main characteristics of the leadership? Are the leaders considered 
legitimate? And how are decisions taken eg. Consensus, majority?  What are the formal and informal rules on access and withdrawal rights to CPRs?   Are there any written bylaws (rules and regulations) that limit access to the resource 
system?  Are the existing formal institutional arrangements effective in governing natural 
resources in general and CPRs in particular?  What about the traditional resource management and governance systems?  What boundary conditions (social, economic, physical, legal) apply to the regulation of?  What are the main factors determining the way in which decisions are made for 
operational and collective choice rules?   How decisions are made (consensus/majority/autocratic)?  Which types of decisions are made through consensus/majority/autocratically   Are all stakeholders represented in the decision-making process and how?  What is the level of participation of user groups/stakeholders in the decision-making 
process?  Are women and youths represented and how?  What are user and stakeholder attitudes/values towards decision-making processes?  What are user and stakeholder attitudes/values towards rule-breaking?   How much legitimacy do the rules and regulations have with users?  How are formal and informal rules enforced? What sanctions are used?  How do users perceive the utility of the rules?  What resources are available for monitoring and enforcement rules and regulations? 
